


A Culture of Peace? Ethnic Partitioning in Pakistan and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

by

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*Thesis presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Political Science in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at
Stellenbosch University*

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March 2020

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Abstract

Ethnic partitioning is regarded as a solution to ethnic conflict that aims to achieve a degree of negative peace, defined as the absence of violence. While negative peace is an important element of contemporary peace studies, in the recent decades there has been a new appreciation for positive peace, especially as it relates to conflict resolution theory. A problem can be identified while reviewing the literature on ethnic partitioning pertaining to its relevance as a method of conflict resolution for its main assumptions are primarily based on principles of negative peace. Most of these assumptions do not directly relate to fostering values associated with positive peace that are now regarded as essential for sustaining a peaceful environment. For this reason, this study has aimed to assess the success of ethnic partitioning as a method of conflict resolution, incorporating elements of both negative and positive peace. In doing so, it has assessed its ability to foster a sustainable culture of peace.

A research design and methodology must enable a thorough assessment of ethnic partitioning's ability to foster a sustainable culture of peace in a variety of contexts as this will lead to a conclusion as to whether ethnic partitioning can be regarded as an effective method of conflict resolution. A case study comparative analysis is the most optimal method for this assessment as it is able to compare cases of ethnic partitioning in relation to various cultural and identity factors associated with a culture of peace. To structure this analysis, the cases of Pakistan and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) have been compared against the prescriptions for a culture of peace outlined in the official United Nations' "Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace", or more specifically, De Rivera's (2004) categorisation of these prescriptions and indicators into four distinct dimensions, namely liberal development, violent inequality, state use of violent means, and nurturance. The two cases were assessed on whether they fulfilled the prescriptions for a culture of peace in each dimension.

The comparative analysis has found that ethnic partitioning has failed to foster a sustainable culture of peace in Pakistan and the TRNC as all dimensions outlined by De Rivera (2004) are linked to norms associated with exclusion, intolerance, blame and violence. While ethnic partitioning aims to decrease the intensity of the security dilemma naturally stimulated through

ethnic conflict, in the long-term the security dilemma is only extended and heightened. When a country is partitioned and violent processes associated with homogenisation are implemented, the points of contention that sparked the ethnic conflict are only further entrenched and new points of contention and hostility are created. The fear associated with living amongst hostile members of an opposing ethnic group are merely transformed into fears of international violence and potential invasion. In conclusion, this comparative analysis of the cases of Pakistan and the TRNC has found that ethnic partitioning, having been analysed as a method of conflict resolution, is unable to foster a sustainable culture of peace.

Samevatting

Etniese partisie word beskou as 'n konflikbestuursmetode wat ten doel het om 'n mate van negatiewe vrede, wat omskryf word as die afwesigheid van geweld, te bewerkstellig. Hoewel negatiewe vrede 'n belangrike element van hedendaagse vrestudies is, is daar in onlangse dekades 'n nuwe waardering vir positiewe vrede, veral wat konflik-oplossingsteorie betref. 'n Probleem kan geïdentifiseer word terwyl die letterkunde oor etniese partisie nagegaan word, betreffende die toepaslikheid daarvan as 'n konflik-oplossingsmetode, want die vernaamste aannames daarvoor word hoofsaaklik gegrond op beginsels van negatiewe vrede. Die meeste van hierdie aannames word nie direk in verband gebring daarmee om waardes te kweek wat met positiewe vrede geassosieer word nie, wat tans as noodsaaklik beskou word om 'n vredsamese omgewing te handhaaf. Hierdie studie het daarom ten doel om die sukses van etniese partisie as 'n konflik-oplossingsmetode vas te stel, en dit sluit elemente van beide negatiewe en positiewe vrede in. In die loop daarvan het dit die mate bepaal waartoe etniese partisie in staat is om 'n volhoubare vredeskultuur te kweek.

'n Navorsingsontwerp en -metodologie moet 'n deeglike beoordeling moontlik maak van die vermoë van etniese partisie om 'n volhoubare vredeskultuur in 'n verskeidenheid kontekste te kan kweek, aangesien dit tot 'n gevolgtrekking sal lei of etniese partisie 'n effektiewe konflik-oplossingsmetode is. 'n Vergelykendegeleding-gevallestudie is die beste metode vir hierdie beoordeling, aangesien dit gevalle van etniese partisie kan vergelyk met betrekking tot verskillende kulturele en identiteitsfaktore wat met 'n vredeskultuur verband hou. Om hierdie ontleding te struktureer is die gevalle van Pakistan en die Turkse Republiek van Noord-Ciprus (TRNC) vergelyk met die voorskrifte vir 'n vredeskultuur soos omskryf in die Verenigde Nasies se amptelike "Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace" of meer spesifiek, De Rivera (2004) se kategorisering van hierdie voorskrifte en aanwysers in vier duidelike dimensies, naamlik liberale ontwikkeling, gewelddadige ongelykheid, geweld wat deur die regering gebruik, en koestering. Die twee gevalle is beoordeel op grond daarvan of hulle in elke dimensie aan die voorskrifte vir 'n vredeskultuur voldoen het.

Die vergelykende ontleding het bevind dat etniese partisie in gebreke gebly het om 'n volhoubare vredeskultuur in Pakistan en die TRNC te kweek, aangesien al die dimensies wat deur De Rivera (2004) omskryf is gekoppel is aan norme wat verband hou met uitsluiting, onverdraagsaamheid, blamering en geweld. Hoewel etniese partisie dit ten doel het om die intensiteit van die sekuriteitsdilemma, wat uiteraard deur etniese konflik gestimuleer word, te laat afneem, word die sekuriteitsdilemma oor die lang termyn net verleng en verskerp. Wanneer 'n land gepartisie word en gewelddadige prosesse wat met homogenisasie verband hou geïmplementeer word, word die twispunte wat die etniese konflik veroorsaak het net verder gevestig en ontstaan nuwe twispunte en vyandigheid. Die vrees wat verband hou daarmee om tussen vyandiggesinde lede van 'n etniese teenparty te bly word bloot omskep in die vrees vir internasionale geweld en potensiële inval. Ter afsluiting, het hierdie vergelykende ontleding van die gevalle van Pakistan en die TRNC bevind dat etniese partisie, ontleed as 'n konflik-oplossingsmetode, nie in staat is daartoe om 'n volhoubare vredeskultuur te kweek nie.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Stellenbosch University for providing me with the opportunity to complete my master's degree on a topic that I have been interested in for many years. The facilities provided by the University have always been efficient and have allowed me to complete my studies with as much ease as possible. More specifically, the Library staff have always been very helpful with guiding and providing me with information that has been crucial to my study. More importantly, I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Cindy Steenekamp, for encouraging me to research and write to the best of my ability and guide me when I experienced any form of uncertainty or confusion. Her precision and enthusiasm as a researcher and supervisor has inspired me to appreciate all aspects of the research process.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction to Study.....	1
1.1 Introduction and rationale	1
1.2 Background to study	3
1.2.1 Conflict resolution	3
1.2.2 Post-conflict efforts toward peace	4
1.2.3 Understanding ethnic conflict	5
1.2.4 Ethnic partitions	6
1.2.5 Ethnic partitioning in Pakistan and the TRNC	7
1.3 Problem statement and research questions	8
1.4 Research design and methodology.....	9
1.4.1 Case study research design	9
1.4.2 A comparative analysis	12
1.5 Contribution of the study	14
1.6 Chapter outline.....	15
Chapter 2: Theoretical and Conceptual Framework	17
2.1 Introduction.....	17
2.2 The role of Realist conflict management in peace studies.....	18
2.3 Developments in peace and conflict studies in the 21st century	23
2.4 Conceptualising conflict resolution	31
2.5 Identity and culture in the process of conflict resolution.....	36
2.6 Ethnic partitioning	39
2.6.1 The logic of ethnic partitioning.....	40
2.6.2 A critique of ethnic partitioning.....	43
2.7 Conclusion	49
Chapter 3: A Culture of Peace as an Analytical Tool	50
3.1 Introduction.....	50
3.2 Contemporary peace	50
3.3 The United Nations and a culture of peace	53
3.3.1 The four dimensions of the Declaration.....	55
3.4 Conclusion	62
Chapter 4: A Comparative Analysis of Pakistan and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as products of ethnic partitioning	64
4.1 Introduction.....	64
4.2 The case of Pakistan.....	64

4.2.1	Brief political history and contextualisation	64
4.2.2	A culture of peace in Pakistan	69
4.3	The case of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus	83
4.3.1	Brief political history and contextualisation	83
4.3.2	A culture of peace in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus	86
4.4	A comparative analysis of Pakistan and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus ..	100
4.4.1	Political history	101
4.4.2	Liberal development	102
4.4.3	Violent inequality.....	104
4.4.4	State use of violent means.....	106
4.4.5	Nurturance.....	108
4.5	Conclusion	110
	Chapter 5: Conclusions and Significance	112
5.1	Introduction.....	112
5.2	Theoretical framework and analytical tool	112
5.3	Summary of main findings.....	114
5.4	Implications of findings	117
5.5	Recommendations for future research	119
	Bibliography	122

List of Figures

Figure 1: Pakistan in 1947	66
Figure 2: Map of Pakistan	68
Figure 3: Map of Cyprus	85

Chapter 1: Introduction to Study

Homes became strange places, strange places now had to be claimed as home, a line was drawn to mark a border, and boundaries began to find reflection in people's lives and minds. You had to partition your mind, and close off all those areas that did not fit the political division around you

(Butalia, 1998:361).

1.1 Introduction and rationale

Ethnic partitions are considered the final resort when all other efforts toward conflict resolution have been exhausted. Very broadly understood, an ethnic partition is characterised as a solution to ethnic conflict, whereby warring populations are territorially separated, with the use of population transfers where necessary, in an effort to create homogenous units. The expected result of ethnic partitioning is to reduce security fears that ultimately drove the ethnic groups to conflict in the first place (Johnson, 2008:142). Ethnic partitioning is founded on the idea that ethnic groups will continue fighting, and more effort and resources will be wasted, if they are not territorially separated and granted their own form of governance (Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl, 2009:84). By ensuring a safe environment for the ethnic group, separation should be able to promote a peaceful environment that allows the population to heal their wounds from decades – or even centuries – of conflict. The life envisioned as a result of ethnic partitioning, therefore, is one of final conflict resolution, security and sustained peace (Rae, 2002:5).

With the hope of securing their right to self-determination through ethnic partitioning, the conflicting groups are encouraged to drive out their enemy by any means necessary (McGarry & O'Leary, 1994:97). Those already living in their desired territory are afforded the right to forcibly remove, or even kill, members of their opposition, as the land no longer belongs to them (Bulutgil, 2016:4). Individuals, families and communities are uprooted from their homes in the hope that the insecurity of not having a home is better than having one amongst their enemy (McGarry & O'Leary, 1994:97). Ethnic partitioning hypothesises that, even if the process is long

and paved with insurmountable struggle, it is worthwhile for a new, homogenised homeland free from ethnic conflict and violence (Jenne, 2012:255).

There remains debate, however, as to whether this anticipated future is indeed attainable. Scholars such as Sambanis (1999) and Mann (2004) have claimed that it is wrong to assume that peace can be fostered when conflict and violence becomes enshrined in the identity of the new partition. They argue that one cannot expect a population to heal through a method of conflict resolution when its very processes, such as forced mass migration, cultural suppression, and ethnocide, provoke even greater outrage and new points of contention (Mann, 2004:18). If this is the case, one must ask whether ethnic partitioning can be considered a legitimate method of conflict resolution or if its very processes hinder the creation of a sustainable peaceful environment.

This question is particularly relevant in the ethnic partitions of Pakistan and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). It is well known that the partition of India in 1947, which led to the establishment of Pakistan, set in motion one of the largest forced migrations in history (Talbot, 2009: 406). Almost 18 million people were forced to leave their homes and, between 1947 and early 1948, the violence related to the partition resulted in, by some estimates, about one million deaths. A migration of this magnitude, costing the lives of so many, was claimed to be all in the name of security and peaceful living for both Indian Hindus and the Pakistani Muslims (Chaturvedi, 2002:150). Similarly, the TRNC has also experienced ethnic partitioning, although the reasons for enforcing the separation were based on clashing foreign ethnic alliances as opposed to religious intolerance. Following the 1974 Turkish military intervention, which aimed at partitioned homogenisation, roughly 201,000 Greek Cypriots were displaced with the aim of creating a homogenous, sovereign state controlled by the Turkish Cypriot minority. This is a third of the overall population of Cyprus at that time (Sert, 2010:340).

Relations between the Indian Hindus and the Pakistani Muslims, as well as the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, were expected to ease and improve as they became independent, homogenised nations. Increased security and lower levels of conflict were predicted to be a worthwhile outcome of mass migration and the resultant casualties. This study will assess whether the costs

associated with the process of territorial separation are worth it in the long term, or if the very process of ethnic partitioning hinders any chance of conflict resolution and peace for generations to come.

1.2 Background to study

1.2.1 Conflict resolution

Conflict resolution as a theory has evolved from the concept of conflict management, which has had profound implications for perceiving and structuring peace processes. As Richmond (2008:99) has described in the first generation of conflict and peace theory, conflict management seeks to establish order in a conflictual environment to ensure stability within a state. This Realist-based perspective argues that while conflict is permanent and inevitable, it needs to be managed in order for its disruptive tendencies to be overcome (Brigg, 2008:61). From this perspective, order is the goal of any state, which means that disorder is the phenomenon that needs to be repressed. Realist conflict management theories largely discount non-state actors in their explanation of post-conflict affairs as the state is perceived to be the most powerful actor in political affairs (Brigg, 2008:61). In addition, strategies of conflict management necessitate a third party in the establishment of peaceful relations between conflicting groups, as it is believed that the two groups cannot reconcile on their own due to their competitive dynamic (Mason & Meernik, 2006:40).

Conflict resolution as a theory was established to counter this state-centric, psychologically detached view of conflict and peace. Theories of conflict resolution argue that conflict is a psychological phenomenon produced by social, economic, and political structures (Brigg, 2008:60). Violence is not interpreted as being merely a direct expression of inherent conflict, but also the result of structures that lead to discrimination. To understand why a conflict has erupted, and to prevent it from escalating, it is important to understand how these structures may deprive a certain group, or groups, of their basic needs (Moffitt & Bordone, 2005:26). Once the structural components of conflict are acknowledged, the task becomes to create an environment conducive for conflict resolution. One must focus on civil society, rather than exclusively the state, as

previously assumed by conflict management theorists. Within civil society, public and private actors, at both the individual or group level, must construct a positive peace where the roots of the conflict are addressed directly (Richmond, 2008:102). While the role of society is emphasised as providing insight into where human needs are not being adequately addressed, the state has the role of distributing its resources fairly to meet those needs (Mason & Meernik, 2006:126).

In addition to addressing and meeting human needs, a culture of cooperation and negotiation must be fostered in a post-conflict setting (Brigg, 2008:593). This is because groups have values and viewpoints that may clash, but a certain level of respect must be granted to these differences. Compromise and respect must underpin human interaction when attempting to establish conflict resolution (Moffitt & Bordone, 2005:15). While it is important for groups to understand the ways in which they have been unjust to one another, the process of reconciliation that follows is crucial to constructing a peaceful environment. If negotiation and compromise are not pursued after the injustices are described and understood by the involved parties, tensions will only become more hostile (Richmond, 2008:104).

1.2.2 Post-conflict efforts toward peace

As one can see, the notion of conflict resolution coincides with that of maintaining a peaceful environment (Sert, 2010:253). Through reconciliation, fostered through the processes of negotiation and compromise, hostilities and violence can be overcome and a culture of peace can replace them (Sert, 2010:253). It is important to note that a culture of peace cannot be permanently achieved, but rather nurtured continuously by the state and civil society (De Rivera, 2009:218). This cultural development must be stable over long periods of time for the groups to feel settled in the process. Fear of conflict and renewed violence must be reduced for the groups to feel secure enough to engage in compromise (Kaufmann, 2007:206).

In order for a state and society to experience peace, both the negative and positive characteristics of this peace must be nurtured and maintained. Galtung (1969:183) explains that negative and positive peace are concepts that influence one another but must be understood independently.

When a society has achieved negative peace it has low levels of violence, which can be understood as the intentional use of physical force against another that results in physical or psychological injury or death (Violence Prevention Alliance, 2019). Positive peace, on the other hand, is related more to the values of conflict resolution as it includes the fostering of harmonious relationships and inclusive social systems. The distinction between positive and negative peace is important as it acknowledges that while intentionally violent acts may cease, a culture of conflict can make the reoccurrence of such violence more likely and may even result in the intensification of the conflict (United Nations, 2015:34). A method of conflict resolution must, therefore, ensure that a society fosters both negative and positive peace.

1.2.3 Understanding ethnic conflict

Before peace, both negative and positive, can be established, one must understand the causes of ethnic conflict, and its subsequent escalation. Ethnic wars are founded on ethnic identities that have evolved to be unforgiving in their disagreements with their rivals (Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl, 2009:84). Peace is considered to be impossible, as each group feels that negotiation and compromise would only benefit their rival (Jenne, 2010:117). Ethnic identities during times of conflict, according to this view, are strengthened to the point where coexistence is perceived to be impossible. The escalating conflict necessitates that all members of the ethnic groups are mobilised, otherwise their existence will be threatened by the rival group (Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl, 2009:84). The violent clash of ethnic identities relates to the security dilemma, which is a concept founded in Realist scholarship on which the ethnic partition theory heavily draws (Jenne, 2010:117).

According to the security dilemma, when one community interacts with a distrustful opposing group, they employ methods to increase their own security. This effort of security escalation forces the other group to employ similar methods of defence (Sambanis, 2000:1). The result is that both groups are increasingly sensitive to the activities of the other, as any action is perceived to be threatening in times of conflict. This sensitivity and defensive climate hardens the identities of the ethnic groups, which, in turn, urges them to become more aggravated and unstable over time (Sambanis, 2000:1). In this way, the security dilemma active in ethnic conflict arguably

ensures that any possible outcome of multiethnic civil politics is most likely fail (Kaufmann, 1998:122). According to advocates of ethnic partitioning, once the ethnic groups are mobilised for war, the only solution to this form of insecurity is territorial separation. Through territorial separation, each group can exist apart from the threat of the other and feel secure in knowing that they are governed by a structure designed to pursue their own interests (Jenne, 2010:117).

1.2.4 Ethnic partitions

An ethnic partition can be defined as “a fresh border cut through at least one community’s national homeland, creating at least two separate political units under different sovereigns or authorities” (O’Leary, 2007:888). The only way for a group to feel secure in its new territory is to establish the state on homogenous principles and flush out any members of the opposing group. This assumption is expressed by Horowitz (2001:588), when he states that “[i]f it is impossible for groups to live together in a heterogeneous state, perhaps it is better for them to live apart in more than one homogeneous state.” Each ethnic group would be granted their own territory, solely established to represent a particular ethnic identity. This new state would provide a “defensible enclave” within which combatant groups can defend their ethnic group through legitimate means (Jenne, 1998:124).

To achieve a new ethnically “pure” nation, population transfers are conducted in ways that maximise the number of those who identify with the identity of the core state and minimise the number of minorities to such an extent that they can never present a threat to the states in which they are located (Cleary, 2004:21). Seeing that the state represents one identity alone, ethnic cleansing would ensure that in the event of any possible obstacles in the road to peace, no members of the conflicting group remain in the territory that could potentially escalate ethnic-based violence once again (Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl, 2009:84). The security dilemma would, thus, be overcome, as the ethnic group represented by the new state can remain unthreatened and the state can legitimately defend their interests.

Many scholars, such as Sambanis (1999), Mason & Quinn (2006) and Pischedda (2008), have argued that the effort to create an ethnically pure, homogenous region, separate from its

conflicting ethnic group, is misleading in its attempt to resolve ethnic conflict. This is because the very processes involved in homogenising a nation lead to more casualties and hostility, which, in turn, increases the likelihood of future conflicts (Kelman, 1997:330). This argument is made by Kumar (2000:12) who posits that, “partition has more often been a backdrop to war than its culmination in peace; although it may originate in a situation of conflict, its effect has been to stimulate further and even new conflict.” Another prominent author that critiques ethnic partitioning, and its processes of homogenisation, is Sambanis (1999), who concludes that as the human costs of partitioning increase, so does the possible recurrence of war. Ethnic cleansing and population transfers, which involve acts of killing, expulsion and intimidation, do nothing but escalate the security dilemma, and result in an intensification of conflict (Kelman, 1997:330). As a result, the once internal, civil ethnic conflict now has the ability to escalate into much greater inter-state wars (Downes, 2001:60).

1.2.5 Ethnic partitioning in Pakistan and the TRNC

The partition of India in 1947, and the subsequent establishment of Pakistan, represented the start of the challenging process of homogenisation. In the early 1900s, tensions escalated between the Muslims and Hindus of India regarding what the future of India would entail following the withdrawal of Britain as a colonial power (Kukreja & Singh, 2005:87). The majority Hindus, represented by Mahatma Gandhi and his allies, championed for a united India, while Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the leader of the Muslim League from 1936, urged his followers to fight for an independent state of Pakistan (Adnan, 2006:204). Jinnah advocated for the realisation of the “two-nation theory” which, at its core, represented the argument that the most optimal solution to the conflict would be for the Muslims and Hindus of India to control their own territory without restraint from the other (Adnan, 2006:205). This was eventually reified in 1947 when Britain withdrew itself from its Indian colony and British lawyer Cyril Radcliffe designed a partition for the region along fundamentally demographic lines. The Muslim areas of India were to be independently known as Pakistan and ethnic cleansing would be implemented in an effort to relocate Indian Muslims to this new territory (Ganguly, *et al.*, 2019:131).

Almost three decades after the partition of India, the Turkish Cypriots accompanied by the Turkish military partitioned the island of Cyprus and underwent a very similar process of homogenisation and ethnic cleansing. Cyprus comprised of two main ethnic groups, with strong affiliations to external states, namely the Turkish and Greek Cypriots (Milano, 2006:142). Following the independence of Cyprus from British colonial rule in 1960, a constitutional framework was put in place to ensure both the Greek and Turkish Cypriots were fairly represented in matters regarding the functioning of the state (Milano, 2006:142). Both ethnic groups struggled to settle on the appropriate implementation of the constitutional framework, and, as a result, tensions intensified (Kaufmann, 2007: 207). Eventually, in 1963, the Turkish Cypriots, alongside the Turkish military, retreated into defensible enclaves in the North and declared themselves as territorially and administratively separate from the Greek Cypriots in the South (Dodd, 2010:55). The establishment of a Northern administration was solidified in 1974 when, in fear of a Greek plot to reunify the island, the Turkish Cypriots rebelled and effectively gained control over 37% of the island (Milano, 2006:143). In both 1963 and 1974 ethnic cleansing was utilised by the Turkish Cypriots in their struggle to preserve their ethnic culture (Kaufmann, 2007: 207).

In both Pakistan and the TRNC, ethnic partitioning resulted in the violent large-scale, and long-lasting process of ethnic cleansing. Homogenisation was hoped to cleanse the nation of its rivals, and in so doing, develop a nation of similar-minded people. This process of ethnic cleansing in both Pakistan and the TRNC meant that millions were uprooted from their homes, either by choice or by force, resulting in large-scale incidences of violence and death. In both cases, there is substantial debate as to whether ethnic partitioning led to more conflict between the rival ethnic groups, or if conflict would be more intense and ruthless if the groups had not been separated. This debate remains relatively unchanged, and similar arguments are applied to different cases of ethnic partitioning.

1.3 Problem statement and research questions

There exists a standoff in the literature around ethnic partitioning and its relation to conflict. Having outlined the development of conflict resolution as a theory, as well as ethnic partitioning

as a method of conflict resolution, there appears to be a gap in the research regarding the link between ethnic partitioning and conflict resolution, including both its negative and positive components. While the literature on these topics is extensive, it is unclear how a method of conflict resolution that violently enforces separation, rather than prioritising negotiation and compromise, is able to foster a culture of peace. Thus, the primary research question of this study will investigate whether ethnic partitioning as a method of conflict resolution is able to foster a sustainable culture of peace? To answer this question, one must investigate cases wherein ethnic partitioning has been utilised as a method of conflict resolution, or more specifically, the cases of Pakistan and the TRNC. This study will, therefore, investigate the question of whether ethnic partitioning in Pakistan and the TRNC were able to foster a culture of peace?

The intention of this study is not to assess what the outcome could have been if ethnic partitioning had not been established in Pakistan and the TRNC, or whether other methods of conflict resolution could have been more successful at fostering a culture of peace, but rather to analyse whether ethnic partitioning has or has not been successful at fostering a sustainable culture of peace in the two cases studies.

1.4 Research design and methodology

1.4.1 Case study research design

This study will utilise a case study research design wherein two cases, Pakistan and the TRNC, will be compared. A case study research design is defined as an approach whereby “a phenomenon is explored within its context using a variety of data sources” (Baxter & Jack, 2008:544). This form of design analyses a contemporary phenomenon within its context, thus allowing all of its aspects, as well as influential factors, to become evident. It is especially important for cases where the context and phenomenon work together to create certain results, and, consequently, are not easily separated (Monroe, 2000:43). A case study research design, especially one that compares and contrasts two or more cases to analyse a certain phenomenon or process, can unpack what results are circumstantial and relative, and which are constant to the phenomenon itself (Yin, 2003:13). In the case of this study, and its investigation of both Pakistan

and the TRNC, it becomes important to understand whether the phenomenon of ethnic partitioning can be regarded as a method of conflict resolution able to foster a sustainable culture of peace, and what role the specific contexts of the regions had to play in this.

The advantages of a case study design are multiple, however, the most fundamental benefit relates to its ability to investigate a topic within the context to which it applies. With a case study design, one can utilise many context-specific, qualitative sources of evidence when answering a research question, while still utilising objective, quantitative data (Yin, 2003:13). Rather than viewing subjective, circumstantial factors as a weakness to reaching a valid conclusion, case study research designs embrace them as necessary for comprehending the complexity of social phenomena (Monroe, 2000:43). This form of study is, thus, rigorous and detailed, involving many sources of data that allow for a holistic interpretation of events (Monroe, 2000:43).

As Monroe (2000:43) notes, the most problematic disadvantage of case study designs is that the findings and conclusions reached cannot be generalised due to the limited number of cases under investigation. While a case study design's advantage lies in its ability to provide a descriptive and in-depth investigation of a phenomenon as it relates to certain cases, this can be interpreted as a limitation, simply because this level of assessment cannot be granted to a great number of cases (Monroe, 2000:43). As a result, case study designs struggle to present a basis for scientific generalisation (Yin, 2003:10). Having said this, it is the responsibility of the researcher to ensure that, although a study is based on a great amount of contextual information, the findings reflect an assessment of a particular phenomenon as objectively as possible, while still acknowledging the importance of contextual factors (Peters, 2013:15). In this study, it is imperative that ethnic partitioning as a phenomenon is judged as objectively as possible, while still allowing for the contextual influencers of this phenomenon to be accounted for and explained.

This research design has been chosen because, in order to understand ethnic partitioning and its association with conflict resolution, it is necessary to investigate contextual conditions. It is important to understand the ways in which ethnic partitioning has influenced the separated conflicting ethnic groups, while acknowledging that their unique contexts, advantages and challenges have played a role in influencing their post-conflict development. One cannot study

ethnic partitioning without an investigation into cases that have utilised this strategy, and the ways in which they may or may not have established relative peace. The experiences of the cases cannot be separated from the theory of ethnic partitioning, because ethnic partitioning as a method of conflict resolution is dependent on the successes or failures of cases that have implemented such a strategy. It is for this reason that case study design is the optimal choice for this study.

As outlined by Yin (2002:55), the selection of cases, and the criteria used in the process, is crucial to ensuring a study is as consistent and reliable as possible. Cases must be similar enough that generalisations can be reached, and different enough that certain factors relating to the phenomenon stand out when comparing the two (Peters, 2013:15). In this study, four relevant criteria were used to select two cases best able to answer the research question. First, the cases had to have experienced ethnic conflict to such an extent that ethnic partitioning was seen as the only option to guaranteeing peace. Second, the reasons for such a decision must have been based on the belief that homogenisation is linked to lower incidences of conflict, and will, therefore, be effective in establishing peaceful separate nations. Third, the ethnic groups involved must have devoted considerable effort, through ethnic cleansing and population transfers, to ensure the complete homogenisation of their populations. Fourth, the cases must have experienced different forms of ethnic conflict including, for example, conflict grounded in contrasting religions, languages, foreign alliances, or race. This is because their unique experiences of ethnic conflict would allow for an analysis able to separate the effects of ethnic partitioning from other forces so as to ensure an unbiased assessment. If the source of conflict was the same, it would be more difficult to assess that which is caused by the specific nature of ethnic conflict, and by ethnic partitioning, respectively. Having investigated the few cases that may fit these criteria, Pakistan and the TRNC were regarded to be the most well-suited to answering the research question. It is important to note that the territories of Pakistan and the TRNC were not subject to ethnic partitioning but rather the product of ethnic partitioning. Pakistan was partitioned from India as a result of religious and territorial disputes, while the TRNC was partitioned from Cyprus due to foreign ethnic alliances. In both cases, ethnic conflict became so forceful that ethnic partitioning was seen to be the only solution as homogenisation would allow their communities to experience a level of security, and lower incidences of violence. To achieve this, India and Pakistan as well

as the Republic of Cyprus and the TRNC undertook a substantial mission of homogenisation, including acts of population transfers and ethnic cleansing. Pakistan and the TRNC were the products of the partition of another, stronger state, and face similar economic, political and social problems that can be compared. In this way, both nations fit the four selection criteria necessary for this study.

1.4.2 A comparative analysis

This study will be a comparative analysis, wherein the differences and similarities of Pakistan and the TRNC's post-conflict cultures will be investigated. A comparative analysis is a method of research by means of which the similarities and differences between certain cases are explored, and the underlying causal mechanisms laid bare (O'Neil, 2009:3). Comparative analysis studies typically treat the processes they study to be, in some way, independent of the context in which they are situated. Important in this study is what remains constant across the cases being studied, as this could relate to the phenomenon as an independent variable (Peters, 2013:16). When investigating a case study in terms of its relation to another, the extent of their differences, and how and why this is the case, needs to be answered. This will lead to an explanation as to whether the common phenomenon shared by the cases influenced these differences, or whether that is related to a particular context (Peters, 2013:15).

An important advantage of comparative analysis, especially when implemented in a case study research design, is that the real world becomes a laboratory for researchers, who are able to see what works in a given set of circumstances and why, without having to intervene to manipulate any variables themselves (Peters, 2013:3). They can compare cases on multiple grounds; find and explain links between them; investigate why they are different and why this is the case; and ultimately reach a conclusion derived from a thorough analysis of the subject under investigation and its application to the real world (Peters, 2013:4). The conclusions reached as a result of a comparative analysis of case studies is therefore as objective as possible, in the sense that the researcher is able to reach conclusions regarding the phenomenon itself across many contexts; as well as subjective, in the sense that unique contexts, and implementation strategies, are taken into consideration (Peters, 2013:4).

The disadvantages of comparative analysis, paradoxically, derive from the advantages mentioned above. While scholars are able to observe the real world and compare certain cases to reach meaningful conclusions, both theoretical and analytic, this is a challenge given the dynamic and complex settings of realistic politics. Countries are very diverse in terms of political structures, culture, territory, economics, and other factors, which are intertwined and constantly changing. It is, therefore, a challenge to study a phenomenon as an independent subject when it is continuously being influenced (O'Neil, 2009:5). One is forced to consider a wide array of factors, explain their influence on the subject, and decide as to whether they are relevant to a specific research problem thereby making it possible for the researcher to fall victim to interpretative errors, whereby the textual data is misunderstood or utilised incorrectly (Peters, 2013:9).

Regardless of these limitations, a comparative analysis of two case studies is the best research design for reaching sound conclusions on ethnic partitioning and its relation to conflict resolution. This is because a comparative analysis allows for an assessment of ethnic partitioning as a form of governance for post-conflict societies, both within and independent of context. Any differences between the two cases could potentially undermine the universality of ethnic partitioning and any similarities between the two cases could expose an important pattern inherent in the method itself. In either case, a comparative analysis will allow for an understanding of the way in which ethnic partitioning can be implemented, why it is implemented, what factors influence its establishment and progression, and its ultimate success as a method of conflict resolution. By comparing Pakistan and the TRNC, and pinpointing areas in which they are similar or different, the research questions posed here are able to receive the necessary scrutiny.

The study will be qualitative and interpretative in nature, as the quality of ethnic partitioning as a form of conflict resolution will be assessed. Material collected will be used for describing and explaining certain contextual phenomena, rather than for quantifying purposes, and are thus indicative of qualitative research (Williams, 2007:67). The study aims to understand the process of ethnic partitioning and homogenisation from a multitude of relevant sources to gain a better

understanding of their progression to, or away from, peace. In this way, it is necessary to utilise secondary, desktop research to compare the two case studies. The secondary research will be comprised of existing journal articles, books, interviews of relevant parties, statistics, ethnographies, documents, and records. The relevance of these sources will guide the analysis.

1.5 Contribution of the study

The way in which this study demonstrates whether a culture of peace is able to be established in ethnic partitions is valuable to the literature on this topic, as few scholars have been able to successfully link the processes of ethnic cleansing and homogenisation with cultures of peace and conflict resolution. This is because a trend has developed in the analysis of ethnic partitioning where attention is placed on the ways ethnic partitioning either does or does not protect human rights, or, more specifically, whether ethnic partitions protects more human lives than it takes. In such case that fatalities were lower after the enforcement of ethnic partitioning than before, it is concluded that ethnic partitioning has succeeded in settling the conflict. Although the conclusions reached from this perspective are valuable to the study on conflict resolution, there remains a gap in the research. It is most likely found that fatalities that occur after the conflict are fewer than those during the conflict, because measures have been put in place to cease fighting, in the hope of finding a long-term solution. As a result, ethnic partitioning, and the processes involved in the process, are effective in terms of lowering casualties. In this sense, theoretically, ethnic partitioning has halted the given instance of ethnic conflict, and is successful as a method of conflict resolution.

Literature concerning ethnic partitioning in this regard reflects the outcome of negative peace, however, it does not account for the cultural impact of ethnic partitions, and the ways in which homogenisation affects the sustainability of positive peace in this regard. Nor does it assess whether a strategy of conflict resolution will solidify peace for extended periods of time. Therefore, the link between ethnic partitioning and positive peace is largely neglected by scholars, thus creating a gap in the literature. This study, therefore, aims to address this gap by not only assessing whether ethnic partitioning has established negative peace by reducing conflict in terms of decreased levels of violence and uprisings, but also investigate the ways in

which ethnic partitioning has embraced the values and processes that guarantee the sustainability of positive peace. While on paper conflicting ethnic groups may seem to be more peaceful than when the conflict was at its height, this may not be the case when closer assessment is made. In doing so, this study will be able to provide a more holistic understanding of the legitimacy of ethnic partitioning as a method of conflict resolution in terms of the relevant criteria for a culture of peace.

1.6 Chapter outline

The first chapter provided a background to the topics which will be elaborated on in later chapters. These topics included the introduction of conflict resolution as a theoretical framework; ethnic conflict; ethnic partitioning as a method of easing such ethnic conflicts; and the critics of this strategy. Having touched on these topics, this chapter has provided an overview of the problems present in the literature regarding ethnic partitioning as a method of conflict resolution and, in doing so, has introduced the research questions this study will answer. The chapter has outlined the ways in which these questions will be answered, and why a case study research design implementing comparative analysis will aid this process. The second chapter will elaborate on the topics briefly mentioned in this first chapter, thereby providing an overview of conflict resolution as a manner of theoretical framework, as well as its practical applicability to ethnic partitioning. The intent of the chapter is to illustrate how relevant operational concepts have developed over time, especially from the traditional Realist perspective, and what this has meant for the field of peace and conflict studies. Under investigation in this chapter is conflict resolution, as well as the ways in which it can be separated from ideas of conflict management; peace and how it can be defined and operationalised in relation to post-conflict environments; the role of ethnic identities in conflict; and, finally, homogenisation and its reference to the security dilemma. This will introduce the problem in the literature regarding whether ethnic partitions are successful in building a peaceful society, as well as various unanswered questions relating to this subject.

The third chapter will outline the ways in which these concepts can be applied to various case studies, and how the United Nations' (UN) "Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture

of Peace” can be utilised as a tool for analysing the role of ethnic partitioning in developing a sustainable culture of peace. The chapter will begin with an outline of the general assumptions underlying this Declaration including an explanation of how it views peace in general, and how it believes this peace should be established. In this way, this chapter will link the values of conflict resolution mentioned in the second chapter to this Declaration. This will be followed by an assessment on the Declaration’s prescriptions for and indicators of a culture of peace. It will demonstrate how the work of De Rivera (2004) has summarised the various components of this Declaration into four distinct dimensions, namely liberal development, violent inequality, state use of violent means and nurturance. Each will be conceptualised and operationalised as a tool for assessing post-conflict environments. Explanations as to why the dimensions are required in answering the research questions posed in the first chapter appear throughout this chapter, and address how they can be applied to the cases of Pakistan and the TRNC.

The fourth chapter will form the results section of this study, wherein Pakistan and the TRNC will be analysed and compared using De Rivera’s (2004) dimensions as a guideline. The chapter will centre on the similarities and differences between Pakistan and the TRNC’s post-conflict experiences as they relate to the four dimensions. This fourth chapter will begin by providing a brief political history of these cases, which will clarify the reasons for the ethnic conflict; why it was intensified; what methods of conflict resolution were utilised prior to territorial separation; and why ethnic partitioning was eventually considered. The contextualisation of the two cases will explain how ethnic partitioning was enforced and what role ethnic cleansing played in homogenising the new territories. The comparative analysis will assess whether Pakistan and the TRNC have been able to fulfil the criteria relating to the four dimensions of a culture of peace, as outlined by De Rivera’s (2004) summary of the UN Declaration. As each dimension is assessed, conclusions will be made regarding whether ethnic partitioning did or did not establish a post-conflict environment reflecting that of peace. This will be followed by the fifth chapter, which will provide a summary of the main findings; the implications of these findings in terms of the relevant debates outlined in Chapter 2; and make recommendations for future scholars and policymakers.

Chapter 2: Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

2.1 Introduction

Conflict is a concept that humanity has tirelessly attempted to comprehend and with each new conceptualisation of conflict is a new approach to its resolution. There have been countless theories centred on explaining the complex nature of socio-political conflict, with some able to withstand heavy criticism, and others that have fallen out of favour. In the past century, the study of socio-political conflict has undergone significant conceptual shifts, and methods that strive to resolve it are being reassessed accordingly. One such method is that of ethnic partitioning, which is based on the idea that once all other methods at establishing peace have failed, territorial separation is the final, last resort for the conflicting ethnic groups. While ethnic partitioning is often implemented in an effort to decrease high conflict rates, there remains an intense debate on whether it should be considered at all.

This chapter will explain the ways in which the concept of “conflict resolution” has evolved from a purely Realist conception of conflict management into the multifaceted concept it is today. This is important because any effort designed to establish peace, including ethnic partitioning, bases itself on a certain conceptualisation of conflict, where it is the duty of social scientists to critically examine the underlying assumptions of these efforts in terms of the ways in which they might decrease, or indeed increase, rates of conflict. It is for this purpose that this chapter will begin by analysing the Realist view of conflict in general, and the reasons why it has placed so much emphasis on the security dilemma in explaining the dynamics of a conflict. This chapter will then examine how the role of conflict management is interpreted by Realist theory, including the role of the state and third parties in this process. What becomes evident in this discussion is that, although this theory has been convincing enough to withstand centuries of criticism, the experiences of the 20th century have led to more forceful criticisms and, ultimately, the development of a new, more holistic understanding of conflict. In doing so, this section aims to provide a foundation of understanding before the concept of conflict resolution is introduced and analysed.

2.2 The role of Realist conflict management in peace studies

Conflict resolution is a recent but impactful concept in peace and conflict studies. While much of the 21st century peace and conflict literature is focused on qualities and norms relating to cooperative practices of negotiation, non-violence, reconciliation, and compromise, this has not always been the case (Dunn, 2004:66). What we think of as conflict resolution was not formally established until the mid-20th century. Rather, the Realist conceptualisation of conflict management, as opposed to conflict resolution, dominated the field of peace and conflict in the West for centuries (Richmond, 2008:99).

In theoretical terms, conflict has largely been understood through a Realist lens in the last few centuries. It is important to stress that there are many variations of Realism, however, its core assumptions have remained relatively unchanged. The core assumptions of Realism have had considerable influence on the Western interpretation of conflict, including the dynamics before, during, and following such a conflict. In particular, the International Relations Realist tradition has centred on discussions and debates about power, including where power comes from, what this power looks like, how to achieve it, and how to retain it (Betts, 2012:66). This emphasis on power is also coupled with a state-centric perspective, where peace and conflict are understood solely in reference to states and inter-state relations (Waltz, 2012:103).

This is significant for Realists attempting to comprehend the dynamics of International Relations, as Realism views the state as the most important, powerful and unitary actor in International Relations. If one wants to comprehend or even change the international or civil status quo, one will need to engage with the mind and behaviour of states (Richmond, 2008:55). Any other actor, such as non-governmental organisations or civil society, is considered to be secondary to the actions of states. Politics, according to Realists, occurs top to bottom, in the sense that the state has the power to manipulate its citizenry in any direction they see fit (Tellis, 1996:9). Although the state remains dominant in the Realist understanding of International Relations, Realism also claims that states are not independent of human nature. On the contrary, states think and behave according to these same qualities (Richmond, 2008:55). A state, being made up of rational individuals, is shaped by the motivations and behavioural traits of those humans that constitute it, and which it in turn both serves and protects (Freyberg-Inan, 2004:26).

Due to the significance of the state in a Realist comprehension of peace and conflict, as well as the reality that a state is driven by the demands of human nature, it is necessary to understand that which characterises and drives human nature per se. Realism, as a theory of international relations, was accredited with developing a conceptualisation of human nature so accurate that it was able to dominate Western political thought for over five centuries (Schuett, 2010:3). The theory argues that humans are both universally and permanently selfish. Realists claim that all human motives are derived from self-interested efforts focused on maintaining and guaranteeing their own survival and well-being (Forde, 1992:62). Realists argue that upon deeper reflection and evaluation, even when an individual, group or state appears to be acting in the interest of another, or on the basis of moral principles, that they are acting in their own self-interest for the achievement of a specific end. Indeed, all human behaviour can be interpreted as either being connected to a quest for security, desire for expansion or pure necessity, all of which descend from the core will towards survival (Freyberg-Inan, 2004:26).

Humans compete with one another for power that will aid in guaranteeing the realisation of security, expansion and necessity. The more power a person possesses, the more resources they are able to control (Glenn, 2009:527). The more resources they control, the more likely they are to secure their own survival and get what they want (Donnelly, 2005:38). According to Realists, however, merely possessing power is not enough. Instead, human actions and motivations are based on the relativity of power. This means that, in order to feel secure in guaranteeing one's survival, one must possess more power than others, as this will minimise the threat of others using their power against you or depriving you of what you want (Fearon & Laitin, 2004:846). The consequence of this is that human nature forces one to gain as much power as possible, while still being permanently suspicious of others in this process. One must constantly assess whether another has the power to potentially cause harm, how they might exact such harm, and what can be done to prevent this eventuality (Waltz, 2012:103).

The intrinsic need to survive and gain a relative advantage becomes more complicated, according to Realists, when one understands the anarchic nature of international politics. While humans may be interpreted as fundamentally selfish, and thirsty for power, the deleterious impact of

these qualities is limited by the laws of a state that governs over them (Burton & Dukes, 1990:160). For example, there may be a national police force or system of law that punishes those who act too immorally or whose actions inhibit the security of others (Nel, 2015:29). There is no authority to govern or dictate inter-state behaviour (Nel, 2015:29). There is no centralised power to dictate certain rules of conduct and punish those who break these rules, nor is there is a system to encourage and reward good actions (Waltz, 2012:103). With no governing institution in place, a state must possess as much relative power as possible to feel safe, and to ensure control over the distribution of resources and international affairs in general. The state must position itself in such a way that any misconduct of another state or states is discouraged as much as can be possible without a central authority (Jeong, 2000:117).

It would appear that states, being locked in an international arena with no governing authority where each seeks to gain as much relative power as possible, have no option but to distrust one another and act in their own defence (Donnelly, 2005:37). When there is no governing body to guide and rule affairs, there can be no certainty as to whether an actor will remain committed to peaceful agreements where there is no enforced punishment for disloyalty. In such a scenario, fear and distrust underpin all relations with the other, whether friend and foe (Tang, 2011:514). To prove the validity of this argument, Realist scholars such as Herz (1951), Jervis (1988) and Butterfield (1951) reference the so-called “security dilemma”. The security dilemma, and the conditions on which it is based, refers to why individuals, groups or states find it challenging to compromise, regardless of whether they are on friendly or hostile terms. The importance of the security dilemma in conflict and peace studies is immeasurable, and is continually mentioned in not only Realism but almost all theories of international relations (Montgomery, 2006:157).

For the purpose of this study, Donnelly's (2005:37) description and explanation of the security dilemma will be utilised. He explains that Realists have developed an analogy that best explains the complications of selfishness in international affairs. The analogy introduces two criminals, A and B. Both are questioned separately by police for a crime they committed together. The best option for the prisoners is for both to remain silent about the crime, as this would grant them each the lightest possible sentence. This would, thus, entail that both prisoners fully trust that the other will not confess. If one confesses and another does not, however, the one who remains

silent will receive the worst possible sentence, while the one who confessed would receive a lesser, but not the lightest possible, sentence. Both prisoners would, understandably, prefer cooperation and loyalty, for this would grant them the best outcome. However, the fear that one prisoner will confess, in this analogy, drives the other to do so (Donnelly, 2005:37). This represents the stance of realists in their interpretation of events. According to Realists, due to human selfishness, there can be no guarantee that an actor will adhere to a mutual prior agreement when placed in a situation of vulnerability. The greatest insurance for (rather than assurance of) one's survival is not relying on the other, but rather expecting the worst from them, even during times of supposed cooperation (Burton & Dukes, 1990:160).

Even if states remain loyal to one another and have no apparent reason to compete or harbour any suspicion against the other, according to Realists, conflict is a permanent, omnipresent phenomenon (Lentner, 2011:153). While conflict is an inevitability and present in all relations, the nature and intensity of this conflict can change. States can be seen to cooperate with each other from time to time when it suits their quest for power and security, resulting in the development of mutually beneficial agreements. This can change at any time when the slightest feeling of insecurity and instability develops because, as mentioned previously, conflict is inherent in all human behaviour and thought (Forde, 1992:62). The relations between Russia and Iran can be used as an example of this. Historically, the two countries have faced many challenges that have resulted in conflict, including Soviet support of Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s (Katz, 2012:54). Despite this, the two countries have cooperated in their fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) where they, alongside Syria and Iraq, coordinate to share security and intelligence (Radio Free Europe, 2018). Although the states appear to be supporting one another, Realists would argue that security and power are dominant principles guiding the activities of the states, who are in fact only expediently mutually supportive. Their past hostilities were not overcome by an inherent desire for peace, but rather in an effort to serve their own, selfish interests that happened to be aligned with the interests of another (Forde, 1992:62).

Human nature dictates the impossibility of a peace wherein all parties feel completely safe in relation to one another, and no longer experience distrust (Glenn, 2009:527). This does not,

however, necessarily imply constant disorder. To the contrary, disorder and instability are considered enemies of international politics and are concepts that drive most efforts toward peace. No state would prefer an environment of instability and chaos under the reign of anarchy, for such disorder would intensify the security dilemma and drive states to abandon cooperation in the name of security and survival (Brigg, 2008:61). For this reason, conflict management in an anarchic environment where order and stability are established is the closest humans can get to the realisation of peace (Brigg, 2008:61).

A conflict can be managed in many different ways, and this management is usually based on type and intensity. Often, stability is fostered and established through, as described by Richmond (2008:101), a “victor's peace”. This is when proceedings following conflict are dictated by the victor. Having shown its power, and the relative strength of this power over others, the victor is able to manage inter-state exchanges as much as an anarchic environment permits (Richmond, 2008:9). A victor's peace was evident in Côte d'Ivoire in 2011 when national and international forces loyal to the politician Alassane Quattara militarily defeated those loyal to Laurent Gbagbo, the former president of Côte d'Ivoire (Piccolino, 2018:485). The fact that the politico-military crisis had ended in the successful attempt to overthrow authority, rather than through peaceful, mutually beneficial negotiations, meant that a victor's peace was established (Piccolino, 2018:485).

The other scenario available, if conflict shows no sign of dwindling on its own or the conflicting parties are too fearful of one another to reach a peaceful agreement, is for a neutral third party to be appointed to manage the situation. This can be done through efforts such as mediation and peacekeeping, or even through coercive and military intervention (Richmond, 2008:100). It is important to note that Realism assumes that a third party inserting itself into a conflict between other actors is never the result of moral or ethical driving forces but, rather, of the belief that it might benefit more from a peaceful solution between two external actors than if the conflict were to be continued (Burton & Dukes, 1990:207). One can note the United States' intervention in Bosnia as an example of third-party mediation. US intervention was the result of intense domestic public outcry for the involvement of the United States in the conflict (Chang, *et al.*, 2007:955). The US assumed the role of a “neutral” third-party mediator, whose role was to

manage the conflict and establish order by persuading all groups involved that it is in their best interest for the conflict to end. In any mediation process, the selfishness of the conflicting groups needs to be consciously addressed and utilised for a solid agreement to be reached, for no party acts selflessly for the sake of morality itself, including the “neutral” mediator (Brigg, 2008:63).

2.3 Developments in peace and conflict studies in the 21st century

While the Realist interpretation of conflict assumes that it can only be managed on account of its permanence, there have been certain developments in peace and conflict studies that have led scholars into a different trajectory. International experiences at the beginning of the 20th century have transformed the way in which social scientists understand conflict and peace dynamics. Central arguments made by the critics of Realism have been reexamined and critiqued through the utilisation of many different disciplines, both traditional and contemporary, to the field of peace and conflict studies (Rogers & Ramsbotham, 1999:742). Traditional Realist concepts have been reworked and new, previously overlooked concepts have been explored; some concepts that were of lesser importance in the past have become more dominant; and new theories have become more popular.

The Realist interpretation of peace as stability and order dominated political thought for many centuries, however, peace studies began to transform in the 20th century as two World Wars revealed the inherent flaws of Realism. The international community came to understand that the idea of peace, and more importantly, the subsequent management of international affairs in accordance with this idea, could neither prevent the First World War, nor indeed the Second (Rogers & Ramsbotham, 1999:740). Methods aimed at managing conflict, as if it were a permanent and natural human tendency, did not produce stability and order. With the first half of the 20th century dominated by intensified conflict and chaos, a new approach that could settle this disorder was urgently required (Mack, 2005:180). Scholars attempting to rework this new “science” of peace and conflict would have to learn from the mistakes of misguided conceptualisations and application and, subsequently, re-examine the core assumptions about human nature, international relations and conflict (Patomäki, 2002:1). Social scientists had to engage with new social meanings and question what they once assumed to be unquestionable

facts about reality (Patomäki, 2002:1). This required exploration into new disciplines, such as psychology and philosophy, revealing new insights into conflict and peace that otherwise were not possible through Realism. In this process, conflict resolution was able to evolve into a more holistic theory of peace and conflict (Mack, 2005:180).

A few major Realist assumptions were subject to significant re-examination and underwent significant transformations. The following section will explore the Realist assumptions that have been debated, and identify what assumptions were suggested as replacements in conceptualising conflict resolution. Six fundamental Realist assumptions will be addressed, namely its state-centred focus; the concentration on the negative aspects of human nature; a rejection of cultural differences in explaining human conflict, and thus, its claim to universality; the practice of explaining power politics through traditional disciplines of international relations; the lack of investigation into how an enemy is constructed by an actor and how this construction can be altered; and finally, the assumed permanence of conflict as opposed to its possible settlement, which, thus, deemphasises the role of committed conflict resolution. Each discussion will begin with an explanation of the logic behind its criticism, and will conclude with theoretical suggestions made as a result of such critique. This will allow for an understanding of why previously dominant assumptions have been deemphasised in the literature, and will include consideration of the implications for practical efforts to address conflict-ridden environments with the goal of establishing peace.

The first fundamental assumption of Realism, which was explained at the beginning of this chapter, is that the state is the unitary actor in international politics, and other actors are merely secondary. The state was the most powerful actor in the world, and other actors merely acted according to the fulfilment of its need for power, wealth and strength (Dunn, 2004:66). While this interpretation of international affairs was relevant before the World Wars, the overwhelming significance of the state slowly lost its favour, especially with the establishment of international organisations such as the UN, where a stronger acknowledgement for non-state actors started to develop (Wendt, 1992:424). Critics argued that Realism has placed too much focus on the more straightforward competition between states as the cause of most conflicts in international politics, and that this has led to the neglect of far deeper, more complex problems that, if

adequately addressed, could ward off conflict for longer periods of time (Jeong, 2000:153). In addition, modern scholars criticise Realism's view that conflict management must start with the state and filter down to other "secondary" actors in the political system. They argued that conflict and peace should be studied on multiple levels, as modern conflict derives from, and is resolved through, many levels of society (Rogers & Ramsbotham, 1999:741).

The critics of Realism stress that social scientists should rather acknowledge the danger of underestimating the power of non-state actors in International Relations. They argue that, while it is important for states to be cautious in their dealings with other states and constantly be aware of any shift that may be occurring between them that could pose a threat to their sovereignty, this awareness ought to be shared on all levels of human interaction (Richmond, 2008:55). Just as dangerous as state-driven conflicts are hostilities sprouting internally, such as contentious political movements, or even globally, such as terrorist organisations (Wendt, 1992:424). Internally, states must be wary of any hostilities within their own country, especially if these tensions take on a rebellious or violent nature. If tensions escalate and a state does not appreciate the significance of intra-state dynamics and grievances, aggravated groups may resort to direct violence or even seek to overthrow the state. Social tensions of this intensity could pose a threat to the ultimate survival of a state (Richmond, 2008:55). Whether the hostilities derive from social constructs such as culture, ethnicity, or religion, or from inter-state rivalry, a state must be able to recognise the intensity of these tensions and develop methods of preventing the escalation of conflict (Jeong, 2000:153). In addition to intra-state hostilities, international organisations could pose a threat to a state, especially in a modern globalised climate where information is easily accessible and individuals can form affiliations with groups outside of their nation. This is clearly demonstrated in international fears regarding the global strength of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS) (Mekaj & Aliaj, 2018:163). Thus, a state must concern itself with matters between states to ensure its survival, but it must recognise the threat of internal resistance beneath the functioning of a state, and also globally through matters beyond it.

The second assumption of Realism relates to its emphasis on the negative, destructive, and selfish aspects of human nature. Critics have argued that not only is Realism limited in its overemphasis on the state in international politics, but it is also limited in its assumptions

regarding basic human nature in general. As noted previously, Realism views all states as possessing human qualities, therefore, an incorrect assumption about human nature will lead to an incorrect interpretation of the state (Schuett, 2010:3). Waltz (2001:3) has been quoted as saying, “our miseries are ineluctably the product of our natures”, and “the root of all evil is man, and thus he is himself the root of the specific evil, war.” As demonstrated in this quote, Realist scholars saw negative behaviour as inevitable due to the destructive aspects of human nature (Schuett, 2010:8). In fact, Realists believed that any behaviour perceived to be selfless and morally positive is misjudged and should rather be viewed in terms of the way it serves the actor (Freyberg-Inan, 2004:68). Critics of Realism agree that human nature is capable of war and destruction, and this may be the result of inherent human selfishness, however, they also argue that human nature is not this simple. They claim an implicit bias within Realism in favour of the selfish, destructive aspects of human nature, which discounts the ways in which humans can likewise be forgiving and sacrificial towards the common good (Schuett, 2010:8).

Criticism of the Realist explanation of human nature has had significant implications for international politics, as it has led to states falling victim to self-fulfilling prophecies. Self-fulfilling prophecies occur when you believe that another will harm or has harmed you and, as a result, you exhibit hostile behaviour in retaliation. Eventually, the other will behave in the way you expected, merely because they are responding to the alteration in your behaviour (Deutsch *et al.*, 2006:28). In this way, Realism’s stance on human nature as inherently evil reaffirms itself through self-fulfilling prophecies, as every state is encouraged to act aggressively and commit themselves to a cycle of conflict and competition. Each state’s defence policy essentially produces the very results it fears (Burton, 1965:37). An interesting, yet controversial, example of this has been explored in Zulaika’s *Terrorism: The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy* (2009). Zulaika argues that US counterterrorism activities perpetuate a self-fulfilling prophecy. He claims that through an exaggerated fear that terrorists will utilise weapons of mass destruction to attack the US, the US has called for pre-emptive attacks on foreign agents that have only provoked more hostility and increased the threat of attack. This argument illustrates the power of self-fulfilling prophecies and the cycles they provoke.

This led social scientists to enquire what would happen if states, and humans in general, started believing in the good qualities of humanity. If one believes in the good in human nature, one is able to use this belief to construct the environment most likely to highlight these positive qualities, while at the same time, suppress the destructive qualities (Deutsch, *et al.*, 2006:29). Rather than teaching states that competition and fear are necessary for surviving international politics, which only works to favour conditions of conflict, it is necessary to appreciate that humans are able to live in harmony and according to peaceful values, norms, and beliefs (Deutsch *et al.*, 2006:27). This can be achieved through the acknowledgement that all humans share the need to survive and thrive, and that states can cooperate based on this commonality. Processes and institutions must be put in place to guarantee the security of all states and establish relationships based on reciprocity and respect. In doing so, the cycle of self-fulfilling prophecies can be escaped (Burton & Dukes, 1990:199).

The third assumption of Realism is that subjective, cultural differences have little influence over behaviour due to the inherent strength of every human's negative tendencies. Critics claim that Realism has taken its interpretation of human nature too far by applying it to every social phenomenon and discrediting other aspects of this nature that may be relevant, including cultural aspects, and identities (Richmond, 2008:16). In the analysis of human and state functioning, all human qualities are regarded as universal and primary, while little attention was paid to the apparent lower-tier, secondary and subjective social influences such as culture and history (Richmond, 2008:16). The core assumptions of Realism do not fully explain why a culture could be seen as more conducive to violent conflict and extremists when placed under pressure or, by way of contrast, why a group placed in very similar circumstances may be more willing to cooperate and reconcile (Rogers & Ramsbotham, 1999:741). Social scientists argue that while humans have common basic tendencies and thought processes, whether evil or not, one cannot assume that this is the only way to judge human action and judgement. With no appreciation for culture, conflict management strategies were all structured in similar ways in their effort to dull the forces of selfishness and greed for power. Western formulations of universal methods of peace and conflict management establishing a stable balance of power were applied to both Western conflicts, as well as foreign relations. As a result of this neglect of contextual social

constructions, conflicts were never fully resolved, or, in some cases, not even perpetuated (Miall *et al.*, 2005:70).

Realism's fourth assumption is that Western disciplines centred on power politics and economic dominance provide an adequate and sufficient framework for understanding peace and conflict. As continuous, unrelenting conflicts began revealing the limitation of Western, universal conceptions and strategies in terms of their lack of capacity to maintain stability and establish permanent peace, scholars began studying the role of cultures and contexts in peace and conflict. Consequently, history, psychology, and sociology started to gain prominence and wider acceptance in peace and conflict literature (Woodhouse, 2010:490). Social scientists have stressed that cultures have unique identities, norms and values that may have sparked numerous disagreements and hostilities between certain groups, noting that it is important to understand the significance of identity and the ways in which threats to salient aspect of a group's identity can force them into conflict (Glenn, 2009:524). While struggles for power and survival are relevant in conflict and peace studies, one must determine the manner of survival being fought for, and the manner by which it is pursued. In other words, some may find that groups retaliate not only if their lives are being threatened, but also when their right to live a particular kind of life is being threatened. In this way, survival has different meanings in different situations and each meaning must be considered when peace is sought (Ross, 2007:18).

In addition to comprehending the significance of culture in terms of states coming into conflict with one another, strategising methods of establishing peace also prove relevant. Western notions of cooperation may not be sufficient in convincing states to reconcile (Rogers & Ramsbotham, 1999:741). One must acknowledge the way in which certain groups have developed their own ways of peace, and how they are able to maintain peace. Unique cultural identities, norms and values may have led to conflict, but may also provide the solution to such conflict (Woodhouse, 2010:490). A new respect for non-Western methods of peace has led to, for instance, many tribal communities, including the Native American Indians under the Major Crimes Act, establishing dual justice systems, with one guided by Western methods, and another founded on indigenous methods (Melton, 1995:129). This demonstrates the call for social scientists to incorporate comprehensive investigations into the history and values of groups to the traditional International

Relations disciplines. This will allow communities to guide the processes of peace in a way that makes them comfortable and increases their sense of security (Melton, 1995:126).

The fifth assumption relates to how an actor comes to understand others as enemies or friends. Realists assume that humans are enemies and rivals by default, and that the construction of a friend or foe is dependent on the threat they pose to one's survival (Schweller, 2004:177). The persistent fight for survival, as well as the distribution of power and chaotic nature of anarchy, requires that enemies and friends constantly change, and even when an actor is perceived as a friend or ally, they will always be regarded with suspicion by other actors. There is, therefore, no need to investigate how this occurred, as the conditions of this disordered, conflictual existence are explanation enough (Copeland, 2000:187). This is debated by social scientists in various theoretical camps, however, the proponents of Constructivism are arguably the most vociferous in this regard. Constructivists criticise Realists for not looking deeper into the complexities of human social construction and argue that humans will not declare another an enemy merely through instinct. Instead, people act and react to objects based on the meanings they attach to those objects (Wendt, 1992:396).

Constructivists assert that when an individual, group or a state is hostile towards another, one must investigate how the construction process that brought about this hostility and why it escalated into conflict (Wendt, 1992:396). The groups can come to realise how they are viewed in the eyes of their enemy and, as a result, why their enemy has reacted in a certain way (Freyberg-Inan, 2004:135). If there have been any misunderstandings in the past, groups can come to understand where these misunderstandings took place and how this has played into creating the negative image of their rival (Deutsch *et al.*, 2006:25). In addition, once one fully comprehends how an enemy came to exist in such a negative light, one may be able to devise a strategy whereby this construction is reversed. One is able to calculate which aspects of the conflict have been more prone to aggravation, and how this has led to distrust and retaliation (Deutsch *et al.*, 2006:25). An example of critically analysing the ways in which enemies come to be perceived is Oren's work *Our Enemies and US* (2003), which provides a critical reflection on how the US came to view certain states as enemies, including Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin, even if their record of relations with that state had been friendly.

Realists claim, as per this sixth and final assumption, that conflict is universal and permanent, where the only way to establish conflict resolution is through conflict management. Realists assume that complete trust and reconciliation are impossibilities in International Relations and, as a result, conflict is a permanent human state. Advocates of this approach argue that there is no other way to approach conflict than through its management (Donnelly, 2005:31). While methods of managing conflicts may evolve and improve, the foundations for each strategy remain the same, as all conflicts have universal characteristics (Freyberg-Inan, 2004:26). Each strategy works to establish a stable environment where selfish behaviour is monitored and regulated, as much as an anarchic environment allows, and conflicting groups agree that a form of agreement is necessary for their own survival (Schweller, 2004:177). Critics of Realism have stressed that social scientists must be cautious of theories that claim to have the ultimate answer for the complexities of human behaviour, including ways in which they are able to live peacefully (Galtung, 1967:116). By declaring the universal and unalterable validity of its assumptions, the arguments made for Realism advance that any questioning of and experiments regarding these assumptions is essentially useless. There is no need for other aspects of human nature to be explored for the purposes of establishing peace, because the answers have already been discovered. Realists argue that one must work with these answers to find solutions to social phenomena and any effort to look outside the assumptions of Realism, consequently, is doomed to fail (Carr, 2012:88).

Critics of Realism have urged social scientists to look beyond the warnings of Realism to challenge the self-proclaimed universal assumptions of Realism. Social scientists must construct new notions of conflict and peace, and utilise ideas that may not even be recognised in Realism (Dunn, 2004:83). They should believe that humans are able to live in harmony, and that this is a means for which all research must be conducted. An approach mirroring this optimism will encourage actors to strive for peace and support the practices of negotiation and compromise (Moffitt & Bordone, 2005:15). In this vein, scholars are urged to reconceptualise concepts that may have defined the field of peace and conflict studies for centuries (Rogers & Ramsbotham, 1999:741). For example, Eller provides an anthological perspective to the field of international ethnic conflicts in his work *From Culture, to Ethnicity, to Conflict* (1999) where he reassesses

challenges traditional notions of ethnicity and conflict and demonstrates the need for new ideas to be explored in the effort toward developing alternative, more holistic strategies for establishing peace, rather than remaining committed to the fixed, self-proclaimed universalities of Realism (Dunn, 2004:71).

Coupled with the transformation of theories regarding peace and conflict must be a commitment to testing these theories (Rogers & Ramsbotham, 1999:742). A theory of peace and conflict studies must not be created or developed solely for academic purposes. Its validity must not be based on whether it can withstand scholarly criticism or debate. Rather, a theory must be judged in terms of its applicability to the real world and its ability to withstand real-life obstacles (Lucas, 2003:236). The more one experiments with new strategies and ideologies, the more successful it will be. Overall, social scientists must remain mindful of the duty they possess to solve social problems rather than accept the world through a single perspective (Dunn, 2004:83).

2.4 Conceptualising conflict resolution

The numerous debates in the field of peace and conflict studies have led to a new conceptualisation of peace following conflict. More specifically, they have led to the formalised, multi-disciplined concept of conflict resolution. Conflict resolution can be defined as placing focus on conducting conflicts as constructively as possible, whereby “violence is minimised, antagonism between adversaries is overcome, outcomes are mutually acceptable to the opponents, and settlements are enduring” (Kriesberg, 2007:52). In other words, conflict resolution involves the positive manipulation of conflicting actors with the aim of establishing enduring peaceful relations. Conflict resolution dictates that the conflicting actors directly address the root causes of their hostilities and formulate peace settlements that allow for non-violent, diplomatic relations to develop (Lambourne, 2004:3). The nature of the relationship between the parties involved must be changed in order to break free of the cycle of distrust and aggression. The resolution of conflict, therefore, requires analysis of the conflict and its origins, as well as a normative shift (Richmond, 2008:103).

This normative shift includes the transformation from behaviour and thought processes that once fuelled the conflict to those that adhere to a new, enduring, peaceful code of conduct (Rogers & Ramsbotham, 1999:741). These new norms must be implemented not just through the state, as assumed by Realism, but also on the micro-, meso and macro levels. This is because states cannot merely force notions of peace and trust onto groups who have been battling for years, decades, or even centuries. Conflict has become ingrained in their everyday lives and has shaped the way they interpret their own survival. For conflict resolution to be effectively pursued, these groups must be convinced that peace is better than persistent insecurity and defence (Steenkamp, 2014:33). They must be encouraged to take action and implement new guidelines of behaviour in the interest of their own good (Richmond, 2008:103).

Social scientists have argued that this form of conflict resolution involves establishing and maintaining order, as groups must agree and uphold certain policies that promote a peaceful relationship. Peace must be a governing process where all levels of human activity and thought are guided toward a common hope for stability and security (Brigg, 2008:50). These concepts of order, stability and security have been emphasised in the Realist perspective of peace, as discussed earlier in this chapter, however conflict resolution is different from the Realist idea of order and stability. Rather, conflict resolution is coupled with the process of norm restructuring and context acknowledgement. Contemporary interpretations of conflict resolution and peace also acknowledge that the security dilemma, as advanced by Realist scholars such as Kaufmann (1996) and Long & Brecke (2003), is a reality for conflicting groups, however, they advance that it can and must be overcome. They stress that groups must feel that they will not fall victim to the unfaithfulness of their enemy, and that this can only be achieved if an environment based on new, peace-orientated values is constructed.

This new order must entail the enforcement and maintenance of certain values, as this will allow peaceful norms to be accepted by all levels of society. Five core values relating to conflict resolution will be analysed in detail in the next section of this chapter, namely equity and shared community; respect for differences; cooperation and negotiation; justice and reconciliation; trust; and non-violence. This section will necessarily often analyse two similar, yet distinct, concepts as one unitary value, where one most often implies or functions in conjunction with the other.

Each concept will be conceptualised, followed by a discussion on how it works to serve the common goal of conflict resolution. This will, therefore, outline the requirements for interaction most suitable for sustainable peace.

The first value of conflict resolution rests on the understanding that conflicting groups must come to respect one another and acknowledge that, regardless of their differences that may have caused the conflict, they have common needs and rights that make them a shared community of equal members (Ross, 2007:320). Equity, as an essential value of conflict resolution, implies that all humans are equal and must be treated as such. This value necessitates that humans are part of a shared community, where all are motivated to survive and flourish within the environment they live (Korostelina, 2012:143). As their actions and thought processes are inherently linked, humans need to interact with and rely on one another. Just as it is desirable not to struggle through economic exploitation, repression and violence with the aim to survive and succeed, it is necessary not to impose these same conditions on another who is attempting to achieve the same thing (Jeong, 2000:26). Human relatedness and fundamental equality ought to drive them to work together in achieving common aspirations (Briggs, 2008:120).

The second value of conflict resolution rests on the assumption that, while people ought to base their future behaviour on the emphasis of qualities that link them to one another, humans must still respect the other's right to be different (Ross, 2007:319). Humans share many essential qualities with one another, and it is important to work from these values in peace processes, however, this does not mean that the differences between them can be ignored. Rather than solely focusing on the qualities that link human beings, such as selfishness, the need for power, and deeming these the primary focus of International Relations, the construction of unique cultures and identities ought to be explored and analysed as well (Ross, 2007:320). The survival of these subjective constructions may become so forceful that groups that have developed strong, polarised identities are willing to sacrifice a great amount of political and economic resources for the sake of the survival of their way of life (Stern, 1995:221). In the effort toward ensuring the protection and successes of human freedom and variety, social scientists must seek to understand identity and culture as social phenomena (Miall *et al.*, 2005:72). They are tasked with

understanding how identities and culture develop, the ways in which they can fuel long-lasting conflict, and how they can be maintained, yet still managed (Briggs, 2008:120).

Having noted their commonalities as human beings, the third value requires that conflicting groups must appreciate the other as an equal, valued partner in the effort toward peace, and interact with one another through methods of cooperation and negotiation (Deutsch *et al.*, 2006:27). Cooperation entails working with others to achieve a common goal and valuing the contribution of others. The concept works from the idea of equity, as one recognises that the input and contribution of another is valuable and may help to reach a common, desired result (Brigg, 2008:120). Cooperation is more productive than competition, as not every disagreement is resolved with a win-lose conclusion. The process of negotiation allows for each conflicting group to feel a sense of comfort and security in the agreements made following a conflict, and this should be the goal of conflict resolution (Moffitt & Bordone, 2005:279). The method of cooperation through negotiation does, however, imply that each conflicting actor accepts that the conclusions reached may not be entirely ideal. Both groups may have to experience levels of sacrifice if peace is to be established and maintained, and ultimately benefit them in the long-term (Plantey, 2007:541).

Fourth, conflict resolution necessitates justice and reconciliation whereby conflicting groups commit to cooperating, and negotiating with one another, with the understanding that the agreements reached are able to reconcile hostilities and, to some degree, right the wrongs of the past. Each group has a particular perception of how the relevant conflict arose; why it escalated; and what injustices took place in this process. If a conflict is to be resolved, these perceptions must be acknowledged and directly addressed through just means by all involved parties, with the aim of leaving the past behind (Miall *et al.*, 2005:270). Reconciliation works with justice in the sense that it strives to mend the hostilities that have been ingrained through conflict (Lu, 2017:11). The parties concerned must take accountability for their actions and consciously seek to heal the wounds that they have created. In doing so, they prove to their rival that they are serious about this peace process and there is no reason for them to fear unfaithfulness. By acknowledging the consequences of one's actions and assuring that certain misconduct will not be repeated, a new, positive foundation is built that sets the tone for future interactions between

the parties (Deutsch *et al.*, 2006:67). This process of justice and reconciliation is not just implemented and maintained by the state, but is upheld at all levels of society. Every individual and group involved in the conflict is encouraged to take action to address the pains of the past, embrace the present, and look toward the future (Lederach, 1998:26).

The fifth value assumes that conflicting groups undergoing a process of reconciliation need to trust that the other will not take advantage of their vulnerability (Wendt, 1992:421). Trust is, therefore, essential in the process of conflict resolution. Conflicting groups need to present themselves as an entity worthy of another's trust, for perceptions of threat and the security dilemma this creates can hinder cooperative processes. Trust can be fostered by respecting the demands of the other party, and through a mutual commitment to follow through on agreed-upon promises. In doing so, behaviour becomes less unpredictable and the cycle of self-fulfilling prophecies is put to an end (Wendt, 1992:421). The groups begin to cooperate more frequently and with more flexibility, which then allows them to develop a perception of one another as reliable partners in post-conflict proceedings (Deutsch *et al.*, 2006:111).

The sixth and final value of conflict resolution rests on the idea of non-violence as it is believed that this trust cannot be fostered unless all violence between the conflicting groups has ceased and is permanently discouraged (Deutsch *et al.*, 2006:37). When groups feel they are being threatened with violent acts, both physical and structural, they naturally feel it is necessary to react with the same, or higher level of violence (Deutsch *et al.*, 2006:655). As more acts of violence are committed in retaliation for past violence, the likelihood of a long-term, peaceful settlement is decreased (Sambanis, 1999:13). The groups become trapped in a cycle of vengeance and hatred, as each act of violence must surpass the act against which it is retaliating (Saideman & Zahar, 2008:30). A method of conflict resolution cannot utilise any form of violence or coercion if it is to succeed, as this only perpetuates the cycle it wishes to break. The only option it has is to promote interactions based on non-violence, where cooperation and negotiation are regarded as the only tools capable of achieving justice (Brigg, 2008:87). This value is especially important in the beginning stages of conflict resolution, as this is the period in which both groups feel most vulnerable and harbour the most resentment toward the other (Steenkamp, 2009:20).

2.5 Identity and culture in the process of conflict resolution

According to contemporary social scientists, actors within a post-conflict environment that adhere to the values outlined above will be able to feel a sense of security; ensure its members feel that justice has been served; and build a stable foundation for interaction. One cannot assume, however, that these values will automatically be established and maintained in a post-conflict setting when groups agree to cooperate. Throughout the conflict, the groups have developed contrasting identities and cultures that have become more polarised as the conflict has worn on (Ross, 2007:15). The process of conflict resolution must foster and nurture new, shared identities and cultures that are based on values of peace. The process must ensure that the conflicting groups promote these values at all levels of society, even when certain circumstances make this difficult. This requires a certain level of understanding as to how identities and cultures develop, how they relate to one another, and if and how they can be changed (Deutsch, *et al.*, 2006:111).

To begin a discussion on identity and its relation to culture, one must first discuss its definition and characteristics, as well as how it develops and changes. An identity can be defined as a “form of social representation that mediates the relationship between the individual and the social world” (Chryssochoou, 2003:225). In other words, identity is the way in which one views oneself and others and consists of one’s unique beliefs, values and expectations. As individuals interact with the world around them and form bonds with others, they gain an understanding of reality that is incorporated into their everyday thought processes and behaviour (Schwartz, *et al.*, 2011:57). Simply put, they develop an identity that acts as a framework for understanding the world as well as themselves (Wendt, 1992:397). An individual, however, does not embody one sole identity and, consequently, functions according to one framework of reality (Wendt, 1992:397). Each individual embodies multiple identities relating to many different spheres of reality. Each identity varies in importance to a person, and some come to have more influence on a person, while others can easily be changed or suppressed if necessary (Reus-Smit, 2018:1). In addition, this identity frames the way an individual views others. A common identity, or identities, can bring people together while contrasting identities can ignite conflict and competition (Wendt, 1992:397). In particular, this logic applies to social identity, which is the understanding of reality that derives from being a member of a social group. Being a member of

a social group means that one identifies with the beliefs, values and interpretations of others held by that group. One's social identity, thus, allows an individual to feel a sense of relatedness to others (Tajfel, 1981: 255).

While there are many different forms of identity influencing an individual, group and state, this study takes ethnic identities as its focus. Ethnic identity is a form of social identity that encompasses the sense of belonging to a community and heritage (Fearon & Laitin, 2000: 848). Ethnic identity is derived from collective experiences as a result of common history, experiences and values, which then come to frame how one comes to view reality. One's ethnic identity, in other words, is developed through communal social evolution and establishment (Toft, 2003:19). It can include, but is not limited to, characteristics such as language, religion, culture, and nationality. One's ethnic identity is the product of both the ways in which external actors classify and understand you, as well those qualities with which you personally identify. Thus, ethnic identity is both externally and internally imposed (Verkuyten, 2005:18).

Social identity, or more specifically ethnic identity, is linked to the question of culture, where social identity and culture frame the way individuals interact with those within as well as outside a group. Eventually, these aspects may go undetected by someone within themselves. Instinct and norms guide most behaviour, and these inclinations are shared and adhered to by other individuals in the same identity group (Schwartz *et al.*, 2011:2). This tendency gives rise to culture (Ross, 2007:2). A culture is a generalised framework for collective behaviour made up of large networks of identities (Wendt, 1992:397). A culture reflects collective knowledge regarding what to value, why it is valued and how to behave to best express these values. These values are then protected by all members of the group because they frame each individual's view of reality. The members are linked in such a way that the survival of oneself is dependent on the survival of the group, where it is the social identity of the group that built the individual (Deutsch *et al.*, 2006:627).

When this culture or ethnic identity is threatened, politics becomes far more than just a struggle for relative power, as proponents of Realism contend (Stern, 1995:218). The personal nature of this attack will involve a struggle between groups over the right to live an existence of their

choosing, where conflict arises when another group threatens this right. The threatened group feels that it is the duty of its members to protect the values that connect them and frame their social reality (Danielidou & Horvath, 2006:406). As a result, it is not possible to give in to the demands of a rival, as it would involve abandoning one's way of life and foundational interpretation of reality. Ethnic foundations that have been developed and fought for would have to be sacrificed, and so conflict becomes so invested with emotional and social significance that any loss on either side will not be tolerated (Ross, 2007:14-15).

The cultural intensity of an inter-group ethnic conflict implies a forceful and emotional security dilemma. Each side expects the other to act selfishly in order to secure their culture and ethnic legitimacy and, as a result of this mutual distrust, both sides refuse to cooperate (Tang, 2011:532). Due to the complex personalised ancestral nature of ethnicity, every act of hostility and violence is de facto infused into the story of an ethnic group and that which constitutes it (Downes, 2001:62). Groups retaliate against each other not just in a bid to gain more power or out of fear that the other will do the same, but also as a result of pure hatred, resentment and rage. Under these circumstances, rationality is often abandoned for the sake of spite and revenge (Tang, 2011:532). Conflict resolution must seek to end this cycle of malice and maintain the identity of respective groups, while transforming the culture in which they operate. New values must be introduced to replace those that are mutually destructive (Jeong, 2000:26).

In this process of comprehending and resolving the complexities of ethnic conflict, one cannot rely on the Realist tradition alone. A Realist focus on power politics and state-orientated competition is insufficient for comprehending and resolving the complexities of ethnic conflict (Dunn, 2004:66). Instead of utilising a single universal framework on thought and behaviour and applying this to every case of conflict, it is necessary to understand how and why an ethnic group may have developed certain values and beliefs, as well as which ones are of most significance to their culture (Reus-Smit, 2018:1). One would be able to explain how a group responds to another that seeks to challenge their culture, and which points of disagreement are more likely to result in conflict due to their relation to the group's identity (Danielidou & Horvath, 2006:406). In addition, there will be more clarity on which experiences have reinforced a group's conception of the enemy, and why these experiences were so devastating to certain inter-group relations.

This would allow one to predict which aspects of a group's culture are so important to the group that any form of compromise would derail the peace process as a whole, and which aspects of this culture can be negotiated for the sake of conflict resolution (Ross, 2007:319). In other words, why and how an enemy is constructed in the mind of a given ethnic group is what is considered to be one of the most important tasks in contemporary peace and conflict studies (Danielidou & Horvath, 2006:406).

Such an analysis into a group's ethnic identities would decrease the chances that the peace process will fail, as the root causes of the conflict are directly confronted. With the most important aspects of an ethnic group's culture clearly outlined and recognised, the groups will feel more secure in the decision to trust the process of conflict resolution (Deutsch *et al.*, 2006:111). Trust in the process and respect for one another will decrease the likelihood of self-fulfilling prophecies described earlier, and allow for more permanent solutions to a conflict. Instead of the win-lose conclusion of conflict advanced by Realism, where the gain of power necessarily means its loss for another, the process of conflict resolution will be able to rest on the belief that both sides can reach a settlement where all parties can gain (Richmond, 2008:101). The two sides must believe that harmony can be achieved if the process of conflict resolution is implemented correctly (Jeong, 2000:26). As per the research question on which this study is based, post-conflict environments must be judged on their ability to embrace the processes and values associated with conflict resolution.

2.6 Ethnic partitioning

Ethnic partitioning is a method of conflict resolution that claims to be the last resort for peace in hostile situations, and has been implemented in numerous contexts of heightened conflict. Ethnic partitioning is the act of territorially separating ethnic groups when it is believed that the conflicting groups have incompatible identities that cannot be reconciled (Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl, 2009:84). In his work *Literature, Partition and the Nation-State*, Cleary (2004:2) characterises partitioning as the creation of two or more states from one, conflicting unit, with the assumption that separation will enhance the peacefulness of the region. Partition is,

thus, the result of “the desire or the need to control specific territories” which then leads to “the break-up of existing geographical and political units” (Waterman, 1996:346).

Swee (2015) notes that this form of conflict resolution has become increasingly prominent, especially after World War II. He notes that a quarter of the ethnic civil war episodes since World War II have been resolved by physically dividing the conflicting groups into partitioned jurisdictions. Sambanis (2000:446) found that there were 125 civil wars between 1944 and 2000, of which 21 resulted in partitioning. As war started to frame the politics of the 20th century, groups started to feel victimised by the decisions of those in power, whose policies started to negatively affect certain groups under their governance. These groups no longer wanted to be represented by elites with whom they could not identify (Jenne, 2012:121). More territorialised minorities governed by a single state recognised their right to self-government and self-determination and, as a result, wanted to be in control of their own destinies. These minorities wanted to govern a sovereign state and be able to pursue their own interests and institutionalise their own culture (Jenne, 2012:121). This led to greater attention being paid to the logic of such acts of self-government and the partitioning that accompanied such an establishment.

2.6.1 The logic of ethnic partitioning

Two works by Kaufmann (1996;1998) have provided valuable definitions and explanations of the logic of partition and are referenced by fellow advocates and critics alike. Kaufmann argues that an ethnic war can reach a point where no form of peaceful intervention can work, and more extreme measures are the only option. He explains that the war has heightened the feelings of insecurity experienced by the conflicting ethnic groups to such an extent that no side is able to lower their arms and cease acts of violent retaliation. In such case, there is no strong, centralised state authority to force the groups to cooperate and discourage violence (Kaufmann, 1998:122). Every act of defence taken by one side is perceived as an offensive threat to the other. The security dilemma thereby becomes more complex when considering any form of intervention other than territorial separation (Kaufmann, 1996:139). Any solution that aims to restore multi-ethnic cooperation, such as power-sharing, will ultimately fail because of the intensified fears, hatred and trauma experienced by the ethnic groups.

Any effort aimed at ceasing ethnic conflict must tackle the feelings of fear and distrust that arise from this security dilemma. Cox and Sisk (2017:2) argue that the main threat to social cohesion for conflicting ethnic groups is the inescapable fear that the other side will use force to repress their national identity. This fear is present before, during and following high-violence contexts. Fear is the reason for conflict in the first place, and the reason why it continues to defy any peaceful solutions (Kelman, 1997:348). This fear could lead not only to the physical separation of groups within a territory, but also the formation of parallel social and political institutions, where members seek refuge from the fear through intra-group bonding (Cox & Sisk, 2017:2). This description of fear causing life support withdrawal into one's own group has been clarified by Rothchild and Hartzell (1999:216), wherein they explain that fears regarding the survival of one's identity and even one's physical existence can cause members of a group to simultaneously intensify conflict, and withdraw into their communities, thereby entrenching social divisions.

According to partition theorists, there comes a point in some situations where the fear and hate resulting from social divisions are hardened to such an extent that negotiation and cooperation under one state seem impossible (Saideman & Zahar, 2008:81). In these circumstances, the most humane last resort would be to separate the warring groups. Waterman (1996:346) provides a fitting metaphor to understand partition and the experiences of the actors involved. He explains that in the lead-up to the partition, the state territory can be viewed in the same light as real estate property, where the respective parties are joint tenants. According to this metaphor, the tenants are unable to cooperate, and cannot live in harmony. The property, or the literal state, is then divided in such a way that the groups feel that they can leave the conflict with their dignity still intact and without sacrificing their rights, identities and cultures (Getso, 1999:591). Territorially distancing the groups will avoid a win-lose scenario, to which most ethnic conflicts succumb, and allow for both sides to uphold their legitimacy as ethnic groups (Kaufmann, 1998:122).

One of the most salient arguments made by advocates of ethnic partitioning is that ethnic partitioning is able to create ethnically homogeneous states, and in turn, to lower the level of conflict (Sambanis, 2000:441). Ethnic partitioning essentially redraws borders and develops suitable governing institutions that encompass the culture of a single ethnic group. The new state is able to secure the well-being of the population it represents and ensure public goods are

distributed according to the preferences of this group (Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2005:798). Horowitz (2001:588) concludes that: “if it is impossible for groups to live together in a heterogeneous state, perhaps it is better for them to live apart in more than one homogeneous state, even if this necessitates population transfers.”

This understanding of homogenisation relates to the concept of identities and cultures, as the new state acts to serve a more unified sovereign identity (Rae, 2002:5). An institution, including a state, is essentially a stable structure, consisting of many different identities that form a culture codifying rules and norms that must be followed. The culture becomes embedded in the collective knowledge of the citizenry, as well as the functioning of the state (Wendt, 1992:399). A homogenous state, therefore, represents a limited amount of identities and one, overarching culture. The culture has inherent perceptions of peace and the processes that must be followed to construct this peace. Culture thus determines whether this homogenous state will continue hostile relations with another, or whether it pursues conflict de-escalation, reconciliation, and peace (Ross, 2007:26).

To create this homogenous state, the ethnic group dominating a particular region must “cleanse” the territory of members of the enemy ethnic group. The ethnic group represented by the new sovereign state is effectively concentrated and reduces the rival population. This act of ethnic cleansing is defined as the “expulsion by force in order to homogenise the ethnically mixed population of a particular region or territory” (Pappe, 2006:2). Ethnic cleansing is the effort to institutionalise an ethnic culture by ensuring there is no threat of an enemy resisting and rebelling against the state (McGarry & O’Leary, 1994:97). For the purpose of contextualising the process of ethnic cleansing, the case of the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1993 to 1995 will be taken into account here (Bell-Fialkoff, 1993:110). In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Bosnian Serbs sought to establish an institution that solely represented their interests and which was strongly aligned with those of Serbia. To achieve this end, the Bosnian Serbs accompanied by the Serb paramilitary forced the Muslim Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats out of the Bosnian territory (Mulaj, 2005:9). In addition to the cultural and identity factor in ethnic cleansing, the groups may also view the process as necessary for the strengthening of territorial claims. For this reason, the forced mass population transfers are seen to be permanent when they

are implemented (Bulutgil, 2016:6). In terms of the Bosnian Serbs, they believed that they had a historical right to the Bosnian territory, and were, therefore, justified in forcibly removing their rivals and reclaiming their land. The more Bosnian Serbs that are concentrated in Bosnia as the result of ethnic cleansing, the more justified their claims to this land would be (Mulaj, 2005:9).

A variety of methods can be used in the process of ethnic cleansing, most notably mass population transfers and cultural suppression. By definition, this involves forced mass population transfer, where an ethnic community is forced to leave a territory and relocate to another by any means possible (McGarry & O'Leary, 1994:97). While this process is typically politically consensual, the ethnic groups may experience large-scale acts of massacre as it is believed that by coercing the enemy into leaving the territory and instilling a great level of fear, the process of homogenisation will be made more effective and accelerated. The perpetrators of the ethnic cleansing utilise numerous methods, including mass killings, deportation, and compulsory agreements regarding population exchange (Bulutgil, 2016:6). These violent acts took place during and after the Bosnian ethnic partition as an estimated 110,000 individuals were killed, and about 2.2 million were forcibly removed from the territory (Stefanovic & Loizides, 2017:218). To accompany these acts, all aspects of the rival's culture must be suppressed and erased institutionally. A homogenous state is no longer required to accommodate a variety of political, economic and social interests, therefore, public institutions can be restructured to the satisfaction of one ethnicity and its inherent norms and values (Mann, 2004:18). The Bosnian Serbs knew that they needed to establish an institution that was free from the control of any other ethnic group. To do this, they aimed to institutionalise their identity and exclude any non-Serbian ideological leanings in government (Mulaj, 2005:4). As with most incidences of ethnic cleaning, their rival ethnic cultures would be erased from collective memory to allow for a new state identity to develop (Pappe, 2006:3).

2.6.2 A critique of ethnic partitioning

Critics claim that, rather than ending the cycle of violence, fear and hatred in ethnic conflict, ethnic partitioning has the capacity to entrench hostilities and even escalate the conflict over a longer period of time. Prominent scholars in this critique include Sambanis (1999), Kelman

(1997), Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2009), Kumar (2000) and Jenne (2010), to name a few. They argue that while ethnic partitioning can prevent violence for a short time following a conflict, it does nothing to address the conflict's root causes, nor the immediate events that led to its escalation. In other words, ethnic partitioning is a method of temporary conflict management as opposed to a method of conflict resolution able to maintain peace over a long period of time. The processes involved in ethnic partitioning, including massacres and forced population transfers, often create more complex problems between the opposing groups. For example, in the process of partitioning regions, certain ethnic groups will claim the same territories for a multitude of reasons (Toft, 2003:20). Territorial dispute has been a major force in the decades following the partition of Yugoslavia. The multiple successor states established through the partition of Yugoslavia have warred over control over certain territories or the redrawing of borders (Vladisavljević, 2004:390). As demonstrated by this example, there is truth to the critique that ethnic partitioning effectively ensures that ethnic conflict is transformed from an internal conflict to an international conflict.

Many critics of ethnic partitioning argue that the founding values and principles of the new partitioned territories stand in direct contrast to those of peace. When a strategy aimed at decreasing rates of conflict is embraced by the parties involved, it will set the tone for all relations to come. As explained by Jenne (2010:274), a philosophy of compromise, cooperation and negotiation can be fostered when encouraged by a method of conflict resolution. In this way, a state can be established through the enforcement and encouragement of those values so crucial to conflict resolution, as described earlier. Coakley (2009:481) and Hooghe (1993:44) explicate that the conflict between the Dutch-speaking Flanders and French-speaking Wallonia in Belgium has been resolved through the fostering of these values. The root causes of the conflict were addressed before they had the chance to escalate through methods of compromise and negotiation (Coakley, 2009:481). In many cases, however, new states can be created through the rejection of these values. Through ethnic partitioning, new states are founded on principles of exclusion and intolerance that then shape the culture of their citizenry which, as a result, only heightens the security dilemma (Ross, 2007:3). To legitimate the establishment of the new state, its leaders must advance the narrative that they cannot reconcile with another group as they pose a threat to the survival of an ethnicity (Saideman & Zahar, 2008:30). The leaders of this new

nation must convince their citizenry that the very existence of the enemy in a territory is unacceptable if their homogenous ideal is to be fulfilled (Rae, 2002:11). For example, Rae (2002) describes how the Bosnian Serbs would often maintain their status of legitimacy as an ethnically partitioned territory by referring back to incidences of perceived injustices and reiterating the need to reject any interaction with the Bosnian Croats and Muslims for fear of reliving the past.

The result of encouraging principles of distrust and non-cooperation is that actions of exclusivity come to frame the functioning of the nation (Kelman, 1997:334). Through ethnic partitioning, the population is then convinced that there is no need to respect the opinions of another with whom they disagree. If the principle of exclusivity resulted in the ethnic group acquiring their own territorial sovereignty, logic would dictate that this behaviour is successful. To get what one wants, one does not need to adapt to the needs and desires of another through processes of negotiation and compromise (Kelman, 1997:334). This means that the principles of exclusivity and destruction will be adopted into collective knowledge and will, thus, become a norm accepted by the public and encouraged by the political elite (Deutsch *et al.*, 2006:627).

The governing ethnic group has fought for and acquired its national legitimacy through the exclusion and destruction of others, however, this does not mean it is recognised as a legitimate and respected community by their rival or even the international community (Dagher, 2018:87). Considering that both groups seek ethnic legitimacy and the right to live an existence without the threat of another depriving them of this, ethnic partitioning effectively achieves very little. Each group seeks to establish legitimacy as an ethnic group through partitioning; however, creating a sovereign state guided by certain ethnic principles does not automatically lead to ethnic legitimacy, but rather achieves the exact opposite (Dagher, 2018:87). The group cannot claim to be ethnically legitimate and secure if it is still under threat from its rival and is being eradicated in another territory through ethnic cleansing. Indeed, the power of their enemy is becoming more concentrated and forceful, which poses an even greater threat to their existence (Berg & Solvak, 2011:470). The groups have not, therefore, achieved the legitimacy and security for which they have fought (Lederach, 1998:12).

Through the construction of a national identity reliant on conflict with another, as well as the will to destroy all remnants of their rival, violence becomes not only acceptable, but encouraged. The rival ethnic group is deemed an enemy of the state with no entitlement to basic rights in a certain territory, which then legitimises the use of violence in the cleansing of the new territory (Fearon & Laitin, 2000: 855). The illogicality of ethnic partitioning, according to critics, is apparent in this effort to prevent conflict by supporting the violence that usually perpetuates such conflict. In this way, by normalising intimidation, expulsion, and exclusion, a new, violent state and civil culture is constructed and institutionalised (Cleary, 2004:22). It is important to note that the violence involved in ethnic partitioning is not only physical, but also structural, and social. Methods of violence utilised in the process of ethnic cleansing includes intimidation and exclusion, both physically and psychologically (Bulutgil, 2016:6).

As ethnic cleansing becomes more widespread and severe, new experiences of trauma are created (Downes, 2001:111). Ironically, while the conflict arose from certain hostile events and disagreements, the method aimed at resolving these problems creates more of the same. More atrocities take place, more individuals are killed, and more division is created between the groups (Pischedda, 2008:106). Eventual negotiation and cooperation are impossibilities as a result of the continuation of behaviour that perpetuated the cycle of conflict and violence. This argument has been discussed in some depth by Sambanis (1999:19) when he argues that as the number of deaths and displacements rise, the probability of new conflict also rises. The leaders of the new states then create a more intense international conflict in retaliation against the use of violence that the process of ethnic partitioning at first necessitated (Pischedda, 2008:107).

Due to the continuation of fear and distrust, violence, traumatic experiences and institutionalised exclusivity, critics of ethnic partitioning argue that the security dilemma is not weakened, but rather, transformed into a more dangerous international rivalry. While advocates for ethnic partition argue that at a certain point there is no other solution to ethnic conflict due to the intensification of the security dilemma, critics argue that the processes associated with ethnic partitioning merely change the security dilemma from an internal to international phenomenon (Sambanis, 1999:11). This is because the groups have not dealt with the root causes of their conflict and committed themselves to rectify their wrongs. Now that the new state functions

according to narrow political interests and identities, the potential for reconciliation is made even more challenging (Lindley, 2007:227). In addition, the new states often find or generate international allies that share the same negative perceptions of their rival. An international alliance means that the once internal, civil conflict has the potential to erupt into a full-blown international war. In the 21st century, this international conflict is far more threatening due to the development and increasing popularity of nuclear weapons (Freyberg-Inan, 2004:133). Having noted the strength of ethnic identity, and the possibility for international alliances based on these identities, it is more likely that ethnic conflicts are able to escalate to far more dangerous levels (Pischedda, 2008:107).

While an international perspective is important for the critics of partition, scholars such as Sambanis (1999) and Mason and Quinn (2006) among others, have stressed the importance of understanding the perspective of those who still remain within the boundaries dominated by their rival. Although the newly partitioned states undergo processes to flush out their rivalled ethnic group for the sake of homogenisation, they will never be completely homogenous (Sambanis, 1999:3). There will be minorities left behind in a territory governed by the principles of a group that actively seek to expel all traces of their identity, and who have killed members of their community in this process. The minorities are stripped of their rights yet still have to accept their suppression because those are the terms to which the leaders of their ethnic group have agreed (Mason & Quinn, 2006:24). Although the group left behind is victimised through the processes of ethnic partition, they are capable of being very dangerous to the new ethnically-dominated state (Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl, 2009:118). The minorities may rise up and rebel against the state that is repressing them. In this process, they may appeal to the nation that represents their values, identity and principles, thereby sparking or escalating international conflict between the conflicting groups (Mason & Quinn, 2006:24). Such was the case in Northern Ireland, as explained by Downes (2001:74), following the ethnic partitioning of Ireland as a result of the ongoing conflict between the Protestants and the Catholics. The citizens of Northern Ireland were unionist Protestants who believed that coexisting with the nationalist Catholics would only impede their development, thus cumulating in the partitioning of Ireland. The Catholics that remained in Northern Ireland remained the largest minority and often rebelled against the newly established state (Downes, 2001:74). The Protestant unionists came to understand that their

idealised vision of a homogenised nation could not be fully realised for those left behind in territories controlled by their rivals harboured resentment that had the potential to destabilise the state.

In cases where conflict has arisen due to domestic territorial disputes, partitioning can directly contribute to this problem, and guarantee future conflict. Territorial disputes are often causes of ethnic war, whether they relate to externally influenced separatist movements that seek to annex a certain territory, or internal desires for ruling one's own affairs (Jenne, 2010:126). The aim to control a certain territory can be based on a multitude of reasons; however, this is most often due to the resource richness of that territory. By granting one group access to this territory, another group will often attempt to rationalise that their claim to the land is more legitimate (Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl, 2009:101). In addition, regional or international actors can often insert themselves into domestic politics in the hopes that they can benefit from the restructuring of the new state (Jenne, 2010:140). These external actors then radicalise certain ethnic groups and drive them to suppress or drive out others for a greater claim to a territory (Bulutgil, 2016:4). In such cases, the act of ethnic partitioning does little to quell future conflict, but rather exacerbates the conditions of the original conflict (Jenne, 2010:133).

Overall, advocates argue that ethnic partitioning, and the processes involved in ensuring homogenisation, is able to prevent the recurrence of war and prolonged violence, while critics of ethnic partitioning argue that this is not the case as partitioning may inspire new conflicts. In a study conducted by Sambanis (1999) of 125 cases of partitioning, the author found that as more people are relocated and even killed as ethnic cleansing takes place, the probability of future violence increases. Other scholars have reached similar conclusions when analysing the effects of ethnic partitioning in various different contexts. For example, Jenne (2010) argues that ethnic partitioning does not address the root causes of the conflict, but instead creates more disputes that add to the original conflict. Partitioned states will continue their conflict through inter-state means, such as destabilising their rival regime or attempting to regain certain territories. Wigmore-Shepherd (2013) also claims that ethnic identity becomes politicised and more forceful when groups are territorially separated with no intention to address the root of their conflict. Consequently, ethnic partitioning is most often unsuccessful in preventing further conflict.

2.7 Conclusion

This chapter has argued that, due to the formalisation of the concept of conflict resolution, ethnic partitioning has been critiqued in the broader literature for its lack of adherence to values that are conducive to peace. According to Realists, the challenges of the security dilemma can only be overcome through methods of conflict management as conflict can never be permanently resolved. As a result, methods of conflict management were centred around this inflexible perception of conflict, including that of ethnic partitioning. Following the development of a relatively new notion of conflict resolution, conflict has been reconceptualised as a phenomenon able to be overcome, not merely managed. The theory of conflict resolution advances that conflict can be mitigated when conflicting groups come to embrace values such as non-violence, negotiation, compromise, and a respect for human differences. In doing so, they will foster a sustainable peaceful culture of approaching conflict. The difficulty of attaining conflict resolution has not been undervalued in this chapter, for it has elaborated on the challenging role of ethnic identity in conflict. According to theorists of ethnic partitioning, these ethnic identities can be so forceful that conflict resolution is deemed an impossibility. While ethnic partitioning as a strategy of conflict management can be satisfactory for a short period of time, many theorists have argued that it cannot resolve the conflict in such a way that prevents its eventual escalation. Critiques have largely maintained that the processes involved in ethnic partitioning, such as forced population transfers and mass killings, will only result in the continuation, or even escalation, of conflict.

To assess whether ethnic partitioning can be regarded as a method of conflict resolution, one must investigate if, how, and why it can foster a peaceful socio-political culture able to prevent future conflict. The next chapter aims to identify how the success of ethnic partitioning can be assessed with the use of the UN's "Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace" as an analytical tool, more specifically as it categorised by De Rivera (2004). This chapter will elaborate on the importance of a culture of peace in post-conflict societies and why the Declaration is the best method of assessing whether sustainable peace can or has been fostered in ethnic partitions. A culture of peace will be operationalised as it relates to the generalised dimensions of the Declaration and in such a way that allows for a sound investigation of Pakistan and the TRNC.

Chapter 3: A Culture of Peace as an Analytical Tool

3.1 Introduction

A contemporary conceptualisation of peace has various components, each providing a suggestion for methods aimed at avoiding future conflict. Peace must be approached in such a way that is subjective as well as objective; contextual as well as universal, multi-levelled, as well as unitary components, are correctly understood. When one can fully grasp the nature and underlying assumptions of the contemporary conceptualisation of peace, one can assess whether a community can achieve, or has achieved it. Likewise, the same necessity for holistic comprehension applies to a culture of peace. A culture of peace is thought to be present when certain conditions are met, as these conditions prescribe what will lead a community toward conflict resolution (De Rivera, 2004:535).

For ethnic partitioning to be considered a success in terms of its prevention of future conflict, it must foster and maintain a culture of peace. According to the UN's "Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace" (1999:2), a culture of peace has certain dimensions that a post-conflict society must fulfil. The Declaration provides guidelines for how a society can meet the requirements of a culture of peace and it is the aim of this chapter to define and operationalise these requirements. In doing so, this chapter will consider how the Declaration can be used as a tool to assess whether peace and the conflict resolution it necessitates, can be fostered in a post-conflict setting. This chapter will begin with an assessment of what is meant by peace in the 21st century, as well as recommendations of how it must be analysed. This will be followed by a discussion on the origin and development of a culture of peace, why it has been adopted by the UN, and how it can act as a prescription for post-conflict societies.

3.2 Contemporary peace

To understand what is meant by a culture of peace, and more specifically the UN's interpretation of this concept, it is imperative to consider what is generally meant by peace in the 21st century. A contemporary definition of peace is provided by Anderson (2004:103) when he notes that

“peace is a condition in which individuals, families, groups, communities, and/or nations experience low levels of violence and engage in mutually harmonious relationships.” Anderson (2004) describes four characteristics of peace that can be interpreted from this definition, namely its objective, subjective, multi-levelled; and multi-dimensional qualities, each of which will be discussed below. These characteristics allow a holistic understanding of peace that can be utilised when studying its presence or absence in certain societies.

The first and second characteristics of Anderson’s (2004) characterisation of peace relates to the subjective as well as the objective nature of peace. To begin, this characterisation of peace assumes that peace is a condition that can be achieved through encouraging behaviours and thoughts related to peace processes, but it can also be neglected by contrasting processes. Peace is, thus, not a static concept as it can fluctuate and evolve (Anderson, 2004:103). Working from this view, the first characteristic relates to peace as a condition that can be analysed relatively objectively at various points in time. A social scientist can conclude whether a community is inclined toward peace or conflict through the utilisation of relevant scientific measurements and tools of analysis (Anderson, 2004:103). Statistics measuring incidents of violence, for example, can be useful in reaching an objective and valid assessments of the peacefulness of a certain environment, given the operationalisation of violence is correctly implemented. An objective assessment must also be coupled with subjective measures to reach a holistic comprehension of peace. The second characteristic of peace is, thus, the recognition of these subjective factors that influence peace and conflict, including negative perceptions of others, levels of respect for differences, the willingness to use force against one’s rival, and possible visions of unity (Anderson, 2004:104).

Bridging from this subjective understanding of peace, Anderson (2004) notes that peace is a condition experienced on multiple levels, each providing a certain context with constructs of peace or conflict. This third characteristic works from the observation that actors of all levels of society, ranging from individuals to nations in general, can either enforce or deny peace according to their own interpretation of events and visions of the future. This contemporary understanding of peace is a development from Galtung’s (1969) original conception of the levels of actors within a social system. Galtung stressed that peace is a concept that characterises a

system, whether this system is intrapersonal, interpersonal, intrasocial, or intraglobal. Conceptions of peace are founded on the cultures and traditions underpinning all systems of human interaction. As peace is constructed within certain contexts and systems of human functioning, this then affects the application of peace processes within these systems (Galtung, 1985:75).

The fourth characteristic is one commonly investigated within the field of peace and conflict studies and relates to the two dimensions of peace. This fourth characteristic regarding the distinction between positive and negative peace is of great importance to this study, as the UN's understanding of a culture of peace often relates to both positive and negative aspects of peace assumption. Negative peace must be understood separately from positive peace, although both concepts work cooperatively. Negative peace is regarded as the dimension relating to the continuum of low to high levels of violence. Negative peace advances that lower incidences of violence will lead to higher levels of peace. To be precise, this study will utilise the definition of violence provided by the World Health Organisation (WHO). The reason why the WHO's definition will be utilised is that the organisation has strong ties with the UN and the definitions it advocates are typically employed by the UN, including the definition of violence (United Nations, 2019). In addition, across the literature on peace and conflict studies, the WHO's definition is often referenced as the standard definition of violence. The WHO, and the UN by default, considers violence to be "the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation" (Violence Prevention Alliance, 2019). Merely viewing peace in terms of the lack of violence, however, is not adequate for characterising peace, as many conflictual periods have resulted in the cessation of violent acts, but have remained hostile and unforgiving toward their rival. Other, more positive conditions of peace must be considered alongside the negative to construct an accurate conceptualisation of peace.

Positive peace constitutes the presence of mutually harmonious relations wherein the processes of cooperation, integration, and social justice are implemented and respected. Many of the values enshrined within positive peace have been echoed in the literature on conflict resolution and are

critical to this study (Galtung, 1969:183). Positive peace advances that there needs to be efforts directed towards not only reducing incidences of violence but also toward addressing the roots of the conflict; ensuring justice is served for those affected by the conflict; advancing reconciliation, and promoting inclusion (United Nations, 2015:34). While peace operations work to uphold these positive peace values, there needs to be considerable focus placed on building long-term, cooperative state institutions that ensure the sustainability of these values (United Nations, 2015:34). This requires the acknowledgement and transformation of structural violence, whereby each party recognises their oppressive behaviour and displays a willingness to restore justice (Miall *et al.*, 2005:54).

3.3 The United Nations and a culture of peace

From the early 1990s onwards, the UN has supported the idea that for peace to be established and maintained, a society must develop a culture conducive to such a condition. Woodhouse (2010) provides a discussion on the development of a culture of peace within the UN's peace operations. He notes that the idea of a culture of peace evolved from the realisation made by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) that, to live harmoniously, societies develop various cultural arrangements based on values of cooperation, reconciliation and non-violence (De Rivera, 2004:532). This led to the recommendation by the UNESCO International Congress in 1989 that the organisation must "help construct a new vision of peace by developing a peace culture based on the universal values of respect for life, liberty, justice, solidarity, tolerance, human rights and equality between men and women" (UNESCO, 1989:2). In 1992, the UN adopted the Culture of Peace Programme proposed by UNESCO and in 1999 the General Assembly adopted the "Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace". The success of this programme led the General Assembly to declare the year 2000 as "the international year for the culture of peace" and, later, declared the entire first decade of the 21st century the "International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence for the Children of the World." This study will focus on the 1999 Declaration and Programme of Action, as this is where the UN's prescriptions for and indicators of a culture of peace are outlined and discussed.

The concept of a culture of peace formed the basis of the “Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace” officially adopted by the General Assembly in 1999. This is significant as the UN embodies the role of an international enforcer of peace and is often the main authority on institutional and social transformations following conflicts. Member states have found success in adhering to the UN’s guidelines on methods and strategies for creating and conserving peace. In 2015, the organisation had over 128 000 civilians and uniformed workers active in 39 peacekeeping missions spanning across four continents. Many large-scale efforts have led to the UN being labelled “the largest provider of international peace operations” (United Nations, 2015:1). For this reason, the organisation’s prescription for peace is highly accredited, including its “Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace”.

The Declaration (1999:2) defines a culture of peace as “a set of values, attitudes, traditions and modes of behaviour and ways of life” that is based on nine criteria. An important aspect of this Declaration is the value of respect, as it is referenced in five of these criteria. A society must come to respect life by pursuing non-violent resolutions to conflict; sovereignty and non-intervention in domestic matters that are within the jurisdiction of a state; all human rights and freedoms; the right to development; equal rights for all; and freedom of expression and communication. The Declaration also states the importance of commitment when it explains that one must remain devoted to the peaceful settlement of conflict; show complete adherence to the principles of justice, tolerance, solidarity, cooperation, and cultural diversity; and committed efforts toward sustainable economic, social and political development.

One should note that modern scholars stress that a culture of peace must be embraced by all levels of society, thus echoing a multi-levelled approach to peace described above. As expressed by De Rivera (2004:533), the value of a culture of peace as a social movement lies in its inclusion of governments, international organisations, and individuals in peace processes. Thus, while the state is paramount in promoting a climate of peace to guarantee the wellbeing and security of its population, the role of the individual and civil society must not be underestimated (Richmond, 2008:103). This is a notable development from the Realist state-centred notion of peace, as it is no longer the primary role of the state to ensure the eradication of conflict, but rather the cooperation of all social levels (Richmond, 2008:102). States, in conjunction with civil

society, must decide to reject violence for their own sense of security, as pertaining to negative peace, and also commit themselves to promoting and institutionalising inclusive and cooperative values, as pertaining to positive peace (De Rivera, 2004:531). The media and education system must also contribute to the promotion of a culture of peace by endorsing and supporting its core values to ordinary citizens. On an interpersonal level, a culture of peace must be reflected in the behaviour of all individuals within a nation, as it fundamentally belongs to everyone, no matter their role in society (United Nations, 1999:4).

3.3.1 The four dimensions of the Declaration

To aid in the operationalisation of the UN's "Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace", one must explain and provide measures of the extent to which a society has developed in the key dimensions that are discussed (De Rivera, 2004:535). When analysing the nine criteria for a culture of peace, De Rivera (2004) found that a culture of peace was assumed to be best described and categorised in terms of four dimensions. These four measurable dimensions are: liberal development, violent inequality, state use of violent means, and nurturance. Each dimension can be measured according to Anderson's (2004) four principles of peace mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, namely subjectively, objectively, from multiple levels, and in terms of their correspondence to negative and positive peace. This will guarantee a holistic and ultimately accurate assessment of the post-conflict societies of Pakistan and the TRNC. One must be aware that certain concepts and measures are utilised by multiple dimensions, for example, included in both the liberal development and the violent inequality dimensions are references to income inequality and rates of unemployment. This is unsurprising, as each dimension is linked to and works cooperatively with the others. This next section will provide an overview of each dimension, an explanation of why this is conducive to a culture of peace, and how it can be measured reliably. The indicators of these dimensions of a culture of peace are summed up by De Rivera (2004:100-101) with his "template for assessing local culture of peace" and will be utilised to a great extent in the remainder of this study. There are numerous studies utilising De Rivera's dimensions of a culture of peace and their various indicators, including Milani & Branco's *Assessing Brazil's Culture of Peace* (2004) and Francisco & Jose's *Indicators for a Culture of Peace in Spain* (2004).

3.3.1.1 The conceptualisation and operationalisation of liberal development

Liberal development accounts for the social and democratic principles of liberalism mentioned in the Declaration. This dimension can be divided into three subsections, namely: democratic, economic, and social development. In terms of democratic development, the dimension necessitates a mode of governance that allows for full political participation, both in terms of the right for all individuals to vote in general elections and the right for any and all political parties representing diverse interests to compete for representation in the state (De Rivera, 2004:542). A country that operates according to values of egalitarianism, individualism, and democracy is more likely to construct a non-conflictual tone of state operations, according to the Declaration's references to liberal development (Basabe & Valencia, 2007:407). In terms of economic development, this state must dedicate significant efforts toward developing a free and stable economy in which all members of society are encouraged to participate and dependence on foreign aid is limited, as this would guarantee durable liberal development (De Rivera, 2004:536). With democratic and economic development, a state must have a profound respect for all human rights and dedicate its resources toward increasing rates of literacy and school enrolment, developing efficient healthcare facilities, and a fair distribution of income (Basabe & Valencia, 2007:406).

The Declaration states that a population will feel more comfortable in an environment that satisfies their basic needs and will, therefore, be less inclined to radicalism and violence. In a liberalised society, the universal human rights to education, health and non-discrimination are respected and nurtured by the state (De Rivera, 2009:57). The constitution of a country should represent these rights and punish any act whereby the rights of another is denied or abused. As their rights are protected by the state, citizens should feel that no bias exists in terms of access to services and opportunities to earn a living, and that they, therefore, have no need to violently retaliate (Hegre, 2000:19). If members of the population do, however, experience grievances with the way they are being governed or treated by the state, a country must develop effective institutions that allow these citizens a platform to express themselves and an opportunity to vote for the reconstruction of the policies they have deemed unfair or ineffectual (Barro, 1999:160). As the citizenry learn to trust the non-violent practices of liberalism and grow more accustomed to utilising conflict resolution tools such as negotiation and compromise, these practices become

part of the national culture (Hegre, 2000:19). As a result, the nation will function according to the logic that armed rebellion and violence are never beneficial, and peaceful negotiation is the only way to effectively solve and rectify injustices (Halperin *et al.*, 2004:96). In addition, the country will be better able to develop economically as all individuals are granted equal opportunities to participate in the economy and a liberalised economy would be relatively free of state control. As the country develops economically and on the basis of equal opportunity, the state will be more capable of supplying the population with necessary public services and distribute its resources fairly, regardless of ethnic groupings (De Rivera, 2004:546).

Liberal development can be assessed in many different ways, including both objective and subjective indicators. In terms of democratic political development, one can analyse whether one group is favoured over another in terms of representation in government, policy directions, ability to express matters of concern, and even with regards to the right to vote (Halperin *et al.*, 2004:96). To aid in this assessment, the conclusions reached by Freedom House can be of value as this organisation reports the extent to which a country has dedicated itself to the expansion of freedom and democracy (Freedom House, 2018). As one comes to understand the political nature of a country, one can observe whether state policies inflict harm on any group and whether this group can challenge these policies (Barro, 1999:160). The state must also allow for the development of a stable, liberalised economy that is free from government control and integrated in the global economy, as this would allow for more state resources to be granted to social welfare affairs of state (De Rivera, 2004:546). Socially, it is essential to uncover the extent to which basic human rights are granted to every citizen, including access to quality healthcare and education (Basabe & Valencia, 2007:406). One can assess the state of economic and social development and the country's general developmental status through the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI), which measures countries according to health and primary education related factors, and the Human Development Index (HDI) designed to measure a country's social development in terms of health and primary education. As accomplished in the reports of these indices, the extent of liberalisation must be judged on the basis of all levels of society, ranging from the rights of an individual to the development of collective identity groups. In so doing, holistic conclusions regarding the state of liberal development and a culture of peace can be reached.

3.3.1.2 The conceptualisation and operationalisation of violent inequality

The second dimension is violent inequality, which includes the areas in the Declaration that strive to address inequality and discrimination. As this dimension is focused on the absence of violence, it directly correlates to negative peace explained above. As prescribed by negative peace approaches, a society founded on a culture of peace must reject all forms of violence, especially when this violence is geared toward an individual, vulnerable group (Jeong, 2000:31). This dimension necessitates fair and equal treatment of citizens socially and politically within the borders of the state (De Rivera, 2004:542). Inequality is characterised as violent when it is the result of direct intent to harm another. Violent inequality can be physical or structural, both constituting an environment directly contrasting that of a culture of peace. Within the dimension, there is an emphasis on the assumption that a society must be inclusive and tolerant if it is to construct a peaceful future, as exclusivity, oppression and discrimination can only result in conflict. The total community of a nation must be treated as members of an inclusively diverse identity, willing and able to co-exist peacefully (Korostelina, 2012:2).

An inclusive society that actively seeks to address discrimination and oppression, as well as the inequalities this produces, will naturally develop a culture of peace, as no group will feel that it must rebel to escape a cycle of repression (De Rivera, 2004:542). The UN recognises that all citizens deserve to be granted the right to live and be represented by the nation in which they live (Basabe & Valencia, 2007:406). When a group feels that it is being threatened by another, physically or structurally, its instinct is to defend itself. According to the security dilemma often referenced in peace and conflict studies, once a group develops a tone of defence its rival will do the same, resulting in a cycle of self-fulfilling prophecies. Thus, by enforcing violent inequality, a society only guarantees the retaliation of the oppressed party (Deutsch *et al.*, 2006:28). A state's only way to prevent this, according to the Declaration, is through the acceptance of every citizen as worthy of human rights, as well as a commitment to abolishing any structures that may create a disadvantage to any group. Through these efforts, rates of physical violence and incarcerations naturally will be lowered, which will allow for individuals to feel more secure in their dealings with other groups (Ross, 2007:3).

Assessments conducted with this dimension must aim to observe and unpack any institutional or policy-related factors that may intentionally seek to oppress or exclude another group. One must be able to reach conclusions about the inequalities that exist within a country, especially when there appears to be an unequal distribution of income disadvantaging one group over another, the possibilities of conflict increase (De Rivera, 2004:542). In addition to unequal distribution of resources, violent inequality must be addressed by decreasing homicide and incarceration rates, especially when it is evident that one, dominant group is violently oppressing a more vulnerable group unable to effectively defend themselves, or if one group suffers as the result of democides (Basabe & Valencia, 2007:406). As such, the higher the number of homicides, the less likely a society is capable of fostering a culture of peace (Steenkamp, 2014:18). Structural violent inequality exists when one group is, or multiple groups are, institutionally disadvantaged by a dominant one. One can identify such violence through institutional policies directed to harm a particular group or limitations regarding the realisation of a group's universal human rights (Steenkamp, 2014:18). Violent inequality must also be observed in terms of individual experiences, including the reasons why certain groups may feel that they have been discriminated against by another and what they feel is the most effective strategy to prevent this harm. Through this one can discern whether a group is capable of, and willing to, engage in violent conflict in the future (Hegre, 2000:19).

3.3.1.3 The conceptualisation and operationalisation of state use of violent means

The third dimension, state use of violent means, is associated with a state's use of military force, increased military expenditure, and arms exports to exhibit force both domestically and internationally (De Rivera, 2004:543). When faced with challenges or disagreements, a state must "refrain from military, political, economic or any other form of coercion" (Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace, 1999:10). The citizenry of a nation must feel that the realisation of their interests does not mean the rejection of another's, for the appreciation of human rights should govern all international activities. The norm of political relations must be regarded as one founded on the values of negotiation, diplomacy and cooperation, as these are the methods that produce the most constructive, mutually beneficial outcomes (Moffitt & Bordone, 2005:279). In other words, a population must feel secure that their government will use

any diplomatic means possible to ensure their wellbeing, with violent and military efforts only employed in the most desperate of cases. In this security, the state and civil society would naturally foster a culture founded on norms of non-violence (Sobek *et al.*, 2006:519).

This third dimension advocates for the international rejection of violence and universal respect for all human rights. The Declaration, as well as many social scientists, find that societies often claim to be peaceful but in reality are more prone to war and its inherent processes (Steenkamp, 2014:117). These countries rarely make use of the diplomatic tools of negotiation and compromise, but rather utilise violence as an instrument of power to threaten other countries and even their own citizenry. They consistently motivate their violent behaviour by insisting that compromise is a weakness that only aids in the satisfying the interests of the enemy and only through threats and acts of violence can one's interests be safeguarded; power retained; and culture preserved (Steenkamp, 2014:117). This is problematic, as the threat and use of military means in times of struggle only results in the international use of violence in retaliation to their own behaviour, which only perpetuates the cycle of defence and attack mentioned in the discussions on the security dilemma (Kemp & Fry, 2004:8). The legitimisation of violence not only affects the activities of the state, but also its people. This is because when a state uses violence as a way of dealing with complex issues, it demonstrates to its followers that this behaviour is not only acceptable, but will also lead to success (Kemp & Fry, 2004:8). The population grows accustomed to violence and human rights violations as they learn to accept them as a necessary part of their political, social and economic landscape (Steenkamp, 2014:117). A culture of peace, consequently, means the rejection of violence in its many forms, and the normalisation of the respect for human rights and nonaggressive conduct (Sobek *et al.*, 2006:519).

To measure state use of violent means, one's primary task would be to quantify state military expenditure relative to other state sectors and analyse the state's practice of threatening military action in international affairs (Basabe & Valencia, 2007:406). This would require an examination of the state's military activity record; production and deployment of weaponry; and military recruitment initiatives (Galtung, 1990:296). Internally, a state must discourage its citizenry from abusing the human rights of another. To assess a state's respect for human rights, one might

assess in what circumstances and for what reasons the state has encouraged human rights violations and what impact this had on the groups that suffered as a result (De Rivera, 2004:273). Internationally, the extent to which the country exports arms could represent the state's legitimization of violence. This exportation could indicate the state's support of international violent movements or an alliance with an aggressive state. If a state endorses international violence, this state will likely spark or escalate future conflicts (De Rivera, 2004:542). Conclusively, this assessment would provide clarity as to whether the security dilemma, that has been escalated through ethnic conflict, has been reduced through ethnic partitioning.

3.3.1.4 The conceptualisation and operationalisation of nurturance

The fourth and last dimension is labelled nurturance and is often described as the feminine, empathetic, compassionate element of a culture of peace. While this dimension explicitly prescribes gender equality for a country to completely embrace a culture of peace, often indicated by a substantial number of women in positions of power, it mostly advances the feminine qualities of a nation (De Rivera, 2004:128). By "feminine" qualities, this division of the Declaration refers to the traditional values associated by women, including their natural understanding of the importance of childhood development and empathetic understanding of universal suffering. In terms of education, a nation must devote significant efforts to ensuring its youth receives adequate education based on teachings of tolerance, cooperation and solidarity; the origins of conflict; how conflict can be resolved; and how injustices can peacefully be confronted (Boulding, 2002:13). In terms of universal empathy and solidarity, a state must dedicate itself to aiding the vulnerable and defenceless, as well as show a greater will to offer assistance to their neighbour and accept, rather than create, vulnerable refugees (De Rivera, 2004:541). Overall, a culture of peace requires a state to be orientated toward warmth and affection both in its dealings with the youth of the nation, as well as the internationally helpless (Basabe & Valencia, 2007:416).

Long periods of socio-political conflict can force a society to harden and develop a more selfish attitude toward both domestic and international affairs. Conflict becomes a natural way of life, constantly reinforced by the norms of heightened, patriarchal forms of "masculinity" relating to

qualities such as ruthlessness and coldness (Basabe & Valencia, 2007:416). This culture of unempathetic masculinity is reflected in the state's education system, as children are brought up with teachings of intolerance and prejudice, often directed at particular groups (Steenkamp, 2009:43). Children are extremely impressionable, and lessons learnt during their school years are not easily changed, which means that by conditioning the youth of the nation in this way, future conflict becomes an inevitability (Bar-Tal, 2011:217). The first step in changing these norms is to construct educational programmes that teach the values of tolerance and acceptance, especially in circumstances where such compassion is inconvenient (Hegre, 2000:34). When a state focuses on educating its citizenry in the processes of peace, a newfound recognition of the universality of human rights will develop. The nation will learn to be more empathetic to human suffering, which will lead to a more inclusive domestic and foreign policy (De Rivera, 2009:107). According to this dimension, a normative shift in the direction of inclusivity, empathy, and respect for all human rights will naturally lead to a state that is more willing to accept and aid refugees and displaced bodies. It will also refuse to drive out and displace their own citizens, even if disputes make harmony very challenging (De Rivera, 2004:541).

This dimension, being firmly rooted in feminine qualities, explains that nurturance is evident in the number of women in parliament and other positions of power, although this is not significant to a culture of peace (De Rivera, 2004:543). What is a more important indicator of nurturance is a state expenditure on education, and whether this education is founded on the teachings of tolerance, cooperation, and other peace processes. Curricula supporting peace must be developed, textbooks must be written and experimental programmes must be constructed (Bar-Tal, 2011:218). Other indicators of nurturance are both the state's acceptance of refugees, and its limited amount of generated refugees (Basabe & Valencia, 2007:410). This would indicate the extent to which a state embraces inclusive, compassionate and "feminine" values that aid in the fostering of tolerance and solidarity in a post-conflict society.

3.4 Conclusion

Contemporary peace is a multidimensional concept that its operationalisation requires a researcher to engage with many levels and methods of analysis when studying the subject. Due to this

complexity, this chapter has developed a conceptualisation and operationalisation of peace relating its various components, which has provided the necessary foundation for introducing the meaning of a culture of peace. The notion of a culture of peace has been emphasised to a great extent by the UN and is defined, explained and operationalised by the organization's "Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace". Due to its significance, this chapter has outlined and explained the UN's prescriptions and indicators for a culture of peace through the framework provided by De Rivera (2004) in his categorisation of four dimensions of the Declaration. In doing so, this chapter has explained why this Declaration is required for a successful assessment of whether the ethnic partitions of Pakistan and the TRNC have been able to foster a sustainable culture of peace.

The next chapter will apply the UN's "Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace", as well as De Rivera's (2004) categorisation of the four dimensions of this Declaration, as an analytical tool to two cases, Pakistan and the TRNC. Each case study will be divided into four sections corresponding to the four dimensions of a culture of peace, namely liberal development violent inequality, state use of violent means, and nurturance. After each case study is analysed, a comparative analysis will be undertaken. If commonalities exist, there will be an investigation as to why and whether ethnic partitioning can be determined as the causal factor. If differences exist, this must be reasoned and explained. By comparing the similarities and differences between the two cases, one will be able to conclude whether ethnic partitioning, and the generalised practices it involves, can foster a sustainable culture of peace.

Chapter 4: A Comparative Analysis of Pakistan and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as products of ethnic partitioning

4.1 Introduction

The ethnic partitioning of India and Cyprus have established two nations founded on the idea that homogenisation would grant them a more peaceful, unified society. With the use of De Rivera's (2004) dimensions of the UN's "Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace" (1999) as an analytical tool, this chapter will compare the cases of Pakistan and the TRNC in order to assess whether the process of ethnic partitioning has aided in fostering a sustainable culture of peace. This chapter will be divided into three sections, the first and second of which will analyse the case of Pakistan and the TRNC respectively, and the third of which will compare the cases. The first two sections will begin with a contextual framework that describes what processes led to the inter-ethnic conflict, why ethnic partitioning was considered, how ethnic partitioning was enforced, and generally what peace processes, or lack thereof, have taken place until the present day. The four sections thereafter will analyse whether a culture of peace has been fostered in terms of De Rivera's liberal development, violent inequality, state use of violent means, and nurturance dimensions. The third chapter will be structured in the same way, the two cases will be compared and conclusions will be drawn.

4.2 The case of Pakistan

4.2.1 Brief political history and contextualisation

The creation of Pakistan was the realisation of the two-nation theory which assumed that a unified, ethnically homogenous homeland separate from India that would provide security to the Muslims who had been neglected in Indian politics. Homogenisation, and the security it is assumed to provide, is difficult for any state to achieve, especially one that has recently emerged from such a hostile, aggressive conflict. The Muslim leaders of the ethnic partition were optimistic in realising this two-state theory, however, questions remain as to whether this has been achieved, to what extent, and why.

In the climate following World War II, tensions between the Hindus and Muslims escalated to a seemingly unbearable level. The recognisable roots of this conflict lie in the decline of enthusiasm for British colonial rule in the early 1900s, when both the Muslims and the Hindus in the Indian colony voiced their resistance against British rule (Crompton, 2007:48). While their aims were similar, their visions for the state of affairs following independence from colonial rule differed to a great extent. The Hindu majority was represented by the Indian National Congress (INC), led by prominent political figures, including Mahatma Gandhi (Malik, 2008:90). The party advocated for a unified independent India that was controlled by a strong, central authority. This authority would govern India as a whole, including its diverse religious and cultural communities (Malik, 2008:90). While this arrangement instilled a strong sense of nationalist determination into the Hindu community, the Muslims were left feeling insecure and vulnerable. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the leader of the Muslim League, feared that during colonial rule, the British had been able to uphold and protect the rights of the Muslim population and prevent conflict between them and the Hindus (Wynbrandt, 2009:140). After independence, however, a centralised, strong Indian government that represented the overwhelming Hindu majority would oppress the minority Muslims who only constituted 19% of the population (Kukreja & Singh, 2005:87). It is from this fear that Jinnah advanced his “two-nation theory”, which argued that the Muslims and Hindus are two completely different communities that cannot coexist under one central authority, let alone live in harmony with one another (Chaturvedi, 2002:151). They have their own religions, languages, histories, and customs that deserve to be represented by a government that upholds and protects the principles inherent in their respective cultures (Adnan, 2006:205). A Muslim homeland, later to be named Pakistan, would not only tolerate and include the Islamic faith but its governing structures would come to reflect the Islamic faith, thus transforming the religion into an “Islamic ideology” on which the state was built (Kukreja & Singh, 2005:90).

The presence of two directly contrasting visions of independence came to a head in 1946, when both the Muslims and Hindus began to recognise that compromise was a near impossibility. Following the 1946 elections, mutual suspicion and ideological tension led to widespread aggression in the latter half of the year (Pandey, 2001:22). There seemed to be no headway in the development of a mutually beneficial and acceptable constitutional arrangement of an

independent India, and Jinnah decided to take matters into his own hands when he proclaimed the 16th of August “Direct Action Day” (Ziring, 2003:38). The Muslims expressed their dissatisfaction toward the constitutional progress by demonstrating in the streets and attacking members of the opposing groups. The Hindus retaliated with equal force, setting in motion the violent uprising that would result in tens of thousands of deaths and, ultimately, the final partitioning of India (Wynbrandt, 2009:155). The only way to halt the violence and guarantee the satisfaction of all groups involved was to divide India and create a Muslim homeland. A year after Direct Action Day, Pakistan was established and institutionalised ethnic partitioning would commence (Jha & Wilkinson, 2010:2).

Figure 1: Pakistan in 1947



(Ahmed, 1997:xxix)

In 1947, an ethnic partition was officially established, which set in motion one of the largest forced migrations in history. Pakistan was established with five main provinces, namely West Punjab, Northwest Frontier Province, Baluchistan, Sindh and East Bengal, as shown in Figure 1 above (Kukreja & Singh, 2005:41). With Pakistan finally established, Muslims living within the borders of India would now have to uproot themselves to live in their new homeland and Hindus situated within the newly inscribed Pakistan borders would be driven out with no valid claims to

the land they once owned. On estimate, Jha & Wilkinson (2010:2) report that 17.9 million people were forced to relocate as a result of the 1947 partition. The further partition of the Punjab and Bengal provinces, according to the concentration of religious groupings shortly after 1947 complicated matters further, as the Muslim communities in the two provinces were only marginally dominant with a 53% majority. India and Pakistan agreed to halve Punjab and Bengal and allow for population transfers to boost the majority levels substantially (Partition Museum, 2019). Consequently, although displacement occurred throughout the subcontinent, the most substantial occurrence of migration was in the Punjab, where a total of over nine million people migrated within the first two months (Talbot, 2009:406).

The challenges of this ethnic partition were not confined to the homogenisation process, however, as constant confrontations with India, especially as a result of disputed territories, led to many violent conflicts in the future. India and Pakistan to date have fought four wars since the establishment of Pakistan, namely the 1947 First Kashmir War, the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War resulting in the establishment of Bangladesh, and the Kargil War of 1999 (Paul, 2005:8). All of these wars, with the exception of the war of 1971, were the result of territorial dispute tensions with India over Kashmir.

Kashmir, an Indian territory located in the northwest of the country bordering on Pakistan, has been described by Amin (2000:321) as “one of the oldest unresolved conflicts still on the UN agenda.” The agreed-upon term of the ethnic partition in 1947 was that the determination of any territory would rest on what the majority of its population desired. This was not the case with Kashmir, as its majority Muslim population were not offered a choice in their acceding to India (Amin, 2000:321). As a result, Pakistan contested this accession, claiming it was unlawful and unfair to the majority of Muslims that occupy this land. In 1947, Pakistan commenced an unconventional war against India, however, the Indian army managed to secure the Kashmir capital of Srinagar and retain its control over the territory before the UN-sponsored a ceasefire (Haqqani, 2003:39). In 1965, Pakistan sent infiltrators across the UN enforced ceasefire line as part of its Operation Gibraltar and staged an attack on Indian troops in Kashmir (Paul, 2005:113). Once again, Pakistan made no territorial gains (Haqqani, 2003:42). The last major war was fought in 1999 when Pakistan sent troops into the Kashmiri district of Kargil to join rebels

fighting against Indian occupation. This resulted in an estimated 1,300 battle-related deaths (Adnan, 1999:129). The conflict between India and Pakistan over the territory of Kashmir has never been resolved, despite numerous attempts at conflict resolution. Even in February of this year, both countries conducted airstrikes against one another as a result of flared up tensions over the territory (Pandya, 2019:65).

Although the main subject of hostility, Kashmir is not the only territory that has resulted in a war between India and Pakistan. Before the partition of India in 1947, the country now known as Bangladesh formed the Indian province of East Bengal. Following the partition, this region became the Eastern Province of Pakistan and was a significant distance away from the Western province (Lyon, 2008:30). Despite the reality that the population of East Pakistan was greater than the West, the Eastern Bengalis grew frustrated that they lacked appropriate representation in the government, where they felt that their economy was being exploited by the interests of the West (Lyon, 2008:30). The Eastern Bengalis rebelled against Pakistani military rule in 1971, with the West utilising its military strength to suppress the uprising. The use of military force entitled India to intervene and defeat the Pakistani army, leading to the secession of Bangladesh as an independent country. The establishment of Bangladesh meant that Pakistan was now a country where all provinces were in one, unified geographical unit, as shown in Figure 2 (Crompton, 2007:66).

Figure 2: Map of Pakistan



(Central Intelligence Agency, 2019)

The ethnic partition that established Pakistan resulted in not only international confrontations with India, but also internal conflicts between the refugees and the natives, the centres and the peripheries, the rural and the urban, and the divergent claims made by the branches of Islam. Before a discussion on the internal hostilities and subsequent conflicts, an overview of the different population groups is required. The Punjabis represent the majority population of Pakistan located in the Punjab. As referenced previously, West Punjab underwent significant ethnic cleansing to boost the proportion of Muslims within the newly constructed borders (Hill, 2008:166). The Sindhis are located in Sindh, which is situated in the southeast of Pakistan with the city of Karachi as its provincial capital. They often view themselves as the original Muslims of Pakistan, as it was in this region in the eighth century that the Islamic faith first came to prominence (Crompton, 2007:53). The Muhajir, literally meaning “refugee”, is a group that has often clashed with the Sindhis as many of them settled in this region after the partition of India (Corsi, 2004:43). After 1947, many Hindus migrated to India as a result of the ethnic cleansing of the region, and left a substantial vacuum in Sindh, later to be filled by Muhajir refugees (Corsi, 2004:43). In general, the Muhajirs spoke Urdu, and were highly educated and skilled, often assuming positions of importance in the struggling Pakistani economy following 1947 (Dixit, 2002:6).

Pakistan was founded on the belief that homogenisation would provide a homeland for those who felt excluded from the Indian effort toward independence from the British colonial rule. Millions gave up the security of a familiar home to migrate to Pakistan in the hopes that, in the long-term, they would experience peace, communal harmony, and a sense of belonging. The next section will assess whether Pakistan has been able to foster liberal development, equality, non-violent means of cooperation, and a more nurturing socio-political environment able to guarantee the safety of its citizenry.

4.2.2 A culture of peace in Pakistan

4.2.2.1 Liberal development

The first characteristic of a culture of peace, according to De Rivera’s (2004) summary of the UN’s “Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace”, is that a country must have

a stable and equitable democracy, and a growing economy and a sustained social effort aimed at alleviating poverty and inequality. Despite the importance of development in these areas, Pakistan has often prioritised national security over human, democratic, and social development, as a result of continuous international and domestic disputes. Military regimes were justified based on the need to prioritise national security in the face of Indian aggression. Ultimately, these military regimes have only served to stifle civilian participation in the government, slow economic development, and allocate scarce resources to the nation's arms race with India. Such actions are detrimental to Pakistan's efforts toward conflict resolution because, as has been discussed in Chapter 2, without sufficient efforts toward promoting inclusion and equity, a nation is more likely to engage in conflict.

The first aspect of liberal development is the government's commitment to a democratic state that encourages the participation of its citizenry in national decision-making thus allowing for a culture of dialogue and choice to be fostered. A democratic state is important for a society striving toward peace as it can encourage its citizenry to respect the differences of others and engage in practices of compromise and negotiation, all of which are essential to the concept of conflict resolution discussed in Chapter 2. This is a problematic ideal for Pakistan seeing that Pakistan has lacked a stable form of government in its 72 years of independence (Paul, 2005:48). The most consistent aspect of Pakistani governance, however, has been its reliance on military authoritarian rule and the declaration of martial law, which was in effect for 30 years of Pakistan's history (Candland, 2008:17). Many Pakistani leaders have relied on military regimes to preserve some level of control over the direction of state affairs, including Generals Ayub Khan (1958-1968), Zia ul-Haq (1977-1988), and lastly Pervez Musharraf (1999-2009) (Azeem, 2017:24). Military regimes such as those imposed on Pakistan often rely on undemocratic processes to maintain their rule over a territory, thereby hampering the opportunity for the general public to participate in state decisions. All three leaders would create new electoral colleges with the aim of building a new party able to bargain with the business and feudal elite, effectively allowing them to be elected as president through the façade of a free election (Candland, 2008:15). Even when elections were held, democratic participation was encouraged, and parties were allowed to participate, and special allowances were granted to soldiers during the electoral processes, leading to 31.6% of the provincial electorate comprising of military votes

(Kukreja & Singh, 2005:43). Once the leaders were “elected”, they would utilise a malleable judiciary as a means of maintaining the constitution, thereby granting their regime constitutional approval (Azeem, 2017:24).

In addition to the faux democracy in Pakistan, and often the cause for its malpractice, all state decisions were based on the primacy of national security, which, according to the critics of ethnic partitioning mentioned earlier in this study, is common in ethnic partitions that are consistently faced with a persistent and ever-increasing security dilemma. Pakistan has always viewed India as a threat to its survival and every Pakistani leader has emphasised this when constructing certain policies, or mobilising its citizenry in support of its military activities (Siddiqa, 2007:63). The leaders of Pakistan have often refused to grant their citizens any authority to influence national policies, as the potentially severe consequences of devaluing the necessity of national security in favour of any other social demands were believed to be too great to risk (Haqqani, 2003:45). The neglect of public opinion and influence on state matters, as well as the significant portion of national resources dedicated to national security, has contributed to the fractionalisation of the ethnic groups in Pakistan. The groups neither feel represented in a government that demands unchallenged dominance nor that their electoral votes are of any significance (Kukreja & Singh, 2005:59).

The second aspect of liberal development is a rising, stable, free economy. Pakistan’s economy has undergone growth, however, given the amount of financial assistance it has been granted by international organisations, this growth is underwhelming. Pakistan managed to adhere to neoliberal economic policies, including those supported by the structural adjustment programme, and has continued to develop, albeit at a very slow pace, as a result (Azeem, 2017:162). Between 1950 and 1999, Pakistan’s per capita economic growth has averaged at 2.2% and in the 21st century this rate increased to 3.6%, due to high consumption demand and accommodative monetary policies (Candland, 2008:57). Pakistan appears to have made significant advances in terms of its economic freedom and has privatised most of its state-owned enterprises, including government banks and many manufacturing factories, which is considered great progress when understood in the context of modern Western liberal development models (Candland, 2008:6). Although Pakistan has achieved relative economic stability, much of its development has been

due to significant foreign development assistance. Between 1960 and 1998, Pakistan received assistance amounting to about 58 billion US dollars as well as 22 adjustment loans from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Easterly, 2003:439). During this period, the World Bank alone has loaned Pakistan an estimated 20 billion US dollars (Easterly, 2003:439). As a result of this assistance, Pakistan entered the 21st century as the third-largest recipient of foreign development assistance in the world (Easterly, 2003:439).

The third subsection of liberal development is equitable and indiscriminatory social development. Even when Pakistan experienced periods of increased economic growth, social development did not always accompany economic development, due to high social polarisation (Easterly, 2003:470). To evaluate how effectively Pakistan has pursued durable social development, the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) and the Human Development Index (HDI) are useful tools of analysis. In terms of its Global Competitiveness, Pakistan ranked 129th out of 137 countries, positioning it in the lowest 6% of the rankings (Pakistan Education Statistics 2016-17, 2017:2). The country's HDI value was also underwhelming at 0.562, which is below the average of 0.645 or 0.638 for South Asian countries. This poor HDI score places Pakistan 150th out of 189 countries (Human Development Reports, 2018). A negative factor that has contributed to its low ranking, according to Ahmed (2016:73), is that 45% of the Pakistan population is situated close to the poverty line. In addition, throughout Pakistan's history health expenditure has been low and the delivery of facilities related to healthcare has been inefficient. Between the years 1970 and 2007, Pakistan's health expenditure ranged from a low band of 0.5% to 0.8% of its gross national product (GNP) (Akram, Padma & Khan, 2008:490).

The reasons for a lack of social development is much the same as those impeding the development of Pakistan's democratic and economic developments, namely too great a focus on national security and socio-political instability. As the country constantly faces threats of conflict with India, it has spent an abundance of its national budget on maintaining its military power and defending itself (Veganzones-Varoudakis & Rizvi, 2019:2). According to conflict management theorists, such actions to guarantee negative peace is the only way for a state to survive, however, from a conflict resolution standpoint, if such negative peace is not coupled with positive peace conflict is much more likely. With national security as the state's primary priority,

little time and resources have been spent on constructing effective and long-lasting social developmental policies. The country's decision-making elite, often comprised of military personnel, have failed to develop and implement inclusive developmental projects that set realistic targets for 20-25 years into the future (Ahmed, 2016:41). This means that the government has never been sufficiently devoted to strategising methods of improving the welfare of its citizens and decreasing rates of poverty for extended periods of time (Kukreja & Singh, 2005:56). Another important factor in Pakistan's developmental neglect is the presence of unrelenting internal rivalries that obstruct any form of consensus. Pakistan struggles to satisfy its population in terms of the distribution of resources, and uses the threat of India to validate its reluctance to approach this complex dilemma (Ahmed, 2016:70).

4.2.2.2 Violent inequality

The second dimension of the UN's "Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace" is titled violent inequality, as it emphasises the need for countries to reject all forms of discrimination, intimidation, and inequity in their societies. According to the Declaration, a culturally peaceful nation is one that recognises "the need to eliminate all forms of discrimination and intolerance", including those based on "language, religion, [and] political or other opinion" (Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace, 1999:2). Once a country is able to embrace values associated with equity, inclusion and justice for all, conflict resolution is more likely, as elaborated on in Chapter 2. Pakistan was established on the idea that it would be a place free of discrimination, exclusion and suppression, where Muslims could live peacefully and harmoniously alongside one another. This vision of Pakistan, with its attempts to eliminate discrimination and intolerance, is one where a culture of peace would typically develop (Kahn, 2007:175). What this vision did not take into account is the number of groups that would feel neglected by the very processes that aimed to elevate their political voice, including the One Unit scheme.

Following the partition of India, Pakistan needed to fulfil its promise of unifying the Muslims that had once been suppressed by the Hindu majority, and it was hoped that the establishment and implementation of the One Unit scheme in West Pakistan would be the best method of unity.

This One Unit Policy aimed to unite the multiple ethnicities present within Pakistan by favouring a central, unitary administrative province, labelled West Pakistan, from the original four and the capital of West Pakistan would be Lahore, located in the Punjab region (Chaturvedi, 2002:153). The scheme seemed to favour the Punjab as the centre of Pakistan, which was the most densely populated province in West Pakistan, while locating the other three provinces on the periphery (Malik, 1997:190). The hope was that by centralising the government's control of the country, provincial politicians would not be able to mobilise certain ethnic groups toward provincial independence, although this would eventually occur in 1971, with the founding of Bangladesh (Ziring, 2003:71). The policy also led to the adoption of Urdu as the national language, even though it was the mother tongue of only the Muhajirs, who constituted just over 7% of the Pakistani population (Kukreja & Singh, 2005:108).

The One Unit scheme appeared to be downgrading the status of the non-Punjabi and non-Urdu speaking populations, and declaring the superiority of one province, one language, and ultimately one ethnic group above any other in all sectors of society, effectively establishing a mono-ethnic statehood. The policy meant that important national institutions would show a preference for the Punjab, including the armed forces, the bureaucracy, and numerous economic sectors including agriculture, on which the Pakistani economy largely depends (Malik, 2007:200). In addition, despite its lack of use, Urdu became the base for all educational institutions, cultural activities, and press (Kukreja & Singh, 2005:53). All other languages were discouraged as languages of literacy, including Bengali, spoken by 55% of the total population of Pakistan, and Sindhi, which was spoken by 5.3% of the population (Kukreja & Singh, 2005:53). The greatest beneficiary of the One Unit was perceived to be the Muhajirs, as they spoke the Urdu language, and were already highly literate and more educated than many other ethnic groups in Pakistan (Malik, 2007:200). The social advantages of the Muhajir community led to their disproportionate overrepresentation in government. Kennedy (1991:943) writes that although the Muhajirs represented just 8% of the overall population of Pakistan, by the year 1973 they held over 33% positions in the civilian bureaucracy, as well as many positions in the Secretariat. They were also favoured in terms of business and by 1974 the Muhajirs held close to half of all the senior positions in public enterprises (Kennedy, 1991:943). Those who were not represented by the state, including all non-Punjabis and non-Urdu speakers, viewed Punjabi

favouritism, or what was to be named the Punjabisation of the state, as a form of institutional violence (Chaturvedi, 2002:153). As mentioned in the previous chapters, institutional violence refers to when certain structures act to favour one group over another, leading to the discrimination and unequal treatment of the excluded groups (Richmond, 2008:101). Thus, what was intended to unite the nation ultimately emphasised the differences of the various ethnic groups, each claiming to be more worthy of political power and state resources than the other, which, according to critics, is the most common consequence of ethnic partitioning.

Many groups rose up in defiance against the One Unit scheme, declaring their right to be represented as separate identities (Qadeer, 2006:68). A notable instance of the fight for cultural preservation occurred in 1972, when the Sindhi-speaking community violently demonstrated throughout the Sindhi Province for the restoration of Sindhi as the official language of Sindh (Kukreja & Singh, 2005:53). These language riots, which resulted in about 55 deaths, led to the Sindhi Language Bill of 1972 (Kukreja & Singh, 2005:53). In retaliation against the One Unit Urdu favouritism and despite the concentration of Urdu speakers in the urban sectors of Sindh, this Bill declared that Urdu was not recognised as a provincial language in Sindh (Adeney, 2006:144). Through the One Unit Scheme, as well as the subsequent Sindhi Language Bill, the citizens of Pakistan could no longer regard one another as intricate parts of a shared community, which was discussed in Chapter 2 to be an important component of conflict resolution, because the state aimed for one identity to represent the whole. The same feelings of neglect that led to the partition in the first place were beginning to surface much like in the years leading to the partition of India (Kukreja & Singh, 2005:52). The failure of the One Unit scheme proved that it was neither a method of conflict resolution nor conflict management. In addition, it became evident that the critics of ethnic partitioning were correct in predicting that efforts at homogenising a nation necessitate violent exclusion and long-term obstacles to peace.

4.2.2.3 State use of violent means

The third dimension of the UN Declaration, according to De Rivera (2004), focuses on state use of violent means and urges countries to publicly discourage “the persistence and proliferation of violence and conflict”, both within the borders of the state as well as internationally (Declaration

and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace, 1999:2). Non-violent methods of conflict resolution in Pakistan were relatively uncommon, both internally and internationally. The installation of military regimes can provide some reasoning for this rarity, as violence was a principle on which these regimes depended. In addition, violence was considered to be the only way for the Pakistani government to respond to the persistent fear of India, which only intensified the security dilemma. As previously discussed, such an outcome is predicted by many critics of ethnic partitioning when they argue that the processes involved with violent territorial separation naturally increase the security dilemma and lay the foundation for future violent state affairs, both internationally and internally. This is concerning, given the fact that this need for security and increased levels of defence has led to the India-Pakistan nuclear arms race. The threat of nuclear arms in any aggressive confrontation between Pakistan and India can be devastating, especially when a culture of negotiation and compromise has not been fostered in Pakistan.

During the process of ethnic cleansing following the partition in 1947, violence became the norm and an expected method of acquiring what one desires (Kukreja & Singh, 2005:169). Although one cannot calculate exactly how many people died as a result of the partition of India, an estimate of the number of people killed ranges between 200,000 and 400,000 (Mann, 2004:485). Mann (2004:485) notes the malevolent severity of murderous ethnic cleansing when he explains how groups of men would kill their own family members out of fear that members of the opposing group would attempt to rape them. The personal trauma associated with ethnic partitioning has led to a significant amount of hostility and blame between India and Pakistan, which critics argue is common with ethnic partitions (Chaturvedi, 2002:156).

Since its establishment in 1947, Pakistani leaders have always maintained that India is a permanent rival that only seeks to harm the Muslims of Pakistan. They stressed the narrative of India being a hostile and aggressive country that ultimately seeks to challenge the integrity and sovereignty of Pakistan (Bahadur, 2003:248). Pakistan felt vulnerable, as a new nation whose size, economy, and military was much smaller than its Indian neighbour, who had fought against its very existence (Kahn, 2007:183). Pakistani leaders stressed that compromise would only weaken the state of Pakistan, and strengthen Indian's hold over the Pakistani people, and that

Pakistan's only hope would be to strengthen its military, increase its arms, and never give in to India's demands, thus legitimising Pakistan's permanent search for security (Cheema, 2002:7). Kahn (2007:183) documents how the first Prime Minister of Pakistan urged the Pakistani public to regard India as an enemy who "indulged in their black hatred to the full". The population of Pakistan were told, as stated by Mehdi (2003:85), never to forget the ways in which India "looted and plundered, committed rape and murder of their near and dear ones and inflicted forced migration." With every war fought, Pakistan dedicated more resources to its national security agenda. The state would use the war as validation that all other social issues, including those that would effectively maintain a culture of peace in the country, were to be removed from the national agenda (Kukreja & Singh, 2005:42).

Instilling existential fear of another in a community and subsequently increasing one's security in retaliation against this actor's security capabilities is typical of the security dilemma discussed in the previous chapters (Sambanis, 2000:1). With no efforts dedicated to fostering negative peace, let alone positive peace, a cycle has ensued. The more aggressive the Pakistani state became with regards to India, the fewer values of peace were implemented, which then led to more violent clashes with India and the continuation of the cycle (Paul, 2005:39). State use of violent means in conflictual situations has become the norm in Pakistan, resulting in a frozen conflict with India and a militant society (Ganguly *et al.*, 2019:132). This had lasting effects not only in terms of Pakistan's conflict with India but also in terms of the norms encouraged by the state that have been internalised by its citizenry. When conceptualising conflict resolution, without a normative shift from behaviour and attitudes associated with violence, blame and fear to those associated with non-violence, inclusion and trust, a conflict can never be resolved. Lieven (2011:72) explains that the population of Pakistan continues to express itself through sporadic and violent riots, as well as the destruction of property, instead of non-violent political mobilisation. As a consequence, and even though ethnic partitioning is based on the premise that a new, homogenised territory would decrease the security dilemma, the exact opposite has been taking place in Pakistan.

The Indo-Pakistan security dilemma, and the arms race that commenced as a result, has led to the Pakistani government prioritising its military defence and has contributed to the fostering of a

culture of violence (Cheema, 2002:3). The military has always been stronger than any other national institution and exerts significant influence over national policies despite being completely independent of civilian control (Haqqani, 2003:45). In the search for security, Pakistan has dedicated most of its budget, more precisely 18.5% of national government expenditure, to the military (The World Bank, 2018). In 2016, Pakistan's Army consisted of 520,000 personnel and a reserve element of about 500,000 (Global Security, 2016). More importantly, after India detonated a nuclear device in 1974, Prime Minister Bhutto was prompted to highlight the need for Pakistan to match India's technology and military capabilities (Dixit, 2002:332). Consequently, Pakistan started acquiring nuclear weapons capability and conducted nuclear tests in 1998, officially making itself a nuclear weapon state (Menon, 2013:5). In 2015, Pakistan was reported to possess between 100 and 120 nuclear weapons and produces enough highly enriched uranium for between 10 and 15 warheads every year (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2016). The need to develop a military strong enough to compete with India has dominated Pakistan's state of affairs since its very establishment. Now, with a forceful nuclear weapon capability, as well as neither an affiliation with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) nor the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the threat of war between India and Pakistan is more dangerous than it has ever been (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2016).

A culture of violence has implications for civilian militancy and has ultimately developed a new problem for Pakistan, which is that of terrorism. Pakistan has previously supported groups that the West considers to be terrorists, most notably the Taliban. Pakistan supported these groups with training and military bases in the hope that they would help Pakistan in its quest for control over Kashmir and destabilise India's ally Afghanistan, which borders on most of Pakistan's western border (see Appendix A) (Shuja, 2007:26). The support of these militant Islamic groups led to unstoppable forces extending their influence over parts of Pakistan and provoke widespread acts of violence against the Pakistani civilians (Nadadur, 2007:46). As these militant Islamic groups became more hostile toward the civilians and their violence continued to escalate, the Pakistani government began to fully comprehend the threat they posed to the people of Pakistan. To counter this threat, the Pakistani government further militarised local lashkars, viz. groups of men armed by the state that seek to take revenge for past injustices (Shah, 2010:298).

The state provides these groups with weapons and urges them to attack the Pakistani Taliban group Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in the hopes that violent tactics will suppress their efforts, even though the support for militant groups was what brought about this problem in the first place (Shah, 2010:299).

This example demonstrates the state's reliance on violent means to combat problems that were created from the same tactics. Pakistan's unresolved conflict with India, which was deemed impossible to solve through the partition of 1947, has led to a culture of violence in Pakistan. The military requires a large share of national resources to appear powerful in its rivalry against India, even developing "the world's fastest-growing nuclear stockpile" to achieve this end (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2016). In addition, the Pakistani state has supported militant projects such as the Taliban that have then evolved into forces that threaten the security of Pakistan itself (Nadadur, 2007:46). Pakistan has, therefore, been ineffective in fostering values conducive to conflict resolution and a culture of peace through its reliance on violent means during conflict.

4.2.2.4 Nurturance

The final category of the Declaration, conceptualised by De Rivera (2004), is titled nurturance, discussing what are stereotypical feminine qualities that relate to peace, including empathy, a desire to care for children and the moral obligation to aid those who are vulnerable. Nurturance is essential for peace because it promotes the feeling of a shared, equitable community, which was illustrated in Chapter 2 as being necessary for conflict resolution. In all sectors of society, Pakistan has constructed a narrative that demonises Indians and stresses their ever-increasing threat to the wellbeing of the Pakistani people, without much mention of a possible solution. This final section will assess whether Pakistan has devoted sufficient efforts toward empowering women, especially in government; developing educational institutions, more specifically relating to curricula that emphasise conflict resolution, and an inclusive society that accepts more refugees than it creates.

The references to nurturance in the UN's Declaration highlight the obligation of all peaceful countries to ensure that men and women receive "equal representation at all levels of decision-

making”, especially with regard to positions in government (Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace, 1999:3). Pakistan has failed to empower women in its 72 years of independence, even when a woman, Benazir Bhutto, assumed the position of Prime Minister in 1988 (Malik, 2008:177). Pakistan was founded as a theocratic state, meaning that Islamic laws became national laws. In the years following the official establishment of Pakistan, and because the institutions of the state were very weak, and the political elite was divided on important national decisions, where the clergy assumed powerful positions in the state (Chauhan, 2014:66). As a result, the clergy was able to direct the state toward antiwomen agendas, ultimately limiting the right to vote to men only, banning women from assuming high ranking positions in government and segregating the sexes in public offices (Chauhan, 2014:66). Although the 1960s and 1970s were periods in which women were given greater, yet still limited, freedom to participate in government, this changed when General Zia ul Haq came to power in 1977 (Ayres, 2009:34). His Islamisation programme radicalised state affairs in such a way that gender inequality was once again institutionalised (Chauhan, 2014:69). When Benazir Bhutto came to power in 1988 her Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) released its manifesto, which promised to eliminate sources of gender inequality and discrimination against women (Malik, 2008:177). This promise was not fulfilled as neither Bhutto’s government, nor her successor, Nawaz Sharif, could abolish Zia’s discriminatory laws (Weiss, 1990:433). Women’s empowerment gathered momentum in the 2000s when, for example, the Pakistan Army Medical Corps appointed its first woman general and women assumed high ranking political positions. However, the achievements toward gender equality have been sub-par due to the state’s preoccupation with national security (Chauhan, 2014:71).

Although many Pakistani leaders were outspoken in their desire to transform state laws in an effort to empower women, including Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, they were unable to make much progress (Weiss, 1990:433). The many conflicts with India required full national commitment, and gender equality advocates could not manage to convince the political elite that gender equality was a pressing concern (Kalia, 2011:93). The political elites argued that traditional Islamic laws and customs were the uniting factors that brought Pakistan into existence and their manipulation would only lead to more hostility and calls for autonomy. The state was already too divided on pressing matters of security and could not allow for the problem of

women's rights to entrench these divisions further (Kalia, 2011:93). For this reason, Chauhan (2014:59) notes that only 5% of women constitute senior decision-making positions in the public sector in Pakistan, and no pivotal plans at raising this number have gained traction. Seeing as the conflict with India has not reached its conclusion, and most likely will not do so in the near future, gender inequality will remain a lower-tier concern not worthy of much political emphasis.

As discussed previously, the UN Declaration discusses the importance of a strong education system that embraces the values of a non-violent society. This is a challenge for Pakistan, which has one of the lowest literacy rates in the South Asian region, and has had since the beginning of this decade (Ahmed, 2016:67). In 2018, Pakistan's public expenditure on education was only 2.2% of GDP compared to the global average of over 4.8 percent (The World Bank, 2018). As demonstrated in the 2019 budget report distributed by the Ministry of Finance, the expenditure on education will remain at this level in 2019, while the military has been provided with 18.5% of the national government expenditure (Ministry of Finance, 2018). The lack of resources dedicated to the education sector is not recent; in fact before 1984, Pakistan's national expenditure on education was averaged at below 2% of GNP (Memon, 2007:48). Consequently, in 2014, Pakistan had an adult literacy rate of 50% (Chauhan, 2014:74). There is also a significant gender gap in education with only 20% of females enrolled in primary school and a female literacy rate of only 35% (Chauhan, 2014:74).

The education provided by the state must teach students methods of how to "resolve any dispute peacefully and in a spirit of respect for human dignity and of tolerance and non-discrimination" (Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace, 1999:6). Education can allow for the necessary values of conflict resolution regarding equity, a shared community and a respect for human differences to be fostered. For those who are educated in Pakistan, the curricula, especially with regard to history subjects, centres around the production of "otherness" (Chaturvedi, 2002:155). Chaturvedi (2002:155) explains how the national subject of Social Studies stated that its learning objective was "to understand the Hindu and Muslim differences". The curriculum would begin with a description of Muslim and Hindu relations as hostile and antagonistic while the Muslims were enlightened yet restrained by the unethical Hindu caste system (Jalal, 1995:6). The Social Studies curriculum would frame the conflict preceding the

partition of India as a successful revolt against Hindi imposition where Muslim martyrs sacrificed their homes and loved ones for the vision of a safe, homogenised homeland that is free from the unethical, inferior Hindu practices that govern India (Kahn, 2007:201). Islam is interpreted as the superior ideology that could not and should never allow itself to be corrupted by profanity (Jalal, 1995:6). The emphasis on Islamic superiority and triumph over the Hindus in Pakistani educational textbooks reflects an informative tone of xenophobia and religious intolerance and obstructs the development of values associated with a shared community discussed in Chapter 2. As a result, the youth of the population are unable to develop an understanding of conflict resolution strategies, in turn obstructing the fostering of a culture of peace.

Another aspect of nurturance, and one crucial to cases of ethnic partitions, is related to the wellbeing of refugees as the UN Declaration stresses that a state must “support actions that foster tolerance and solidarity with refugees and displaced persons”, which includes the aim of “facilitating their voluntary return and social integration” (Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace, 1999:9). The partition of India was one of the largest and most rapid migrations in history, with the migration of about 14.5 million individuals, and the forced displacement of 16.7 million, in the space of four years (Bharadwaj, *et al.*, 2008:2). The refugees were told by the new leaders of Pakistan that they were finally part of a nation that aimed to satisfy their interests and represent their religion and any hardships they had encountered in the process of ethnic cleansing, were worth the realisation of a homogenised homeland (Ergun *et al.*, 2008:26). The promises of this new nation were idealistic and, thus, difficult to fulfil. The new state soon started to understand the burden of these promises, as more refugees demanded shelter, food and security as it was believed to be their right (Khan, 2007:168). The government of Pakistan attempted to cope with the burden of expectant refugees by centralising its authority, aligning itself to primarily the Muhajir refugee group, and restricting the participation of its population in national decisions, as demonstrated in the discussion of the One Unit scheme earlier in this chapter (Khan, 2007:170). The refugees failed to develop the necessary sense of solidarity with one another, as prescribed by the UN Declaration, and, in contrast, developed feelings of intolerance and “otherness” toward each other. As predicted by many critics of ethnic partitioning that have been mentioned in previous chapters, the creation of new trauma through

violent territorial separation only feeds into already existing feelings of exclusion in the conflicting societies.

4.3 The case of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

4.3.1 Brief political history and contextualisation

The second case that will be analysed in this chapter is the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Although Cyprus is internationally recognised as one unit, it has been partitioned twice and remains divided to this day. The northern territory has declared itself the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and is only recognised by Turkey, while the southern territory constitutes the internationally recognised Republic of Cyprus, which is also a member of the European Union (Spyrou, 2011:532). This analysis will assess whether the TRNC has been able to foster a culture of peace as an internationally unrecognised ethnic partition, while still mentioning wherever applicable the influence of the southern territory. To be precise, throughout this analysis, the northern region of Cyprus will be referred to as the TRNC even though it was only officially declared in 1983, as this will allow one to trace its development and avoid any potential confusion.

The conflict between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots first escalated in the 1930s when Greek Cypriots demanded that the British withdraw from Cyprus and allow for the island to be united with Greece, typically known as the movement for *enosis* (Bartmann *et al.*, 2003:165). The Greek Cypriots, who constituted about 82% of the population of Cyprus, created the National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) that was focused on the struggle for independence (Adamides & Constantinou, 2012:169). The minority Turkish Cypriots that constituted 18% of Cyprus, were somewhat protected by British rule (Kıralp, 2017:522). The possibility of an independent Cyprus absorbed into Greece would mean that their political interests would be permanently sidelined in the future. The fear of neglect and possible oppression by the ruling Greeks resulted in the Turkish Cypriot campaign for a continuation of British rule over the island and the establishment of the Turkish Resistance Organisation (TMT) to aid in this process (Kıralp, 2017:591).

Despite the retaliation of the Turkish Cypriots, the island was officially declared independent in 1960, and Greek Cypriots were granted majority governmental representation. A presidential system was chosen as the general political structure of the state on the basis that the president would always be a member of the Greek Cypriot community and the vice president would always be a Turkish Cypriot (Isachenko, 2012:40). The new constitution adopted by the Cypriot state declared that, in order to guarantee political equity, the Turkish Cypriot community would receive 30% of the seats in the Council of Ministers and House of Representatives and its vice president would be granted veto rights in all political decisions (Kıralp, 2017:522). In terms of external political influences, Britain, Turkey and Greece became the “guarantor powers” and given the task of ensuring that the state’s sovereignty remains intact (Sant-Cassia, 1999:24). In this vein, the constitution allowed each guarantor power to station a prescribed number of troops on the island with Greece allocating 950 troops, Turkey allocating 650, and Britain having control over two sovereign base areas (Varnava & Faustmann, 2009:13). The concessions made to the Turkish Cypriots and the British former colonial power were disappointing for the Greek Cypriots whose ambition of uniting with Greece was effectively dismissed. The Turkish Cypriots were also unsatisfied with this power-sharing administration as they were committed to *taksim*, or the idea of partition (Zambylas, 2011:55).

Between 1962 and 1963 tensions between the two communities and their leaders escalated over municipal disagreements. The Greek president of Cyprus, Makarios III, grew frustrated that such a small minority would be granted so much political power and demanded that the constitution be amended (Morag, 2004:614). He sought to limit the veto rights granted to the Turkish Cypriots, thereby enabling the Greek Cypriot community the ability to disregard any counter-arguments made by Turkish Cypriots that were not in their best interest (Kıralp, 2017:522). In retaliation, the Turkish Cypriot members of the executive and legislative branches left their positions and the TMT urged the community to follow their lead and enforce partition by any means necessary, thereby encouraging the use of physical violence in defence of their secessionist strategies (Dodd, 2010:53). The leaders of both communities met in London in 1964 to negotiate a settlement, however, neither side would concede to the demands of the other (Isachenko, 2012:41). The peace talks failed and inter-communal violence continued, leading to

the death of 364 Turkish Cypriots and 174 Greek Cypriots (Dodd, 2010:55). The violence ultimately led to the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force (UNFICYP) by the UN Security Council and a consequent ceasefire (Isachenko, 2012:41). The Turkish Cypriots withdrew into defensible enclaves and formed their own, separate informal administration (Sant-Cassia, 1999:25). In the process, more than 25,000 Turkish Cypriots abandoned their homes (Dodd, 2010:55).

From 1963 to 1974, multiple attempts were made to settle the “Cyprus problem”, however, the longer the two communities were separated, the more issues were created and sustained (Michael, 2007:589). Counter to the interests of Greece, Makarios expressed that his government would support an independent, unitary state, thereby effectively abandoning the pursuit of *enosis* (Kıralp, 2017:598). In retaliation against Makarios, the EOKA B was founded to continue the struggle for *enosis* for which its successor, EOKA A, had advocated and on the 15th of July 1974 EOKA B staged a coup d’etat, deposing Makarios (Varnava & Faustmann, 2009:15). Turkey feared that this movement would be successful and, therefore, detrimental to the Turkish Cypriot vision of *taksim*. Five days after the coup d’etat, Turkey invaded Cyprus as a counter-attack to the EOKA B efforts and occupied 37% of its territory (Milano, 2006:143). The Turkish military offensives resulted in approximately 6,000 deaths and the creation of about 25,000 refugees (Kıralp, 2017:602). In 1983, the Turkish Cypriots deemed the ethnic partitioning of Cyprus a success and proclaimed the occupied territory to be the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), only recognised by Turkey. The two territories are separated by a UN buffer zone as shown in Figure 3 (Sant-Cassia, 1999:26).

Figure 3: Map of Cyprus



(Central Intelligence Agency, 2019)

Despite numerous attempts at negotiation between the Greek and Cypriot communities, no progress has been made on the “Cyprus problem”. The most notable failure of peace negotiations was the 2004 rejection of the Annan Plan. In the early 2000s, the European Union (EU) constructed a proposal that put forward a new constitutional power-sharing order to reunite the island of Cyprus that would allow for the whole state of Cyprus to become a member of the EU (Murzanska & Pelaghias, 2018:22). The proposal urged the Republic of Cyprus to create two federal Chambers, where both communities would be represented in the Senate. In addition, refugee populations would be granted the ability to reclaim their immovable property lost during the two incidences of ethnic cleansing. To facilitate this process, Greece and Turkey would have to reduce the number of troops stationed on the island, while still making allowances for the two states to maintain a military presence (Christophorou, 2005:86). In two referendums, nearly 65% of Turkish Cypriots supported the plan, and almost 76% of Greek Cypriots rejected it (Varnava & Faustmann, 2009:1). The majority of those who voted against the Annan Plan stated that the reasoning behind their decision was a fear for their own security. Many Greek Cypriots felt that the plan conceded too much to Turkey and by maintaining the presence of a large number of Turkish troops, they could not feel safe (Aktar *et al.*, 2010:190). Consequently, the Plan became null and void and the Republic of Cyprus joined the EU in 2004 as a divided country while the TRNC remained unrecognised (Christophorou, 2005:85). Following the 2004 referendum, no durable peace agreement between the TRNC and Republic of Cyprus has been developed, and inherent tensions between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots remain. What follows in this section will assess why this is the case, and, more generally, whether the ethnic partitioning has been able to foster a culture of peace.

4.3.2 A culture of peace in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

4.3.2.1 Liberal development

The UN Declaration stresses the importance of liberal development in fostering a culture of peace, which includes developments in democratic, economic and social sectors of society. When a society is successfully geared toward the development of these sectors, the values associated with conflict resolution, such as the respect for differences, equity and inclusion, can be fostered. The liberal development of Cyprus, although steady and positive, is built on an

unstable foundation of dependency, which ultimately hinders the future of this development. Turkey has maintained its dominant status in all sectors of the TRNC and because of this, the TRNC has become more dependent on the “motherland”, and more isolated as a result. Its reliance on Turkey for security and development has meant that the international community cannot come to accept its claims of sovereignty. One must note that because the TRNC is not internationally recognised, reliable data on its liberal development is limited. The reports that evaluate the state of the nation, such as those conducted by the World Bank and the WHO, do not include a separate analysis on the TRNC, but rather, assess the southern territory as an indicator for the whole island. In spite of these challenges, several authors have conducted reliable evaluations on the TRNC’s developmental status and their work will be referenced in this assessment.

The first component of liberal development involves the establishment of a free and fair democracy that is committed to “strengthening democratic institutions and ensuring full participation in the development process.” The state must also adhere to the principles of pluralism, dialogue, and cultural diversity, which complement the necessary values of conflict resolution relating to equity, respecting the differences of others and the promotion of a shared community (Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace, 1999:3). The 1960 Constitution of Cyprus attempted to embrace these values through consociationalism, which is a mode of governance where all groups in a country are equally represented by the state regardless of whether they are a minority or not. This mode of governance failed, because the two groups felt that they had incompatible identities each relying on an external national power (Solomonides, 2008:65). In 1963 the TRNC was established as a mono-ethnic state, meaning that its government is controlled by one dominant ethnic group, viz. the Turkish Cypriots. Rather than consociational equality, a mono-ethnic state is based on the overarching principle of political singularity and homogenisation, while still maintaining a democratic government (Hadjipavlou, 2007:362). According to Freedom House reports, despite its mono-ethnic foundation, the TRNC democracy is relatively free, with fair elections and a system of proportional representation, where a large variety of parties are able to compete (Freedom House, 2018).

Although the TRNC has maintained a peaceful democracy it has been unable to fully embrace cooperative peaceful values associated with conflict resolution. A free and fair democracy cannot guarantee peace, according to De Rivera (2004:536), if no method of conflict resolution has been activated or sufficiently followed. As explained in Chapter 2, a state must demonstrate a level of tolerance for human differences, which can only be exemplified by modes of communication complementary to efforts aimed at cooperation (Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace, 1999:3). The TRNC has not developed institutions or mechanisms for this purpose and the longer it remains separated from the South, the less constructive communication exists between the two groups (Bryant, 2012:341). Points of contention, such as the presence of Turkish military troops in the North, have become inflexible and compromise seems impossible (Anastasiou, 2002:583). Because the TRNC has failed to embrace values of conflict resolution, but has managed to sustain peaceful democratic procedures, Adamides & Constantinou (2012:242) label the TRNC as an “illiberal peace.” In this way, the TRNC reflects a democracy that has achieved negative peace, which was discussed in Chapter 3, as the absence of conflict, but has not achieved sufficient positive peace, which is associated with addressing the root causes of hostilities (Richmond, 2008:102).

The Freedom House report does, however, explain that while the TRNC was built on the rhetoric of sovereignty and self-determination, the territory became diplomatically, militarily, and financially dependent on Turkey (Lacher & Kaymak, 2005:156). Following the partition of 1963, the TRNC recognised that, in order to secure their territory, they required the economic, political and governmental presence of Turkey, as this would deter the Greek Cypriots from potentially attempting to reclaim the territory (Sert, 2010:252). The Turkish Cypriots soon realised, however, that Turkey began controlling the TRNC government, and many top positions were given to the mainland Turks over the native Turkish Cypriot population. The Turkish Cypriots were unable to reverse the overwhelming Turkish political influence, for fear of losing their aid and political assistance (Kanol & Köprülü, 2017:398). As concluded by Christophorou (2005:102), the Turkish Cypriots came to realise that in spite of their fight to secure their right to self-determination, “they were not masters in their own house”. By 2003, the Turkish Cypriots were frustrated with being marginalised in their own territory by the mainland Turks, as well as internationally through the rejection of their legitimacy. Consequently, despite their stable

democracy, 64% of the TRNC population voted for a reversal of the ethnic partition and the adoption of the 2004 Annan Plan (Hadjipavlou, 2007:351). Their actions were too late, however, as 76% of the population of the Republic of Cyprus voted against the Plan (Aktar *et al.*, 2010:190).

The second component of liberal development is a stable economy that is able to promote human development. When the island of Cyprus was partitioned in 1963, the North inherited a territory that was economically underprivileged and in need of an urgent developmental strategy (Morag, 2004:610). To aid in economic development, only four years after the 1963 partition of the island, Turkey granted great sums of financial aid to the TRNC. Despite this, by 1973 the economic gap between the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots was 50%, which was 30% higher than the gap in 1961 (Morag, 2004:611). The more the TRNC lagged behind the South, the more it became reliant on Turkish aid. Kliot & Mansfield (1997:515) note that since the 1974 partition, Turkey covered more than 60% of the TRNC's annual budget on average. According to the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce (2018), Turkey's economic assistance has helped the TRNC to reach a GDP growth of over 3.8%, however, a lack of durable and independent economic performance has led to its underwhelming international competitiveness ranking of 109 out of 137 countries. Making matters worse, following the failure of the Annan Plan, largely as a result of Greek Cypriot fears that Turkey would extend its influence over the South, it was impossible for the TRNC to receive funds from international organisations (Kanol & Köprülü, 2017:394). The TRNC is left in a cycle of dependence, which greatly restricts its ability to foster a culture of peace. This cycle means that the more the TRNC remains reliant on Turkey, the less the international community will grant the territory the rights of sovereignty, the less economic freedom it is permitted, and the more economically isolated it becomes (Kanol & Köprülü, 2017:394). The cycle of dependence makes fostering a stable culture of peace a great challenge for the TRNC.

Equal and unrestrictive social development is the third component of liberal development and one in which the TRNC has faced numerous challenges. Taşiran & Ünever (2016) have calculated the region's HDI based on the same indicators as the official Human Development Reports. They found the TRNC to have an HDI value of 0.63 in 2016, which ranks it

significantly lower than the 0.869 HDI value of Republic of Cyprus, as well as the 0.725 Mediterranean average (Taşiran & Ünever, 2016). Factors that have had a positive bearing on this score include the territory's health expenditures, which were recorded to be 7.3% of the state budget in 2010 (Katircioğlu, 2014:608). A negative factor in this score is the TRNC's high national unemployment rates, the highest of which was recorded in the Güzelyurt region in 2015 at 8.3% (Deputy Prime Ministry and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015). This is worsened by the reality that more Turkish immigrants settle in the TRNC, the fewer employment opportunities will be available for the local Turkish Cypriots (Lacher & Kaymak, 2005:156). Of those who were employed in 2016, over 32% were immigrants (Youth Unemployment in Cyprus, 2016:7). The civilian frustration with immigrants utilising their scarce resources is made worse by the growing number of immigrants in the TRNC's educational institutions. For example, in 2005, over 68% of students enrolled in university were Turkish citizens compared to 25% of Turkish Cypriots (Hatay, 2007:34). Michaelidou *et al.* (2010:6) note that in some schools, immigrant students have constituted the large majority, which has increased hostility amongst the "indigenous" students against these immigrants. The lack of sufficient means to self-determination, the cycle of financial and military dependence and low social development impedes the TRNC's ability to guarantee its own security, expand its political influence and provide its citizens with the bare necessities, all of are considered essential for the survival of a state and the management of conflict, as outlined in Chapter 2.

4.3.2.2 Violent inequality

The second dimension of De Rivera's (2004) summary of the UN Declaration is violent inequality, related to the UN's rejection of all forms of discrimination and intolerance and mirroring the values of conflict resolution relating to equity, inclusion and justice mentioned in Chapter 2. This section will assess the effects of the TRNC's Turkification strategies, and the ways in which they have encouraged discrimination, oppression and aggression against the Greek identity. In addition, this analysis will explore how the TRNC's discriminatory homogenisation strategies have led to a cycle of revenge and retribution. The TRNC was founded on retaliation against the unequal treatment of the Turkish Cypriot community by the

newly independent government of Cyprus, however, the territory would come to embrace the exclusionary principles it had previously rebelled against.

Turkish Cypriots began their struggle for autonomy because they felt threatened by the increasingly more real threat of Greek cultural domination. In retaliation, the TRNC utilised the process of ethnic cleansing as an attempt to institutionalise a reactionary aim of Turkish cultural domination (Sert, 2010:252). The Turkish Cypriots engaged in activities that would aid in the Turkification of the North, including the forced removal of all Greek Cypriots from the North, the migration of Turkish Cypriots from the South to the North, and the acceptance of Turkish refugees from the Turkish mainland (Bartmann, *et al.*, 2003:168). The greatest source of institutionalised violence in Cyprus is arguably the decades-long Turkish Cypriot attempt to rid itself of any Greek Cypriots by any means necessary, including acts of violence and Greek cultural oppression (Bryant, 2012:342). In the 1980s, the North continued to displace hundreds of Greek Cypriots, reducing their population size from 1,076 to 500 in the space of a few years (Matson, 2013:200). The South interpreted this substantial reduction in numbers of Greek Cypriots as the result of “a sustained campaign of harassment, discrimination and oppression” (Gürel & Özersay, 2006:4). The Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, argued that they were seeking justice for the unequal treatment they had to bear at the hands of the Greek Cypriots and their Greek homeland (Sert, 2010:252).

The Turkish Cypriot acquisition of territory during the two partitions of the island meant that while the Turkish Cypriots were gaining more valuable resources and economic power, they were also aggravating the Greek Cypriots in such a way that only created more problems in the future which, according to critics of ethnic partitioning mentioned earlier, is the most common problem associated with ethnic partitioning. In 1972, 70% of Cyprus’ total gross output in all sectors were generated by the territory that the Turkish Cypriots and their Turkish allies would occupy (Sert, 2010:245). Resulting from the partition of Cyprus in 1974, Turkish Cypriots had increased their control over private land from 12% to 28% while Greek Cypriot ownership fell from 61% pre-1974 to 45% post-1974 (Sert, 2010:246). While this was a victory for Turkish Cypriots, the Greek Cypriots claimed that this was a great injustice, especially with Turkish Cypriots only constituting 18% of the total population of Cyprus (Lacher & Kaymak, 2005:156).

The Greek Cypriot feeling of injustice has resulted in the submission of more than 2,000 applications to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) by individuals seeking justice for their loss of property (Sert, 2010:248). As explained in previous chapters, such feelings of injustice and unequal treatment are detrimental to a society's journey toward conflict resolution. The homogenisation of the North through human displacement and land repossession has created a Greek Cypriots' perception that they are victims of institutional violence, which has consequently become a significant obstacle to the realisation of peace settlements between the North and the South (McGarry & O'Leary, 1994:98).

Another form of perceived institutional inequality in the form of land has been the unfair advantage given to certain groups through the Law for Housing, Allocation of Land, and Property of Equal Value (Law No. 41/1977) (Ekici, 2019:80). This law required that the government adopt a points-based exchange system that would grant certain Turkish Cypriots control over land that had been taken from the previous Greek Cypriot owners (Sert, 2010:246). While the system benefitted the refugees that had fled the South, it also became a tool for favouritism. The points-based exchange system was manipulated by individuals who were granted points for unspecified services to the state and, most crucially, for political gains such as guaranteed votes in democratic elections (Sert, 2010:247). In addition, land would be given to the Turkish refugees, although many were not directly affected by the ethnic partitioning of Cyprus, ultimately leading to growing tensions between the Turkish and Cypriot community in the North (Ekici, 2019:80). More than 60,000 mainland Turks relocated to this territory at the same time as 52,000 Turkish Cypriots, and since 1974, more than 17,000 Turkish citizens were granted land and citizenship in the TRNC (Kliot & Mansfield, 1997:506).

Another source of violent inequality is the unequal treatment of the territories by the international community, which can be considered as such because the Greek Cypriots have deliberately sought to exclude the North from EU affairs. Although the TRNC had acquired a resource-rich territory and many Turkish Cypriots have benefitted from the land previously owned by the Greek Cypriots, it lacked the capacity for stable development that is often granted to internationally recognised states. Greek Cypriots managed to overcome their economic setbacks through international support for their post-conflict developmental strategies (The

Heritage Foundation, 2019). By representing the whole island and gaining resources only available for internationally recognised states, the Republic of Cyprus was able to achieve an economy more stable and secure than it once enjoyed before the partition of 1975 (Kliot & Mansfield, 1997:516). The Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, could not achieve the much-needed economic breakthrough that most independent economies, including the South, experience. Instead, as demonstrated earlier in this section, the TRNC could only rely on Turkish patronage for their economic development (Kliot & Mansfield, 1997:516). The rejection of its plea to join the European Union was another obstacle to economic development, as it could not benefit from the same European alliances as the South (Christophorou, 2005:85). The Turkish Cypriots also argued that because the South was benefitting from representing the island as a whole, the Greek Cypriots did not want to risk reunifying with the North and having to share the positive outcomes of its independent development. The Turkish Cypriots argued that they were being discriminated against by the international community, despite their willingness for a peace settlement with the South (Varnava & Faustmann, 2009:216). As predicted to be the outcome of most ethnic partitions by the critics of ethnic partitioning, an internal ethnic conflict transformed into a conflict spanning across borders.

4.3.2.3 State use of violent means

The third dimension of the UN Declaration, as discussed by De Rivera (2004), is state use of violent means, and rests on the assumption that a country based on a philosophy of non-violence and conflict resolution will be more likely to prevent conflict in the future. The most common critique against ethnic partitioning is that the processes involved with ethnic partitioning are inherently violent and the newly formed partition will be founded on a culture of violence. This critique is definitely relevant for the TRNC because since its establishment, the TRNC has had to rely on violence and threat as a means for guaranteeing its survival, and securing its sovereignty. Although the incidences of violence have decreased since the 1970s, the situation in Cyprus is still hostile enough to warrant the presence of UN and British military bases (Solomonides, 2008:68). The effects of violence and force have remained ingrained in the minds of both Cypriot communities and have led to deep feelings of insecurity, as evidenced by the failure of

the many proposed peace agreements. As such, the ethnic partitioning may have established negative peace, however, a lack of positive peace has led to a cycle of revenge and retaliation.

The 1963 and 1974 partitions of Cyprus have led to considerable suffering by Turkish and Greek Cypriots. In 1963, the Turkish Cypriots, with the aid of the Turkish military, initiated the most violent period in Cyprus' history, which resulted in the deaths of 630 Turkish Cypriots and 260 Greek Cypriots between 1963 and 1967 (Kıralp, 2017:523). The TMT urged its members to forcibly remove Greek Cypriots from the North by any means necessary, including intimidatory tactics, such as torture and physical mutilation (Kaufmann, 2007:216). The acts of physical violence were compounded by the mass of displaced persons, about 25,000 of Turkish Cypriot ethnicity, created through the process of ethnic cleansing (Bartmann *et al.*, 2003:168). The casualties and displaced individuals did not cease with this first partition as in 1974 the Turkish Cypriots became fearful that *enosis* was imminent, and with support from 30,000 Turkish troops, invaded the northern territory of Cyprus. This resulted in the killing of about 6,000 Greek Cypriots and 1,500 Turkish Cypriots (Kliot & Mansfield, 1997:503). Over 250,000 individuals became refugees, with 80% of these individuals having Greek ethnicity (Kaufmann, 2007:215). The trauma associated with the killing and forced removal of civilians on both sides of the conflict would result in strong feelings of victimisation, resentment, and a generalised respect for violence in conflict.

Both the Turkish and the Greek Cypriots blamed one another for the atrocities of ethnic partitioning. Both sides felt victimised by the other and lent on their respective external motherlands for support in defending their ethnic identity (Papadakis, 1998:156). The two Cypriot communities felt that their acts of violence against the other side is legitimated by their need to survive (Michael, 2007:589). The Turkish Cypriots felt that they had no choice, since it was their right to defend themselves and establish an administration with which they could identify, and through which their interests could be satisfied (Danielidou & Horvath, 2006:408). The Greek Cypriot community, on the other hand, blamed the North for killing, raping, and torturing members of their community, for forcibly seizing land that they did not have a right to take; and for involving a strong foreign power that violated the principle of domestic jurisdiction (Bryant, 2012:344). The claims of defensive aggression and the fear of having to relive these

experiences are what have led to the various peace negotiation standoffs. Neither side at any given moment has been able to compromise with the demands of the other for fear that they would lose control over their territory, which, as explained in previous chapters, is a common dilemma experienced by partitioned nations. As the two communities continue to stand their ground, the security dilemma of the so-called “Cyprus problem” is maintained (Papadakis, 1998:156).

Even to this day, significant progress on this problem has been denied on so many occasions that the rejection of negotiated proposals is effectively expected by all parties involved (Aktar *et al.*, 2010:190). The failure of these negotiations can be interpreted as a failure of communication brought on by concentrated ethnic groups dedicated to resisting possible intermixing with one another. The reality of the situation is that the more defensive the two communities become, the more they resist constructive communication, the worse the security dilemma becomes, and the less likely a peace settlement is deemed to be (Anastasiou, 2002:582). Instead of a culture based on tolerance, solidarity and cooperation for the greater good, non-communication and blame are the norm in Cyprus (Bryant, 2012:341). Indeed, Varnava & Faustmann (2009:217) have stated that even the youth of both territories have lingering fears of the Other, even though they have never witnessed the most violent periods of the ethnic partitions themselves (Varnava & Faustmann, 2009:217). Such lingering feelings of fear and trauma are attributed to the lack of a significant normative shift from a violent, exclusionary culture to one of compromise and inclusion, which, as has been discussed previously, is a necessary transition for conflict resolution to take place.

According to Michael (2007:589), the conflict between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots has resulted in a “double minority complex”, where the communities not only manifest fears regarding the potential for intra-state conflict, but are also influenced by the fears of their motherlands, thereby transforming the security dilemma into a two-tiered phenomenon. With regards to the intra-state rivalry, the Greek Cypriots fear that any effort at reunifying the island could extend Turkish influence into the South. Sert (2010:251) notes that when asked how insecure/secure the Greek Cypriots felt living in Cyprus, more than half of the respondents reported feeling somewhat, or very insecure. These insecurities relate to the presence of the

Turkish army, as well as the collective memory of the violent role they had assumed in both partitions. Their fear rests on the belief that a government partly influenced by Turkey would be guaranteed to mobilise a violent rebellion from within (Varnava & Faustmann, 2009:219). Ironically, Turkish Cypriots have declared the same insecurities prior to the 2003 Annan Plan proposal. They feared that reunification with the Greek Cypriots would reestablish their minority status after decades of fighting for their self-determination (Michael, 2007:592). These fears are still felt in the Turkish Cypriot community, despite their vote in favour of a peace agreement in 2003. Turkish Cypriots accepted the plan, not because it would establish peace in the region and ease tensions with the South, but because its EU membership would benefit their economic and political interests. Their YES vote was more of a testament to their recognition that reliance on Turkey was hindering their development, than the fear of ethnic intermixing (Kanol & Köprülü, 2017:394).

With regards to the inter-state rivalry between Turkey and Greece, both states utilise their ethnic connections in Cyprus to advance their broader goals. Turkey has benefitted from the North's economic, political and economic dependence and fears that the domination of Greece will obstruct this relationship (Isachenko, 2012:75). To defend its interests, Turkey has continually called upon its allied Turkish Cypriots to resist any form of peace settlement that might aid Greece in securing greater control over the island. This has provoked strong feelings of nationalism and has constantly reignited the trauma associated with the pre-partition conflict for its own gain (Anastasiou, 2002:584). Greece mirrors these fears and has utilised similar tactics to gain control over the political decisions in the South. A common narrative advanced by the Greeks is that Turkey must not be allowed to have any influence over Cyprus, considering the fact that, according to the European Convention on Human Rights, it committed 14 human rights violations when it invaded the territory (Danielidou & Horvath, 2006:409). In this effort, Greece relies on the past two "injustices" to insist that fear of Turkish domination is rational and realistic (Lindley, 2007:231). According to modern peace theory discussed in Chapter 2, without internal and international willingness and determination to seek justice and reconciliation, conflict resolution is a impossibility. The possibility of fostering a stable culture of peace in the ethnic partition of the TRNC is unlikely, since it would necessitate not only an agreement between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots, but also between Turkey and Greece.

4.3.2.4 Nurturance

Nurturance is the fourth and final dimension mentioned by De Rivera (2004), and refers to a country's generalised respect for human development and freedom that is evidenced by its promotion of and dedication to nurturing strategies (Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace, 1999:2). Nurturance encompasses female empowerment, educational development, and refugee empathy, as all three components represent a nation's ability to prioritise the wellbeing of all humankind and promote the feeling that every member of a society is part of an equitable, shared community. The TRNC has not experienced much development on reforming gender norms due to its reliance on the idea that women must support their husbands, whose duty it is to defend the state (Demetriou & Hadjipavlou, 2014:102). Education has also embraced the national defence narrative in history lessons and has not developed sufficient curricula emphasising conflict resolution. Interestingly, while female empowerment and the development of a nurturing education system have been unexceptional, the TRNC has embraced significant numbers of Turkish refugees on account of the territory's Turkification policy. While this acceptance of refugees is in keeping with the Declaration's prescriptions for tolerance, tensions between the local and refugee populations have grown more hostile.

A nurturing state must ensure that men and women are granted equal rights and opportunities as the promotion of equity and a shared community are necessary values associated with achieving conflict resolution (Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace, 1999:7). The first substantial developments in women equality took place between 1993 and 1998, two decades after the second partition. The most crucial development ensued in 1996, when the TRNC accepted the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (Lisaniler, 2006:134). Also during this time, women's rights activists mobilised support for a modern Family Law that was later accepted by the state. This law allowed for women to acquire paid work outside of the home independently, as they were no longer required the consent of their husbands (Lisaniler, 2006:134). This momentum could not be sustained, however, as the territory faced an economic crisis in 1998, and political uneasiness in the early 2000s, with the Annan Plan (Yirmibeşoğlu, 2008:697).

More recently, Freedom House (2018) reports that women in the TRNC have full political rights and law necessitates that a party's parliamentary candidate list must consist of 30% women. While in theory the nation promotes equal gender rights, in practice, women's participation is limited, especially in positions of leadership. In fact, in the 2018 elections, only four women won seats in the legislature (Freedom House, 2018). The lack of sufficient practical gender equality is not surprising when one analyses the political context. The TRNC has witnessed two violent partitions and considered their highest priority to be building a stable administration and economy, which, in turn, has led to the neglect of gender equality as a topic worthy of state consideration (Demetriou & Hadjipavlou, 2014:102). Between 1963 and 1974, women assumed the role of homemakers or unpaid family workers that supported their husbands in protecting the sovereignty of the territory, and this stereotype has been challenging to overcome (Demetriou & Hadjipavlou, 2014:102). A study by Yirmibeşoğlu (2008) found that women in the TRNC feel that they cannot risk being assertive when it comes to gender equality in the political realm as concerns of women in power is simply too unimportant, considering the many obstacles the state had to face. Women chose to take secondary positions that would support men trying to solve the Cyprus problem, rather than assuming roles that involved solving the problem first hand (Yirmibeşoğlu, 2008:704).

The UN Declaration emphasises the role of education in promoting a culture of peace and while the education system in the TRNC is functional and stable, it does not fare well when compared to other countries (Ufuk & Çağanağa, 2019:1). The TRNC's level of competitiveness has been evaluated by the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce (2018) and the findings conclude that out of 137 countries, the TRNC's education system as a whole is ranked 106th. Its primary education system is ranked 56th, which is boosted by the 100% enrolment and literacy rate and depreciated by the quality of this education, ranked 104th (TRNC Public Information Office, 2019). In terms of the territory's higher education and training sector, the TRNC is ranked 97th (TRNC Public Information Office, 2019). Although its score relating to higher education and training is sufficient and functional, an important note to be made is that the universities in the TRNC are made up of 87% foreign students from over 135 countries (Study in North Cyprus, 2017). As a consequence of the nation's Turkification policies, 55% of these foreign students are from Turkey, and only 13% are from the local Turkish Cypriot community. Such strong

deviations in favour of the foreign inhabitant has the potential to provoke resistance from the local Turkish Cypriots (Study in North Cyprus, 2017).

The TRNC's education system is relatively unexceptional and despite its high rates of primary school enrolment and overall literacy, the quality of this education is problematic. Both the north and the South of Cyprus have historically adapted their school curricula to the narratives of their respective homelands. Turkish Cypriots are taught that Cypriot history was a mere extension of Turkish history (Papadakis, 2008:131). The period between 1963 and 1974 is described as a "barbaric onslaught" on the Turks by the Greeks, and that Greek oppression is solely to blame for the conflict (Papadakis, 2008:136). Greeks are constructed as barbarians and savages that were overcome by the heroic Turkish army, whose goal was to guarantee the security of the Turkish Cypriots (Spyrou, 2011:536). The curricula generally do not present the students with possible solutions to the conflict, but rather reinforces a nationalist identity that the children would have to defend once they mature. In doing so, the schools have constructed enemy images of the Other that they urge particularly male students to defend themselves against. The education system, thus, neither allows for past traumas to be overcome nor allows for a normative shift from a culture of violence and blame to one of peace, both of which have been explained as being necessary for conflict resolution (Varnava & Faustmann, 2009:203).

The UN Declaration states that governments should create an atmosphere of tolerance and solidarity for all refugees to aid in the process of social integration because the promotion of values associated with a shared community are essential for conflict resolution, as was discussed in Chapter 2 (Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace, 1999:9). The refugees created by the two partitions of Cyprus were provided with very different information regarding their displacement, which has heightened tensions between the rival communities. The government of the South reassured the Greek Cypriots that they would be able to return once a formal agreement was established between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots (Loizos, 1981:115). The Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, believed that the separation was permanent, and that they would benefit from the land occupied in 1974 through the Law for Housing, Allocation of Land, and Property of Equal Value (Law No. 41/1977) (Ekici, 2019:80). During the procession of various peace talks between the two communities, the Greek Cypriots expressed a strong

desire to “return home” as they believed that it was their right to reclaim the land they had owned. The Turkish Cypriots refused to allow this, since they had established a system of land reclamation that satisfied their aim of self-determination and autonomy (Sert, 2010:251). The problem of the right to return and the inflexibility of those who have reclaimed territory represents a fundamental problem for the establishment of a culture of peace, as the UN Declaration states that a nation must be willing to facilitate the voluntary return of any refugees (Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace, 1999:9).

Another unexpected consequence of the partition was the number of Turkish refugees who would be granted citizenship in the TRNC. The Turkish government believed that by encouraging the flow of migrants from Turkey, the TRNC would have a greater claim of sovereignty. The acceptance of Turkish refugees meant that by 1996, the percentage of Turkish Cypriots as a proportion of the total population of Cyprus was 24%, 5% higher than 1974 (Bartmann *et al.*, 2003:168). In 2007, the North housed over 78,000 foreign citizens, with an estimated 70,000 of these inhabitants being from Turkey (Hatay, 2007:48). As stated previously, while refugee acceptance is necessary for a culture of peace, it has led to the intensification of tensions between the Turkish Cypriots and the mainland Turkish refugees as cultural differences become more apparent. The Turkish refugees are more socially conservative and religious than the Cypriots and the Cypriots felt that the influx of Turkish refugees would dilute the national Cypriot character and obstruct their cause for homogenised autonomy (Bartmann, *et al.*, 2003:168). Thus, what was intended to be an act of community-strengthening regrettably only led to more intolerance amongst the Turkish Cypriots.

4.4 A comparative analysis of Pakistan and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

Similar to the structure of the case studies above, this comparative analysis will begin by comparing Pakistani and TRNC contexts, which will be followed by a comparative analysis based on De Rivera’s (2004) culture of peace dimensions, namely liberal development, violent inequality, state use of violent means, and nurturance. Each section of this comparative analysis will begin by briefly reiterating what is required of each dimension to foster a culture of peace,

followed by an explanation as to why and how the cases are similar and different in terms of the dimension's requirements, and an assessment of whether each case has fostered a culture of peace in that dimension. Each section will highlight the continuities relating to ethnic partitioning in particular and whether these continuities aid in the fostering of a culture of peace.

4.4.1 Political history

The histories of Pakistan and the TRNC are defined by their establishment through ethnic partitioning, however, similarities can be observed even before their official establishment. In both cases, their antecedent states were British colonies. After World War II, the political climates of India and Cyprus became increasingly more revolutionary as their populations fought against the domination of Britain. The struggle for independence reflected the will of the majority populations, where the interests of the minorities were largely neglected. As talks regarding the practical independence advanced, Britain negotiated with the majority in each territory and the post-colonial vision began to reflect the identity of these majorities. A sovereign Indian state would represent the ideals of the Hindu population, and Cyprus would embody the ideals of the Greek Cypriots. The Muslim and Turkish Cypriot minorities felt that their ethnic identity would be sidelined, as the majorities seized control of state affairs. As a result, the minorities rebelled and forcibly established their own autonomous governing structure that they believed would safeguard their interests. The importance of this pre-partition climate is that in each case, the threat of a post-colonial, independent state propelled the resistance of the minority. Turkish Cypriots and Muslims in India utilised the highly politicised climate of their respective states to construct themselves as long-standing victims of unjust oppression that needed liberation.

The Muslims from India and the Turkish Cypriots established administrative defensive enclaves that would ultimately be referred to as Pakistan and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, respectively. They compelled members of their communities to leave their homes and displace those who were no longer represented by their self-appointed government by any means necessary. In doing so, they claimed the land of those who had been displaced as their own, and transferred it to those who had fled the antecedent state for the new homeland. The repossession

of land would ultimately create more points of contention and hostility, both internally and internationally. Through the process of ethnic cleansing, the two ethnic groups became more militant and uncompromising than at any other time in their histories. Intolerance and revenge would come to frame the socio-political climate of these new mono-ethnic statehoods up to the present day.

While the political histories leading up to the ethnic partitioning of Pakistan and the TRNC are strikingly similar and both relate to ethnic conflict, the conflicts were based on two separate yet distinct identity categories. Pakistan's ethnic conflict was based on inter-religious hostilities present in India between the Muslims and the Hindus. The TRNC, on the other hand, was founded on the strong international alliances between the Greek Cypriots and Greece, as well as the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey. While the roots of conflict between the Muslims and Hindus as well as between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots are based on the clash between heterogeneous identities, this chapter has found that even in the new homelands where homogenisation was promised, conflict still arose within the new ethnic partitions. For the purpose of this analysis, and due to the TRNC's lack of international recognition, the conflict with the southern Republic of Cyprus will be regarded as an intra-state matter akin to the conflict between the provincial groups in Pakistan, while the broader conflict between the Greek and Turkish motherlands will be regarded as an inter-state matter akin to the Indo-Pakistani conflict. This will aid the multi-levelled aspect of this study and prevent any possible confusion.

4.4.2 Liberal development

In terms of liberal development, Pakistan and the TRNC came to rely on one militarised ethnic identity for political, economic, and social development, even when such reliance was damaging the very autonomy both ethnic groups had fought to establish. Politically, Pakistan and the TRNC established mono-ethnic statehoods following their respective ethnic partitions for they feared that democratic plurality would threaten their legitimacy as a nation. The new states felt vulnerable especially when their economies and administrations were in their infancy and hoped that homogenisation would unite the population in such a way that guaranteed development. In

reality, however, ethnic favouritism and dependency would pull some communities further apart and obstruct liberal development.

The two states needed to secure their territories and deter their rival from reclaiming the land they had lost, thus leading to their political dependence on the military even when such dependence obstructed democratic development. The Pakistani state implemented various military regimes throughout its history in the belief that purely democratic procedures such as free and fair elections could only damage the already fragile state. The state needed to remain focused on developing its military, since any weakness could be taken advantage of by the Indians. The TRNC also relied on the military as a deterrent against possible invasion, although this military was mainly comprised of Turkish troops. Due to the TRNC's dependence on Turkey, its political decisions were largely directed by the political elite of Turkey. Such dependence would serve to be detrimental to Pakistan's liberal development, as Turkish military involvement would come to prevent the TRNC's accession to the EU and limit the opportunities for liberal development. Ultimately, both the TRNC and Pakistan became dependent on the military for political direction and civilian participation in the government was deemed inadequate for the development of the nation.

Pakistan and the TRNC were also restricted in the sense that matters of national defence were prioritised over social and economic development. The majority of Pakistan's state resources were dedicated to maintaining its defence against internal and international hostilities, which ultimately had negative consequences for the development of efficient and effective social institutions. Pakistan became reliant on international aid for the maintenance of its military, which was consuming its national resources. As such, Pakistan has struggled to lower its poverty rates and lacks the economic freedom to make necessary transformations. Similarly, in the TRNC, the national defence and economic aid provided by Turkey is often regarded as more important than economic freedom. The TRNC cannot risk losing Turkey as an economic, military, and political ally, as any vulnerability will be exploited by the South. Thus, maintaining a Turkish military presence in the North is perceived to be the top priority, even if this means that social development is somewhat obstructed.

Despite these similarities, the two cases differ with regards to their relative military capabilities and economic status. Firstly, with regard to economic dissimilarities, Pakistan has been able to rely on a variety of foreign assistance, including the IMF and the World Bank, while the TRNC has not. This is because Pakistan's economy adheres to liberal requirements, such as the freedom of the economic sector, has supported its appeal for international investment and aid. The TRNC, on the other hand, has not been afforded the benefits that come with international recognition as a result of its conflict with the South. The second difference between the liberal development of Pakistan and the TRNC relates to their relative military capabilities. Pakistan has had to devote a significant portion of its GDP to the military to remain as powerful as India as it can, which has impeded its liberal development. The TRNC, on the other hand, does not have to devote a considerable amount of resources to its military, due to the presence of Turkish troops in the North and UN peacekeeping troops along the border between the North and South. While these differences obstruct both Pakistan and the TRNC's liberal development, they are context-specific and not direct causes of ethnic partitioning. A direct cause of ethnic partitioning is, rather, the state preoccupation with national defence even where such a preoccupation obstructs any other form of development. The reality remains that the mono-ethnic statehoods embraced by the ethnic partitions of Pakistan and the TRNC failed to ensure the necessary liberal development required for a culture of peace.

4.4.3 Violent inequality

While the second dimension of analysis, violent inequality, is based on the argument that a culture of peace necessitates the rejection of all forms of violent inequality and discrimination, including religious, linguistic, and ethnic intolerance, the ethnic partitions in both cases have not fostered such tolerance and egalitarianism for their very existence depends on a system that rejects these values. Both Pakistan and the TRNC have institutionalised inequality, discrimination, and intolerance, for they believe that only through a homogenised society would they be able to secure their cultural integrity (Bryant, 2012:336).

The ethnic partitioning of Cyprus and Pakistan was based on the premise that each community had the right to self-determination and a homeland that could provide them with security. While

this vision implies equally autonomous states, there always appeared to be one group that benefitted more from institutional inequality than the others. Both Muslims and Turkish Cypriots felt that they had been sidelined by the struggle for independence that followed World War II and expressed a strong will to build a new nation that would provide them with freedom from unfair treatment. The communities proceeded to violently remove and harm any citizens that could threaten their vision of a secure homeland. In the new territories, violence became institutionalised and accepted, with Greek Cypriots and Hindus being stripped of their basic human rights. The founding principles of the new nations encouraged inequality, for it was believed that only through retaliatory discrimination will they feel that justice had been restored.

In the two case studies, both Pakistan and the TRNC developed institutionalised strategies that were aimed at uniting their populations, and, in doing so, maintain a source of legitimacy as a new nation. In Pakistan, the One Unit scheme sought to unite its provinces by the Punjabisisation of the state. These efforts toward unification and centralisation were mirrored in the TRNC in its Turkification of the territory. In both cases, the government aligned itself with the interests of one ethnic identity, which angered those who were not represented by this identity. In Pakistan, the non-Urdu and non-Punjabi communities, especially those who were the native population, felt that the government had institutionally discriminated against them in favour of the refugees in Punjab. In the Republic of Cyprus, the Greek Cypriots were angered by the points-based exchange system implemented in the North, for they claimed they had greater claim over the land being redistributed to the Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turkish refugees. The two cases demonstrate how an effort to unite citizens through the institutionalisation of a single identity can lead to greater divisions and new problems that obstruct the fostering of a culture of peace.

The two cases differed with regard to the direct aim of their respective homogenisation policies, as Pakistan's One Unit scheme sought to unite the populations in Pakistan, whereas the Turkification policy in the TRNC consciously sought to exclude a large population of the island. Despite these intentions, the consequence of these institutionalised homogenisation policies led to those who were not included in the forming of a new, partitioned state experiencing an existential need to preserve their cultural identity. The One Unit scheme in Pakistan led to violent demonstrations against the domination of Urdu and the Punjab, mostly led by the Sindhi-

speaking communities. The demonstrations were an act of defiance against the institutionalised violence and in defence of cultural preservation, which ultimately led to the retaliatory Sindhi Language Bill of 1972 that excluded those who had previously been favoured. In the Republic of Cyprus, the Greek Cypriots had appealed to the European Court of Human Rights in an effort to reclaim their previously owned land (Sert, 2010:248). After decades of the Turkish Cypriot rejection of the Greek Cypriots' demand for land reclaim and compensation, the Greek Cypriots acted in retaliation by preventing the TRNC from being accepted into the EU on the basis that partial reunification would validate the illegal actions of the Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish military. This resulted in the unequal international treatment of the two territories in Cyprus, with one reaping the benefits of sovereignty while the other is denied these privileges. As is apparent in both the case of Pakistan and Cyprus, the favouring of one identity over others will lead to retaliatory acts of defiance. A culture of peace will not be able to flourish in an environment that perpetuates previous conflicts and raises new points of contention.

4.4.4 State use of violent means

The third dimension of analysis provided by De Rivera (2004), as per the UN's Declaration, explains how a state that relies on threats and deliberate acts of violence is unable to promote cooperative practices of conflict resolution in the future and the cases of Pakistan and the TRNC are testament to this claim. The ethnic partitions of both India and Cyprus were the result of failed attempts at conflict resolution regarding post-colonial independence following World War II. The members of the Turkish Cypriot and the Indian Muslim communities were told that living alongside the Other would only endanger the survival of their ethnic identities. The anger instilled in them from the very beginning of their struggle for autonomy remained a part of their national identity and ever-present when interacting with the Other. The Muslim minority and the Turkish Cypriots felt that they had no other option for cultural preservation than violence, for it was precisely this violence that granted them their own homeland.

While physical violence and forced removals waned following the more aggressive years of ethnic cleansing in Pakistan and the TRNC, the fear that the Other could possibly inflict harm on the newly established nation remained. As a result of this fear, both Pakistan and the TRNC

relied on maintaining their defensive means in the hope that military force could deter their rival from reclaiming their lost territory. Pakistani leaders convinced their citizenry that placing national defence ahead of all other sectors of a country would secure the well-being of their ethnicity in general. In so doing, the Pakistani leaders validated the significant amount of Pakistan's state resources dedicated to developing a military that matched that of India. In a similar vein, the TRNC feared that their military power alone could not deter the Greek Cypriots and their Greek ally from reoccupying the territory. As a result, the nation refused to decrease the number of Turkish troops in the Northern territory of Cyprus during all negotiations with the Greek Cypriots prior to 2004. In both cases, their inflexible support for their military force impeded the fostering of a peaceful culture both within and extending beyond its borders.

While advocates of ethnic partitioning argue that the territorial separation of conflicting groups will decrease the intensity of the security dilemma, it is evident in the cases of Pakistan and the TRNC that this is not the case. In each of these two case studies, the conflict that had sparked their respective ethnic partitions has not been solved, and each violent attempt at securing an ethnic homeland has resulted in a retaliatory act of violence. Pakistan's use of violence in situations of disagreement would present a problem to its future security when a cycle of counterattacks came to frame the political character of the state. When Pakistan feared the militancy of Afghanistan, it supported militant Islamic groups in the local communities. This encouragement of violence resulted in a cycle of vengeance when these same militant groups began attacking the Pakistani civilians, and Pakistan provided the local population with weapons to counterattack. In the TRNC, the Turkish Cypriots encouraged the use of violence against the Greek Cypriots for the second time in 1974. The Turkish Cypriots used violence to push their agenda on the Greek Cypriot government, ultimately resulting in a counteract of aggression in 2004 when the Greek Cypriots refused to grant the TRNC the right to EU benefits. In both cases, the nations sought to defend their interests through violent means and the rejection of dialogue and compromise, which has led to a culture of retaliation and revenge. Violence became the preferred method of advancing one's own interests as conflict resolution strategies could be perceived to be a sign of weakness that a rival could use to their advantage.

There are two key differences between the two cases, one relating to incidences of physical violence and the other relating to military capabilities. The first key difference between the two territories relates to their reliance on physical violence following the highly volatile periods of ethnic cleansing. In the TRNC, incidences of physical violence dropped significantly, and the Turkish military is stationed on the territory mostly as a precaution. Pakistan's use of physical violence in international as well as intra-communal conflicts is far more severe, even seven decades following its establishment. The second point of difference between the two cases is their military capabilities. Pakistan has had to compete with the strong Indian military for fear that vulnerability would result in an Indian advantage, subsequently leading to the constant development of its nuclear capabilities. The TRNC, on the other hand, has been able to rely on the Turkish military as a deterrent against southern aggression and do not have to devote significant resources to developing any nuclear capabilities. Regardless of the incidences of physical violence and military expansion, the two states have fostered a hostile environment, where conflict resolution strategies are deemed inadequate and ineffective in hostile situations. The security dilemma has meanwhile been intensified, with each act of counter-aggression leading to the possibility of a solution to the conflict becoming less likely. The groups have created a cycle of revenge that is in direct contrast to the principles of respect and solidarity promoted by the UN Declaration.

4.4.5 Nurturance

The fourth and final dimension of analysis is nurturance, which includes the state's acts of empathy, compassion, and solidarity. Similar to the structure of the case studies, this section will be divided between the levels of gender equality, education, and treatment of refugees, with necessary links made that relate to the overriding theme of nurturance. The first subsection of the nurturance dimension is ensuring gender equality and representation in the state. The two case studies have taken steps to improve the role of women in their communities, however, the empowerment of women has been overshadowed by matters of national security. Even today, Pakistan and the TRNC have an insufficient ratio of men to women in top positions of power, including prominent positions in the state. One must note that while both states have similarities in their neglect of gender equality, they differ in terms of the role of religion. Even though the

TRNC consisted of a large Islamic society, its laws were not necessarily aligned with the laws of Islam and, consequently, could not institutionally oppress women on the grounds of religious obedience. In Pakistan, however, especially during the leadership of General Zia, women's rights were disregarded as a result of the Islamisation policy and its perception that women were subordinate to men. This is not to say religious female oppression was the cause of the neglect of institutionalised gender equality in Pakistan, but rather that religion played a far greater role in Pakistan than it did in the TRNC. Regardless of the presence or absence of gender discrimination in state policies, inherent in both Pakistan and the TRNC is the persistent norm that they have needed to support their husbands and maintain the household especially during times of conflict. According to the Declaration, a society that embraces this form of discrimination will be unable to foster a culture of peace.

The second subsection of nurturance is the development of an efficient, well-funded education system that teaches the youth of a nation the value of peace and conflict resolution. Pakistan and the TRNC have not established education systems that fare well when compared with other countries, although to different extents. Pakistan's education system is of far less quality than that of the TRNC, and this can be attributed to the costly arms race against India that has required a significant portion of state resources. Regardless of this difference, both Pakistan and the TRNC have based educational curricula, especially lessons that teach the history of their nation, on fearing and blaming the Other for past atrocities. The case study analysis of educational literature indicates that the ethnic rivals of the two cases are depicted as barbarians and the members of their own communities as national heroes and martyrs. One may be inclined to tolerate a certain level of bias in the telling of national history, as long as it promotes a desire to find a solution to ethnic rivalries and points of contention. Pakistan and the TRNC, however, have rarely taught their students the value of conflict resolution and compromise as the blame of their violent history is directed towards the Other, who is incapable of adhering to peaceful agreements. In this way, Pakistan and the TRNC have been unable to promote an educational climate conducive to a culture of peace.

The third and final subsection of nurturance is related to the efforts of the state that aims to integrate the refugees of the country. Interestingly, the two case studies have adhered to the basic

premise of this nurturance subsection, as both states have devoted significant resources, including access to land and employment, to ensuring the wellbeing of refugees that seek asylum in the new homeland. A problem arises when these refugees are granted a disproportionate share of state resources, as this leads to resentment within the local populations. This was the case in Pakistan when the non-Punjabi and non-Urdu speaking communities retaliated against the One Unit scheme, and in the TRNC with the policy of Turkification where land previously owned by the Greek Cypriots was seized. In the two cases, the local populations felt that the refugees were being favoured over those who had already established lives in the given territory. The two cases differed with regard to the right of return, however, as the Greek Cypriots were led to believe that they would be able to reclaim their lost land, whereas the Indian Hindus agreed to permanent population exchanges. Ultimately, the Greek Cypriot refugees would retaliate by refusing the TRNC's EU membership, even though it meant that they could not return. Even so, Pakistan and the TRNC have displaced large populations on the basis of intolerance and the treatment of these refugees. Whether as a result of favouritism or hostility, such intolerance has created more problems, which have obstructed the fostering of a culture of peace.

4.5 Conclusion

Having assessed the ethnic partitions of Pakistan and the TRNC according to liberal development, violent inequality, state use of violent means and nurturance, one can conclude that they have not been able to foster a sustainable culture of peace. A comparative analysis of the cases of Pakistan and the TRNC has enabled this study to assess in what ways the two countries were similar or different and why this is the case. While still acknowledging the importance of contextual factors in the fostering of a culture in these ethnic partitions, comparative analysis has allowed one to comprehend the ways in which ethnic partitioning as an independent process has influenced the nature of inter-ethnic relations.

The comparative analysis of the two case studies, based on De Rivera's (2004) dimensions of the UN Declaration, has illuminated the significant role of violence, exclusion, intolerance and blame in ethnic partitioning. The violent processes aimed at homogenising the territories have created irreversible problems for all parties involved and have merely institutionalised the root

causes of their ethnic conflicts. In addition, the process of ethnic partitioning in the cases of Pakistan and the TRNC has created new points of contention and hostility both internationally and internally, most notably regarding territory and the distribution of resources. Rather than fostering a secure environment free of the pressures of the security dilemma, ethnic partitioning has merely transformed previously internal fears into international fears. The two nations have become more militarised and sceptical of one another because the very nature of an ethnic partition rests on the rejection of conflict resolution, an embrace of intolerance and discrimination and the success of violence. The two nations may have experienced periods of non-violence reflecting a negative peace, but have failed to foster the necessary components of positive peace and conflict resolution.

The two case studies demonstrate the failings of ethnic partitioning as a method of conflict resolution, and have implications for various fields of literature, which will be discussed in the final chapter of this study. The final chapter will provide a brief review of the research question posed in the first chapter and a summary of how the findings of a comparative analysis of two case studies have aided in answering this question. In doing so, links can be made between the findings of this study and the main concepts and themes discussed in Chapter 2. Finally, Chapter 5 will discuss how this study has contributed to the field of conflict resolution and possible recommendations for further research in this field.

Chapter 5: Conclusions and Significance

5.1 Introduction

This study has addressed the question of whether ethnic partitioning as a method of conflict resolution is able to foster a sustainable culture of peace. The question is important to contemporary peace and conflict studies as it relates to the contemporary literature surrounding conflict resolution and the sustainability of peace. The forthcoming chapter will be divided into four more sections, where the first will briefly discuss the importance of this question to peace and conflict studies, as well as the observed gaps in the literature. In doing so, it will reiterate why a comparative analysis of two case studies constituted the preferred method for answering this question, and, more specifically, why the UN's Declaration was the required tool of analysis. The second section will provide a summary of the main findings in Chapter 4, and the third section will discuss the implications of these findings in relation to the aforementioned theoretical debates. In so doing, the third section will demonstrate the disconnect between the regular consequences of an ethnic partition, as exemplified by the cultures of Pakistan and the TRNC, and the necessary values of conflict resolution as discussed in Chapter 2. Conclusively, this third section will explain how the findings of this study prove that future conflict resolution is made unlikely by the process of ethnic partitioning, since no culture of peace could be fostered. The fourth and final section will reference the remaining gaps in peace and conflict literature, providing recommendations for future research.

5.2 Theoretical framework and analytical tool

Conflict resolution encompasses an understanding of conflict that is more flexible and optimistic than the understandings of past scholarship. Following the two World Wars, conflict is no longer regarded as a permanent phenomenon that can only be managed, as was assumed in the dominant Realist literature, but rather as a phenomenon that can be overcome through the embrace of certain cultures, values and processes. As the literature on conflict resolution began to grow, social scientists became more aware of the importance of inclusivity, respect for human differences, cooperation, reconciliation and non-violence in post-conflict environments. The UN recognised that a society that has embraced these values would have successfully fostered a

culture of peace and can be regarded as a successful method of conflict resolution. Methods of post-conflict governance that had once been regarded as suitable for conflict management were now to be reexamined in light of the theoretical developments associated with conflict resolution and peace. The methods were no longer assessed by whether or not they could prevent the outbreak of violence in the short-term, which is regarded as negative peace, but how they guarantee the sustainability of this prevention through the normalisation of conflict resolution values and strategies, often regarded as positive peace.

Ethnic partition has been appreciated for its ability to establish negative peace in a region through the physical separation of conflicting ethnic groups. The practice, and the associated processes involved in actively homogenising the newly sovereign territory, entail that the ethnic groups no longer felt threatened by one another's existence. The logic of ethnic partitioning is based on the reasoning that ethnic conflicts can become so intractable and the security dilemma so complex that there is no other option but to physically separate the groups. The minority ethnic groups of India and Cyprus utilised the same logic in advancing their cause of establishing their own respective homelands. The Muslim minorities of a pre-1947 India, as well as the Turkish Cypriot minorities of a pre-1963 Cyprus, were mobilised by the vision of a homogenous, secure homeland free from the oppression of the respective Hindu and Greek Cypriot majorities. The narrative preceding the establishments of the two nations was that the only method of guaranteeing the cultural preservation of an ethnic minority is for an ethnically pure community to be represented by an ethnically pure governing body.

The logic of ethnic partitions, such as Pakistan and the TRNC, which is appreciated for its ability to manage conflict and establish negative peace, must be reexamined in light of the recent developments in peace and conflict literature. Ethnic partitioning must be assessed as a method of conflict resolution as opposed to a method of conflict management and, thus, as a method that is able to foster a culture of peace. In this effort, a researcher must utilise an analytical tool that assesses whether the nation is able to prevent incidences of violence, and whether it is able to foster values conducive to positive peace. The UN's "Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace" (1999), and more specifically De Rivera's (2004) summary of this Declaration, has provided such a tool. The Declaration allowed for an assessment of ethnic

partitioning's post-conflict environment as it related to liberal development, violent inequality, state use of violent means, and nurturance. Through the exploration of these dimensions, one can draw conclusions about the success of ethnic partitioning as method of conflict resolution from multiple perspectives and levels. In addition, by comparing the cases of Pakistan and the TRNC on the basis of these dimensions, one can ascertain how ethnic partitioning as an independent process influences negative and positive peace. Having analysed the contextual influences of peace across all four dimensions, the comparative analysis has drawn conclusions about the link between ethnic partitioning and a culture of peace that applies across distinctive circumstances. The multi-dimensional components of the UN's Declaration were fundamental for this study as they are based on a contemporary understanding of peace and conflict resolution. In addition, this tool needed to be applied to two case studies as it allowed for contextual factors to be understood as separate from the forces of ethnic partitioning.

The previous chapter has demonstrated that the homelands envisioned by the advocates of ethnic partitioning are unable to achieve their desired results in reality. By comparing the cases of Pakistan and the TRNC according to the United Nations' "Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace" (1999), this study has highlighted the flaws of ethnic partitioning as a method of conflict resolution. Throughout the comparative case study analysis, one is able to gauge that the ethnic partitions have been incapable of embracing the values of conflict resolution and, in turn, have made the possibility of fostering a sustainable culture of peace, incorporating both negative and positive peace characteristics, unlikely.

5.3 Summary of main findings

This study analysed how Pakistan and the TRNC are similar and distinct in reference to their liberal development, violent inequality, state use of violent means, and nurturance. The comparative analysis found commonalities between the two cultures regarding the roles of exclusion, violence, intolerance and blame, all of which can be linked to the processes of ethnic partitioning. In terms of the first dimension of a culture of peace labelled liberal development, and its democratic, economic and social components, this study found that both Pakistan and the TRNC had become reliant on the military for creating unity amongst its citizens, and deterring their neighbouring enemies from any

future acts of violence. This dependence had costs for the development of their respective economies and societies in general, as the fear for their survival became their primary focus. Economic resources were being drained by the nations as each attempted to secure the maintenance of their military and foreign assistance became a tool for guaranteeing this security. As such, social development became a concern that could not be adequately addressed, thus contributing to the low HDI and GCI scores. Without this liberal development, a culture of peace cannot be sustained, since dependency and militarisation are factors that stunt the prospects of those who sought peaceful independence.

The second dimension of a culture of peace that was analysed, violent inequality, found that the nations have institutionalised inequality by favouring one ethnic group above any others, even if favouritism negatively influences other legitimate citizens. Although both nations were established on a vision of a state that is based on justice and fairness, the processes of Punjabisation in Pakistan and Turkification in the TRNC fostered a culture in direct contrast to this vision. The processes of Punjabisation in Pakistan, favouring the Punjabi Urdu-speaking community, and Turkification in the TRNC, favouring the mainland Turks, aimed to allow the previously disadvantaged minority groups the ability secure their legitimacy as newly independent, mono-ethnic states. In reality, this assessment concluded that the processes aimed to unite the citizens only lead to the retaliation of those who have been excluded the right to participate in the newly established ethnic partitions. The legitimacy of the newly homogenised nation, being founded on exclusionary and discriminatory principles, was to be questioned in the decades that followed, thus impeding their ability to foster cultures of peace.

The third dimension of a culture of peace is state use of violent means, and this study found that the two cases, rather than implementing methods of conflict resolution to settle ongoing conflicts, would rely on threats and acts of violence. While the value of ethnic partitioning lies in its ability to solve the heightened security dilemma intensified by ethnic conflict by separating the conflicting groups, the findings of this study suggest the exact opposite. Pakistan and the TRNC relied on their military capabilities to protect their sovereignty as a homogenous ethnic partition and throughout the decades, the leaders of the nations were convinced that a threat of military violence was the only means of ensuring the realisation of their interests. The more violence was encouraged and used against their

respective enemies, the more the enemy acts in violent retaliation, which ultimately increases distrust and fear between the two rivals. This cycle of retaliation, revenge and self-fulfilling prophecies would create more points of contention between the rivals and make peace in the respective regions unlikely and arguably impossible. The cycle of retaliation was the result of a general neglect for the root cause of the original rivalry and an acceptance of rivalry with one's neighbour as a permanent political status quo. Pakistan and the TRNC not only accepted violence as a means of conflict management, but also encouraged it on all levels of society and political affairs. Rather than deescalating the security dilemma, ethnic partitioning has merely transformed an internal conflict into an international phenomenon.

Having assessed the fourth and final dimension of a culture of peace labelled nurturance, this study found that Pakistan and the TRNC have not fostered the necessary values of empathy, compassion and solidarity that have bearing on gender equality, education and refugee integration. The two nations have witnessed a degree of female empowerment in their years of independence, however, gender equality matters have been largely neglected in state affairs due to the heightened focus on national security. Both states have significantly more men in powerful positions than women, and women are still expected to support the men rather than work alongside them. In terms of education, Pakistan and the TRNC have comparatively below-standard education systems and do not use education as a tool for equipping the youth with knowledge and skills relating to conflict resolution. The school curricula of the two cases have, instead, focused on emphasising the differences between their "superior" ethnic group and the "barbaric" rivalled ethnic group, as well as teaching the students that this rival was solely to blame for the ethnic conflict that preceded the ethnic partitioning of the once unified territory. Finally, the analysis of nurturance in the two case studies found that even though the refugees accepted into these ethnic partitions were embraced by the administrative authorities, they were favoured much to the dissatisfaction of the native populations. Thus, even though the two cases sought to unite their citizenry, they were unable to foster a culture of solidarity and tolerance that is necessary for a culture of peace.

5.4 Implications of findings

The findings of this study have demonstrated that ethnic partitioning as a mode of conflict resolution has failed to foster a culture of peace in Pakistan and the TRNC. Instead, ethnic partitioning has led to limited liberal development, institutionalised violent inequality, increased use of violent means by the state and the inability to nurture values associated with empathy, compassion and female empowerment. As the values of conflict resolution referenced in Chapter 2 are disregarded, ethnic partitioning increases the likelihood of violent conflict in the future and cannot, thus, be regarded as a method of conflict management nor conflict resolution. A multi-dimensional assessment of the ethnic partitions of Pakistan and the TRNC has proved the validity of the arguments advanced by critics of ethnic partitioning, also outlined in Chapter 2. This next section will outline the links that can be made between the findings of this study; the neglect of the values of conflict resolution; and the general critiques of ethnic partitioning. In doing so, it will illustrate the significance of this study, as well as the methodology that has been utilised, in contributing to the ongoing debates in peace and conflict studies.

Conflict resolution can only be achieved when a society has embraced equity and belief in a shared community, as well as a generalised respect for human differences. A society must appreciate human individuality and foster a culture of inclusion whereby all citizens are granted equal opportunities. The findings of this study indicate that these values and norms have not been embraced by the ethnic partitions of Pakistan and the TRNC. Instead, the nations have developed a culture of exclusion, where certain members of the society are granted more rights than others. Those who do not form part of the ethnic partition's vision of homogeneity are denied the political, economic, and social capacity to advance their interests and, as a result, the ethnic partition has no intention of developing institutions that facilitate cooperation and negotiation. The role of exclusion in ethnic partitions has been incorporated into various critiques of ethnic partitioning as a theory. As Chapter 2 has explained, various critics have argued that ethnic partitions are founded on values that stand in direct contrast to those of peace as actions of exclusivity come to frame the functioning of the nation. As predicted, by rejecting the values of inclusivity and cooperation, conflict is more likely to arise in the future, as those who are excluded in state affairs are inclined to retaliate against the legitimacy of the newly established nation.

Conflict resolution also necessitates a society rejecting the use of violence and rather encourage reconciliation and justice, through cooperative mechanisms such as negotiation and compromise. Throughout the study of Pakistan and the TRNC, violence has played a key role in all state affairs beginning with the process of ethnic cleansing. Both Muslims and Turkish Cypriots in these respective contexts felt that in order to realise their right to self-determination and autonomy, violence would be the most effective means. Having gained success from their violent rebellion against the rule of their rival, the newly formed state, as well as the citizens it was to represent, recognised the power of violence in achieving their desired goals. Even in school curricula, historic acts of aggression were validated, as they allowed for their previously victimised community to mobilise in defiance against the enemy Other. The youth of Pakistan and the TRNC were made aware that violence and the development of a strong military have historically been the most effective political tools in settling disputes. Encouraging acts of violence has been cautioned by critics of ethnic partitioning when they argue that the violence encouraged by ethnic partitioning can become ingrained in a society based on ethnic partition, ultimately sabotaging the fostering of a culture of peace. While this study does recognise that there has not been an all-out war between India and Pakistan and between the Republic of Cyprus and the TRNC, this does not necessarily imply that they are managing their respective conflicts successfully, as a lack of war does not constitute peace. The normalisation of aggression can be detrimental to the harmony of the newly established nation as any governmental decision can be overcome by violent retaliation.

Another major component of conflict resolution is trust, both in terms of an internal trust in the governing political institutions and the government trust in those with whom it had clashed. Trust is also a crucial factor in reducing the intensity of the security dilemma, as actors that do not fear one another are able to cooperate more freely and effectively. This study found that while ethnic partitioning is championed for its ability to decrease the security dilemma, ethnic partitioning is able to transform a once internal security dilemma between ethnic groups into an international phenomenon. As in the case of Pakistan and the TRNC, the new partitions rely on the narrative that coexistence with the enemy is an impossibility, and that the establishment of an independent state is necessary. Through this narrative, the legitimacy of the ethnic partition relies on demonising the Other and victimising one's own ethnic group. Distrust becomes a political tool and is utilised during hostile periods to unite the citizenry. Through the continuous provocation of fear and distrust, the

security dilemma can never be overcome. The failure of ethnic partitioning in reducing the intensity of the security dilemma is an argument that largely dominates the critical literature on ethnic partitioning. As explained in Chapter 2, critics often argue that ethnic partitioning creates an international security dilemma that increases the likelihood of conflict between ethnic groups. As advanced by the critics of ethnic partitioning, the root cause of the ethnic conflict are neglected in favour of physical separation, thereby allowing for the possibility of future conflicts stemming from the same points of contention and fear to arise.

By linking values of conflict resolution to the reality of ethnic partitioning, this study has contributed to the ongoing debate regarding post-conflict modes of governance and their relevance in the 21st century. Previous critiques of ethnic partitioning have centered on the inability of ethnic partitioning to prevent future incidences of conflict, or more specifically, the inability to achieve negative peace. Such a critique centers around the claim that ethnic partitioning cannot be regarded as a method of conflict management. By utilising De Rivera's (2004) summary of the UN's Declaration as a tool of analysis, this study has provided a new perspective on ethnic partitioning as a method of conflict resolution. The tool of analysis has allowed an assessment based on indicators of negative as well as positive peace, essentially adding a cultural dimension to the assessment. In so doing, this multi-dimensional approach has aided a rounded discussion as to why and how ethnic partitioning fails to embrace the necessary values of conflict resolution and the implications of this for sustainable peace.

5.5 Recommendations for future research

This study has allowed for a multi-dimensional assessment of ethnic partitioning in the cases of Pakistan and the TRNC and has reached conclusions regarding the failure of these methods to foster cultures of peace. While this study has contributed to the gap in the literature regarding ethnic partitioning and sustainable positive peace, there remains several topics that have been overlooked or have simply not yet been investigated in this same field of study.

The utilisation of the UN's Declaration (1999), or more specifically De Rivera's (2004) summary of this Declaration, has allowed for a multi-dimensional assessment of Pakistan and the TRNC. Future researchers would benefit from this tool of analysis in their assessments, as it is

able to study societies from multiple dimensions, levels and disciplines. In addition, the indicators for a culture of peace in each dimension is provided by both the Declaration and De Rivera (2004), allowing for a reliable and thorough tool of analysis. The analytical tool would be useful in studying other cases of ethnic partitioning, such as those of Northern Ireland or Bosnia and Herzegovina. As more studies are conducted on areas that have undergone ethnic partitioning, a clearer understanding of ethnic partitioning as an independent phenomenon would be achieved. The analytical tool could also be of use to researchers aiming to assess methods of conflict resolution other than ethnic partitioning, where, for example, consociational democracy is often established to achieve conflict resolution, albeit from a more inclusive standpoint than ethnic partitioning.

A future researcher could also utilise a variety of possible research designs to extend the literature linking methods of conflict resolution to sustainable cultures of peace. Possible research designs include an action research design, as defined and explained in Coghlan & Brydon-Miller (2014), or a cohort research design, as defined and explained in Healy & Devane (2011). An action research design, whereby exploratory research leads to the development of strategy aimed at practical intervention, would bridge the gap between studying in what ways and why a society fails to foster a culture of peace rooted in conflict resolution values and how to foster these values in the future. In doing so, outdated methods of post-conflict modes of governance can be reworked in accordance with the developments made in the 21st century peace and conflict studies. This study could be more case specific than the comparative analysis utilised in this study, ultimately allowing for a more thorough assessment on the requirements of a given society. Another option is for a study to assess the effectiveness of a method of conflict resolution through a cohort research design as this design incorporates a quantitative framework when observing members of a population and their responses to a particular environment over a period of time. These two research designs could contribute to the literature regarding methods of conflict resolution and peace sustainability by testing and observing how a post-conflict population can foster values associated with conflict resolution.

Another recommendation for future research is to study ethnic partitioning through a variety of theoretical lenses. This present study assessed the success of ethnic partitioning as a method of

conflict resolution, thus utilising conflict resolution as a theoretical framework. Future research could assess ethnic partitioning through a different theoretical lens including, for example, ethnic partitioning as a method cultural preservation. Cultural preservation has been mentioned throughout the findings section of this thesis, thereby warranting a separate discussion. If one were to assess the success of ethnic partitioning as a method of securing the survival of an ethnic identity, the results might illuminate a new perspective and appreciation of ethnic partitioning outside of its relationship with conflict resolution and a culture of peace.

In conclusion, this study has linked conflict resolution as a theoretical framework with ethnic partitioning, and has studied this link by utilising the UN's "Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace" as an analytical tool. One can attribute the significance of this study to its ability to study peace from a multi-dimensional perspective, in accordance with the developments made in the field of peace and conflict studies. Sustainable peace is made more likely as more methods previously founded on Realist conflict management assumptions, such as ethnic partitioning in this particular study, are reexamined in light of the contemporary conflict resolution approaches. One must acknowledge the importance of studying a society on the basis of their ability to foster both positive and negative peace, as this multi-dimensional interpretation could illuminate factors that have been overlooked in the past. The aim of this study has been to provide a new perspective on debates that have been on-going for centuries, in the hope that these findings will ballast future discourse.

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